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Abstract 
In the 21st century, law-enforcement, military, border patrol, and private companies all use a 
wide variety of surveillance equipment that is tailored to their specific needs.  This equipment is 
expensive, typically requires an enormous capital investment, and often fails to live up to 
expectations; there must be a better way.  The primary objective of this thesis is to conceptualize 
a new and more capable surveillance system, dubbed the Portable Sensor Network (PSN), which 
can either augment or entirely replace existing systems.  The core concept of the PSN demands 
that it must affordable, portable, modular, and based on existing, commercially available 
technology.  To achieve this goal a four step methodology has been developed: analysis of 
customer’s needs, analysis of the capabilities and features of existing systems, development of 
the PSN based on that analyses, and finally, analysis of the fully developed PSN’s effectiveness 
via analytical methods borrowed from the field of intelligence analysis.  By the end of this thesis, 
it should be clear to the reader which surveillance system(s) are most effective in a given 
scenario and how the PSN can augment or replace that system(s).    
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Introduction 
Background 
Various electronic sensors have been utilized for decades in surveillance systems designed to 
provide intrusion detection for everything from national borders to prison walls.  Modern 
surveillance systems are required to provide border intelligence for three classes of geographic 
regions: geopolitical borders, localities (e.g., cities, ports, small islands, etc.) under strict military 
or police observation (perhaps even quarantine), and fixed installations (e.g., power plants, 
military bases, airports, etc.).  While these systems have evolved significantly from their original 
incarnation, they have been proven insufficient to cope with the 21st century threats facing the 
United States at home and abroad.  The failure of the U.S. to secure neither the U.S.-Mexico 
border nor the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are two of the most egregious and well-known 
failures to successfully implement an affordable system to monitor geopolitical borders.   
One of the biggest problems facing those whose task it is to address the problem of insufficient 
surveillance is cost.  The cost of a surveillance system can be broken down into four categories: 
development, procurement, operational, and maintenance.  In the case of the U.S. – Mexico and 
Afghanistan – Pakistan borders, the cost of border surveillance has been a topic of great debate.  
Successful monitoring of the U.S.-Mexico border is an essential step in reducing the flow of 
illegal narcotics and undocumented immigrants into the U.S; a task which has required enormous 
capital investments.  Unfortunately the border is still insecure despite the fact that the U.S. has 
invested billions of dollars into new technology, technology that has been augmented by a two 
fold increase in the number  of border patrol agents (since 2004) and deployment of 1,200 
National Guard troops along the border.12  With respect to the surveillance needs of the U.S. – 
                                                            
1
 “Napolitano Cancels Virtual Border Fence Project, Proposes Alternative.” Fox News, January 14, 2011. 
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Mexico border, the problem is both a lack of funding and the allocation of that funding.  One 
such example is the choice made by the DHS to fund the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)3, a multi-
billion dollar program that was cancelled in 2011 because it both ran over budget and failed to 
live to live up to expectations.   
Attempts to properly monitor the Afghanistan – Pakistan border have had failures not unlike 
those encountered by DHS.  Here to the problem is not a lack of funding, it is how that funding 
has and continues to be appropriated.  Given these facts, the question becomes: how should 
current funding be allocated so that it both maximizes effectiveness and reduces cost?  Secretary 
Janet Napolitano addressed this question in January of 2011.  The following statement was made 
by the Secretary elaborating as to why DHS cancelled the SBI in favor of a less expensive 
program known as the Alternative SBI4: 
"There is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution to meet our border 
technology needs, and this new strategy is tailored to the unique 
needs of each border region, providing faster deployment of 
technology, better coverage, and a more effective balance between 
cost and capability."5   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Farley, R. (2011). Obama Says Border Patrol Has Doubled the Number of Agents Since 2004. Politifactcheck.com, 
May 2011. 
2
 According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, the Southwest Border remains the primary gateway for moving 
illicit drugs into the United States.  This is estimated to be between a $50 and $60 billion business that relies on 
smuggling in two directions: immigrants and narcotics are smuggled into the U.S. while drug money, weapons, and 
ammunition are smuggled out.  
Molzahn, Rios, and David A. Shirk. Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011. University of San 
Diego, Trans-Border Institute: Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies. 
3
 SBInet Program: Program-Specific Recovery Act Plan. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection, May 15, 2009  
4
 Zuckerman, Jessica. “The 2013 Homeland Security Budget: Misplaced Priorities.” The Heritage Foundation, 
March 23, 2012. 
5
 “Napolitano Cancels Virtual Border Fence Project, Proposes Alternative.” Fox News, January 14, 2011. 
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Secretary Napolitano’s statement reflects DHS’s new approach to border security, an approach 
that is the antithesis of the one embodied by the original SBI.  This approach calls for the 
recalculation of available funds towards programs that provide faster deployment of technology, 
better coverage, and achieve a more effective balance between cost and capability.   To date, this 
plan has proven a more effective use of resources than was achieved under the prior initiative.  
Despite this success, there is room for further optimization, optimization that challenges the 
Secretary’s statement that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution.  There may not be a one-size-
fits-all system, but there may very well be a one-size-fits-all solution – a solution that not only 
addresses the surveillance problems of DHS but those of other organizations as well.   
Foundation of the Solution 
The solution to the problem posed by over-budget and insufficient surveillance systems is three-
fold.  First, the solution, or asset(s) implemented, must be budget friendly.  Any economist will 
tell you that, all things being equal, as the production of a given product increases the cost to 
produce that product decreases.  In this case, the product that is being considered is surveillance 
equipment designed to monitor geopolitical borders.  As the production of a single surveillance 
product increases, its cost decreases.  The problem with the SBI is that the technology being 
produced was in the form of large and very expensive installations that contained the latest 
technology available such as advanced, long-range radar.6  Development and research cost 
remain the same regardless of how many assets are purchased, a cost that is shared in the per unit 
price of the final asset.  As the number of assets produced decreases the development and 
research cost shared by each of those assets increases, driving up the final price of each (e.g., the 
                                                            
6
 SBInet Program: Program-Specific Recovery Act Plan. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection, May 15, 2009   
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B-2, F-22, and DDG-1000 programs)7.  No matter how many of these ‘products’ DHS purchases 
they will always remain relatively expensive.  An alternative to this approach is investing in 
smaller hardware that can be mass produced, a concept DHS has begun to adopt with the 
implementation of the alternative SBI.   With that in mind, the alternative SBI is based around 
the acquisition of hundreds of surveillance assets as opposed to only a dozen.  Though a step 
forward, there is room to take this concept even further.   In place of adopting assets produced by 
the hundreds, DHS could invest in the acquisition of less expensive assets numbering in the 
thousands, thereby reducing the per-unit (and total program) costs that much more.  This 
however is not the only way to reduce costs. 
In an effort to further reduce the costs, any new surveillance assets employed should be 
developed in such a way that they appeal to a wide variety of organizations.  As the number of 
organizations interested in a new asset increase the capital investment required by a single 
organization to develop that asset decreases.  Unfortunately, achieving this is no small task.  
Doing so requires the development of an asset that is the solution to a problem shared by every 
organization for which the asset, or solution, is intended to appeal.  This is a difficult task given 
the organizations covered in this thesis: DHS, the owners of critical infrastructure, and the 
military.  Nonetheless a problem has been found, the identification of items of interest (IOI).   
The second part of the solution relates to the actual design of the asset(s) itself.  DHS’s decision 
to invest, via the implementation of the alternative SBI program, in surveillance assets that use 
off the shelf technology was a step in the right direction but one that, as was the case with the 
acquisition of new assets, can be taken even further.  It is one thing to use off-the-shelf 
technology, it is another thing entirely to use 100%, commercially available components, the 
                                                            
7
 “Planned stealth destroyer could underpin U.S. Navy’s China strategy.” Fox News, June 4, 2012. 
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type of components marketed to every day citizens.  The more these types of components are 
used, the greater the savings.  The potential savings may be so great and the development cost so 
low that private companies take it upon themselves to develop the asset without first being 
contacted by customers to do so.8  Another advantage of using off-the-shelf components is that it 
reduces the time required to go from concept to production.  While it may take additional time to 
implement these assets, doing so can be reduced if the contractor used to develop and produce 
them is the same contractor responsible for the production and development of existing assets.  
The third and final part of the solution proposed addresses the inability of existing surveillance 
systems to identify IOIs.  The three key components to surveillance are detection, identification, 
and tracking of IOIs.  Nearly all surveillance systems are designed to detect and track IOI’s, but 
very few have the capability to identify them.  Even fewer have the capability to distinguish 
between objects of the same class (e.g., a pleasure craft vs. a smuggler’s go fast boat, a narcotics 
smuggler vs. an illegal immigrant, etc.).  If an asset can be developed that addresses this problem 
it has the potential to replace or augment existing surveillance systems in service with all three 
organizations.  This asset is the Portable Sensor Network (PSN). 
In addition to addressing the above deficits, the core concept of the PSN requires it to be 
portable, modular, upgradable, and reusable.  Although these requirements place additional 
restrictions on the final design of the PSN, those restrictions are nowhere near as restrictive as 
the final and most difficult requirement: the design of the PSN must be original.  Original means 
just that, a system that, to the best of anyone’s knowledge (the knowledge possessed by 
individuals whose domain is surveillance equipment, not your average bystander), has never 
                                                            
8
 Reference showing when this has happened in the past. 
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been designed.  The PSN cannot simply imitate the design of current systems by either 
improving the capabilities of those systems or reducing the cost of acquiring them.    
Methodology 
The PSN is a fully integrated, portable, modular, upgradable, rapidly deployable, and 
inexpensive sensor system that fulfills the needs expressed in the preceding paragraph.  The 
primary objective of this thesis is to conceptualize a new and more capable surveillance system, 
dubbed the Portable Sensor Network, which can either augment or entirely replace existing 
systems.  A four step process has been developed to accomplish this objective:  analysis into 
whether or not demand for the PSN exist (or a surveillance system similar to it), development of 
a working concept off of which a tangible product can be modeled, analysis of the proposed 
system’s performance against existing ones, and to provide proof of concept by actually 
constructing one of the sensors the PSN would employs.  This four step process is the 
methodology on which this thesis is based.  If successful, it should be clear to the reader which 
surveillance system(s) are most effective in a given scenario and how the PSN can augment or 
replace that system(s).  The first step towards achieving this task is to determine to whether or 
not and to what extent demand for the PSN exist.  Demand, in this case, is the main discourse of 
the first two chapters.    
Summary Introduction to Each Chapter 
Each of the chapters in this thesis is part of the four step process described in the previous 
paragraph.  The following is an introduction to these chapters and how each of them contribute 
to the overall methodology.   
 
7 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Surveillance Demands in the 21st Century  
In Chapter 1, surveillance demands are broken down by the three organizations analyzed in this 
thesis.  Each organization has its own subchapter which itself is broken down into four sections: 
review, criteria/condition, summary, and mission/scenario table.  The majority of the material 
presented in each subchapter is done so in the review.  The review section contains information 
detailing the background and various missions each organization performs.  This information is 
broken down according to the type of surveillance, offensive or defensive, and the specific 
missions performed within each surveillance type.  Following the review is list of each 
organization’s criteria and condition.  Criteria and condition are gathered based on an analysis of 
the review.  Criteria determine what capabilities an organization must possess in order to fulfill 
its mission.  Condition is the actual ability that organization possesses.  The criteria examined in 
this chapter came from several sources, including:  legislation, contracts, white papers, and 
criteria based on a stated objective (e.g., a public affairs statement regarding the goals of an 
organization). As part of this examination a gap analyses is performed.  This analysis assesses 
the gap, if any, that exist between an organization’s surveillance capabilities and their designated 
criteria.  Both this gap and the criteria from which it is derived are crucial details to consider 
when determining whether or not the PSN is a viable solution for the needs of a given 
organization.  Immediately following the criteria and condition list is a summary.  This primary 
purpose of this summary is to create an abridged list of an organization’s criteria that includes 
mention of what criteria on that list is not satisfied by that organization’s current surveillance 
system(s).  Following the summary is a scenario specific requirements table.   
This table takes the information obtained in the review of an organization and translates it into a 
table that quantifies that organization’s surveillance demands.  These demands are quantified 
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according to the different surveillance missions performed by an organization and the conditions 
under which those missions are performed.  At the end of the chapter, the data contained in each 
organization’s table is assembled into a master one.  The master table serves as a reference for 
determining the needs of one organization versus the needs of another.  It also highlights the 
specific surveillance needs according to external variables such as terrain and climate.  
Ultimately, this information is analyzed with respect to a similar table located at the end of 
Chapter 2.   
Chapter 2: Analysis Existing and Proposed Surveillance Systems 
Once it can be determined what customers want and need in a surveillance system attention is 
turned towards existing and emerging surveillance systems against which the PSN would 
compete.  Chapter 2 of this thesis does just that, it analyzes the features and capabilities of 
existing and emerging surveillance systems.  All of the major existing surveillance systems, 
particularly those in wide spread use by U.S. organizations, are analyzed to determine their key 
features, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and operators (organizations).  This data is then 
compiled at the end of each surveillance system’s analysis as an abridged summary.  Following 
each system’s summary is a table similar to those constructed in Chapter 1, and like Chapter 1, a 
master table is created from them and placed at the end of the chapter.  This table assists in 
determining what features the PSN must possess to be competitive with existing systems and 
what shortcomings those systems have that the PSN can address.  It is crucial that this analysis 
yield useful data that can be applied to the development of the PSN if it is ever going to be 
viewed as a viable alternative or augmentation to existing, already proven hardware.   Moreover, 
this table helps to assess what features existing systems possess that are transferrable to clientele 
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who have yet to take advantage of them.  With this information in hand the development of a 
better and more capable system can proceed. 
Chapter 3: Conceptualizing a Better System 
The major objective of Chapter 3 is to analyze the tables constructed in the first two chapters.  
Analysis of these tables is performed to determine what surveillance system(s) are best suited to 
fulfill the scenario specific surveillance demands of an organization on a mission by mission 
basis.  This analysis also highlights scenarios in which two or more organizations have 
overlapping surveillance demands.  Knowing this information helps to determine what 
components (certain capabilities are directly related to the components installed, others are not) 
of the PSN should have a modular design.  Taking this approach enables the development of a 
system whose variants share the maximum number of unique components, reducing overall cost 
of each PSN unit.  Next, analysis of the tables from Chapters 1 and 2 is conducted to reveal 
which scenario-specific missions have surveillance demands that have not been satisfied by 
existing surveillance systems.   
Following this analysis the tactics and operational use of existing surveillance systems are 
examined on a scenario by scenario basis.  Understanding how an organization employs their 
surveillance systems and the contribution those systems have with respect to that organization’s 
broader mission is crucial to the development of the PSN. This examination makes use of the 
Scenario-Specific Optimization Asset (SOSA).  SOSA is used, in this chapter, to generate some 
of the images used to illustrate specific scenarios and the organization-specific tactics used in 
them.    
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Chapter 4: Design of the Portable Sensor Network 
Chapter 4 begins with a quick review of the analysis and examination conducted in chapter 3.  
This information is then applied to the requirements imposed on the design of the PSN (e.g., 
portable, modular, cheap, original, etc.).  This examination and all of the research conducted 
prior to it is taken and used to create a preliminary design for the PSN.  This design is the 
product of multiple, unsuccessful versions of the PSN that preceded it.  For that reason, the 
design history of the PSN is discussed prior to introducing the final design itself.  Using this 
approach explains how and why the final design came in to being, an excellent method of 
introducing the final designs itself.    
Next, the various features of the PSN are discussed.  While many, but not all, of these features 
are taken from the table at the beginning of the chapter, the discussion of them in this section is 
in greater detail and in the context of their specific application to the PSN.   There are however 
some features and capabilities that require further elaboration.  These features and capabilities, 
due to their originality, will no doubt be scrutinized more than those which are already 
considered to be proven technologies.  As a result, they are explained in greater detail than those 
covered earlier in the chapter.  At the conclusion of this chapter the actual design of each variant 
of the PSN can begin. 
Chapter 5: Variants and Deployment of the PSN 
The preliminary design, features, and scenario-specific use of the PSN is used in this chapter to 
determine how many versions of the PSN are required and what features those versions require.  
This information is then taken and used to determine the approximate cost of each version.  Next, 
the individual variants are deployed in mock scenarios.  This is intended to show how these 
11 
 
 
 
sensors are both deployed, operated, and maintained in the field.    The majority of the mock 
scenarios performed in this chapter will be similar to those from chapter 3.  The only exception is 
that in this chapter the PSN is used in lieu of real-world systems.  The purpose of this is to 
determine whether or not the PSN provides any benefit over existing systems and whether or not 
the capabilities of the PSN can be utilized without modifying the tactics used in those scenarios.  
Any scenario that requires and/or allows for the use of different tactics when the PSN is 
deployed is examined to determine the costs and/or benefits of using those tactics, a task that is 
made much easier via the use of SOSA.  Although SOSA is used to generate illustrations similar 
to those in chapter 3, it is used to its full extent in this chapter to both compare different systems 
and optimize the placement of them. 
Chapter 6: Analysis of the Proposed System 
Once the operation of each sensor system has been established an analysis of each variant of the 
PSN is conducted.  These analyses compare the PSN against existing sensor systems as well as 
judge its ability to handle various scenarios which it may encounter (scenarios derived from 
historical precedence and those which are entirely hypothetical).   
 
Figure I.1: Methodology behind the development of the PSN 
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It is important to acknowledge that the process outlined by the steps in the methodology above is 
an active one.  For example, if analysis conducted in chapter 5 reveals a weakness in the 
operation of the PSN, that weakness will be addressed, if possible, by rethinking the design and 
operation of a specific sensor, component, or sub-component.  The overall methodology and the 
active process of break analysis that supports it is summarized in Figure I.1. 
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Chapter 1: Surveillance Demands in the 21st Century 
Condition and Criteria 
The surveillance demands of any given organization can be determined from three sources: those 
that are explicitly stated by that organization or any organizations to which it is subservient; in-
house and third party audits of an organization that reveal gaps in that organization’s surveillance 
capabilities; and those needs which can be derived from an organization’s mission statement, 
stated objective, and/or responsibilities. These three sources of an organization’s surveillance 
demands are known as the ‘criteria’.  Criteria are the litmus test against which the surveillance 
capabilities of an organization are judged. 
On its own, criteria is nothing more than a statement of the ideal surveillance capabilities an 
organization possesses.  In the real world the capabilities of an organization rarely meet or 
exceed those expected of it.  The current state of these capabilities is called the ‘condition’, a 
statement of what is.  Condition refers to the total surveillance capability surveillance of an 
organization, not the capability of any single component or system (some organizations have 
multiple surveillance systems, each of which has components of its own).  At this point it is 
important to note that surveillance related condition and criteria are not always explicitly stated 
as surveillance specific.  Any criteria or condition which has a surveillance component or 
depends implicitly upon surveillance is also a possible source of both criteria and condition. 
When condition and criteria are combined they paint a picture that reveals both an organizations 
surveillance demands and where those demands are not met.  The difference between condition 
and criteria is known as the ‘gap’.9  Most criteria are either explicitly stated by an organization or 
                                                            
9
 Note: Condition and criteria are commonly used terms in the auditing process.  The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), the preeminent auditing agency for the U.S. federal government, uses this technique as standard 
procedure when conducting its own audits.  The complete auditing process involves determining the condition, 
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can be derived from that organization’s goals/objectives.  Condition on the other hand is most 
often found in reviews and/or audits of an organization’s surveillance capabilities.  The 
following chapter examines major organizations in the U.S. and abroad that rely on surveillance 
to fulfill their mission.  This examination further breaks down the mission of each organization 
by defining the type of perimeter each of these organization monitors.  Since no formal definition 
of perimeters exist that is common to each, a three tier system has been developed: hard, soft, 
and dynamic.  Hard perimeters are perimeters that have a static outer edge defined by a physical 
barrier (e.g., an Army fort, Air Force base, Naval port, prison, etc.).  Soft perimeters are static 
perimeters which have no physical barriers (i.e., a coast line or geo-political border, small, 
circular forest with ‘private property, do not enter’ signs every 50 ft, etc.).  A dynamic barrier on 
the other hand is more ethereal than its counterparts.   Any surveillance asset serving in support 
of a dynamic barrier must be able to adapt according to the day to day needs of its operators. 
Moreover, dynamic barriers are not really barriers at all; they are more or less regions of 
surveillance that encircle a semi-permanent or newly established installation (e.g., a forward 
operating base, tactical airfield, etc.) 
Due to the variety of surveillance demands that exist across the whole of the whole of the 
organizations covered in this chapter, each sub-chapter is organized according to both the 
aforementioned perimeter but also the type of surveillance (mission type) being performed: 
offensive or defensive. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
criteria, cause, and effect of whatever capability is being audited (in this case surveillance).  In this thesis, the final 
two steps in the audit process are implicit in the analysis of the organizations themselves, not explicitly stated like 
condition and criteria.    
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Defensive Surveillance 
Defensive surveillance applies to surveillance that is conducted for the purpose of detecting 
intruders who approach and/or cross the perimeter of an asset whose perimeters may be protected 
by any one of the three perimeters discussed earlier: hard, soft, and dynamic. The protection of 
these assets is made all the more difficult by the vast array of assets that fall into one of these 
three categories.  This is especially true in the case of military assets.  Consequently, the military 
has a greater number of missions unique to each type of perimeter.  The vast majority of 
missions performed by all three of the organizations reviewed in this chapter are defensive, and 
the majority of those are in the defense of hard borders. 
Offensive Surveillance 
For the purpose of this thesis, offensive surveillance is classified as surveillance conducted to 
gather intelligence not directly linked to the security of a perimeter or installation.  Offensive 
surveillance is not always conducted in support of immediate, offensive military action; it may 
be conducted for the sole purpose of gathering intelligence useful to individuals making key 
decisions related to U.S. national security or foreign policy.   
Following the detailed review of each organization there is summary which lists the major 
criteria and condition(s) of that organization.  Each criteria and condition are broken into two 
parts which are separated by a hyphen.  The first part is the official criteria/condition that more 
often than not surveillance specific, the second describes specifically how that criteria/condition 
relates surveillance.   
In addition to the review and summary there is a surveillance table that quantifies the various 
surveillance needs of an organization.  Depending on the number of unique missions and the 
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number of scenarios per mission, each of which has its own surveillance requirements, an 
organization can have a table with multiple rows, with one mission-scenario combination per 
row.10  There are however thousands of possible combinations per mission.  In an effort to 
reduce the number of rows in the final table (to a manageable number), a maximum of five 
scenarios have been logged per organization.  These five mission-scenario combinations are 
modeled after a real life mission-scenario combination.11  Depending on the scenario, 
surveillance assets currently in use may be declared in the scenario title.  The following list 
contains the name and description of the variables used in these tables to quantify the 
surveillance requirements of each organization’s mission-scenario combination(s)12:  
Scenario Title: The specific title of the scenario. This title is typically named based on the real world 
scenario on which it was modeled. 
Operator: The name of the organization represented in that row’s mission-scenario combination.  This 
field has two parts that are separated by a hyphen.  The first part is the organization or mission itself, the 
second is the parent organization and/or class of organization to which the first belongs (e.g., CBP/DHS, 
Army/Military, Air Force/Military, etc.) 
Surveillance Mission: Indicates whether the surveillance conducted in this row is offensive or defensive 
Objective: Indicates how the surveillance assets are with respect to the broader mission.  Assets 
implemented can be used to deter, detain, overtly survey, or covertly survey IOIs.  
 Preconditions: Not used until chapter 3.  This is a variable similar to scenario title but is only used in 
custom scenarios, and is therefore N/A to the scenarios outlined in this chapter 
                                                            
10
 The number of rows can vary for many reasons.  The first and most obvious reason there may be additional rows 
is because a particular organization has multiple surveillance needs (e.g., multiple offensive and/or defensive 
missions each with their own requirements, etc.).  However, an organization may also have additional rows if 
characteristics within that mission vary based on certain criteria, in which case there are multiple ‘scenarios’ for a 
single mission.  For example, an organization may have defensive requirements based on the type of a perimeter 
used in a particular scenario.  If that same mission has different surveillance requirements when the perimeter is 
changed (e.g., soft to hard) then that scenario will be added to the matrix as a new, independent row. 
11
 For example: if there was a real nuclear power plant needing defensive surveillance, that piece of critical 
infrastructure and the surveillance requirements demanded by it would be translated via the use this rating system 
into a mission-scenario combination. 
12
 Some of the variables listed in this section are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 or 1 to 10.  Each value of a rating has a 
unique description attached to it, a description which varies from variable to variable.  Appendix A has a list that 
describes the meaning behind the values attached to each variable 
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Type of Perimeter: Indicates the type of perimeter surrounding an installation requiring defensive 
surveillance.  The three types of perimeters are hard, soft, and dynamic.  All scenarios with an offensive 
surveillance mission are designated as having a dynamic perimeter  
Perimeter Length: Perimeter length is the length, in meters, of the perimeter requiring surveillance.  In 
the case of a border, the perimeter length is the length of the border needing surveillance.  Some scenarios 
are a microcosm of larger ones.  Scenarios of this type are denoted with an asterix and, if known, the 
length of the actual perimeter  
Required Portability Rating: The portability requirements associated with a specific scenario.  These 
requirements represent the maximum size and weight of surveillance assets that can be used in a 
particular scenario.   These requirements are rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most portable 
Required Setup and Teardown Rating: The time and manpower requirements associated with a 
specific scenario.  These requirements represent the maximum time and manpower allotted to initially 
setup and then later repackage a particular scenario’s surveillance assets.  These requirements are rated on 
a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 requiring the least time and manpower  
Required Endurance: The endurance requirements associated with a specific scenario.  Endurance is 
rated according to the number of days (and fractions of a day) an asset must remain operational without 
service of any kind.  Most scenarios do not require (hence the word must) assets with specific endurance 
requirements since those scenarios take place under conditions where resupply is not an issue (e.g., along 
a border that is frequented by personnel on a daily basis).  Scenarios with no endurance requirements are 
designated N/A 
Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the type of terrain in which a particular scenario takes 
place.  The terrain quantified is only that terrain which falls within the scope of that scenario (e.g., terrain 
beyond a given scenario’s required distance of detection or identification is irrelevant).  This rating varies 
on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the most uneven   
Foliage Rating: Foliage rating is used to describe the type and density of vegetation in which a scenario 
takes place.  Both the type and density of foliage are represented by a single variable.  In addition to 
describing type and density, this rating defines how much the foliage present inhibits the operation of 
surveillance assets.  Foliage is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most surveillance inhibiting 
Required Low Observability Rating: Low observability requirements rating is used to quantify how 
important it is that the surveillance assets used in a particular scenario are and remain covert.  Low 
observability is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most covert 
Required Detection Range of Vehicles13: The distance from the perimeter a vehicle must be detectable 
                                                            
13
 All detection, identification, and tracking requirements are under nighttime conditions.  Although many 
surveillance missions are conducted during the day, the majority of those missions have are conducted both day 
and night.  The rational for choosing nighttime is three-fold.  First, conditions at night are far more stringent than 
during the day (including thermal since nearly all are equipped with daytime optics), any surveillance asset will 
perform equally or better during the day.  Second, it would be much more difficult to rate requirements for both 
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Required Detection Range of Humans: The distance from the perimeter a human must be detectable 
Required Class-Specific Identification Range of Vehicles (see footnote 13 below): The distance from 
the perimeter at which surveillance assets are required to identify vehicles as belonging to a particular 
sub-class (e.g., a car vs. a truck or an ultra-light vs. a Cessna) 
Required Class-Specific Identification Range of Humans: The distance from the perimeter at which 
surveillance assets are required to identify the number of individuals traveling in a single group on foot 
Required Recognition Range: The distance from the perimeter at which surveillance assets are required 
to recognize the intent of a vehicle or human.  A single variable is chosen since it is equally as difficult to 
discern the intent of individuals in a vehicle (e.g., a truck load of illegal immigrants vs. some ranchers in 
their pickup) as it is individuals on foot humans  (e.g., a smuggler versus a terrorist versus an illegal 
immigrant) 
Required Tracking Depth of Detected Vehicles: This distance from the point of detection that 
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant surveillance contact with vehicles.  The vector of this 
distance, or depth, depends on the mission type.  If the mission is defensive surveillance of any kind or 
offensive surveillance of a border, the required tracking depth is oriented with respect to the 
border/perimeter.  If the mission is offensive surveillance of a fixed perimeter, the tracking depth oriented 
with respect to the center of the installation/perimeter being surveyed.  Figures 1.1 through 1.5 at the end 
of this list provide a graphical depiction of these measurements, measurements which apply to all tracking 
variables 
Required Tracking Depth of Detected Humans: This distance from the point of detection that 
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant surveillance contact with humans 
Required Tracking Depth of Class-Specific Vehicles: This distance from the point of identification that 
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant, class-specific contact with vehicles 
Required Tracking Depth of Class-Specific Humans: This distance from the point of identification that 
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant, class-specific contact with humans 
Required Tracking Depth of Recognition for IOIs: This distance from the point of identification that 
surveillance assets are required to maintain constant, recognition contact with IOIs 
Surveillance Budget: The surveillance budget is the total, scenario specific, funding, in U.S. dollars, 
allotted for the acquisition of surveillance assets.  In many cases the surveillance budget will be N/A (the 
scenarios in this chapter are modeled after equipment that is already in place, not equipment up for 
purchase.  This variable is used more extensively in chapter 3 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
day and night.  Finally, it is unlikely that the surveillance requirements for a particular scenario change from day to 
night, only the capabilities of a particular asset. 
 
All detection and identification ranges, in meters, are positive if the range is outside the perimeter, negative if inside. 
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Important notes regarding the variables above: 
Later in this thesis the detection, identification, and tracking variables are all graphed.  The large 
number of them makes it very difficult to both first create and afterwards view a graph that large 
(particularly since those variables apply to individual surveillance assets as well).  To make the 
graphing of data used in this and later chapters easier to handle, the required detection range of 
humans and the required class-specific identification range of vehicles are given the same value.  
Similarly, the class-specific identification range of humans and the recognition range of IOI have 
been combine into single table as well.  For the purposes of the table below, the table at the end 
of this chapter, and all graphs created in this thesis, the two combination variables described 
above are named ‘Required Range of Vehicle Human Detection’ and ‘Recognition Range of IOI’ 
respectively.14  The same logic has also been applied in similar manner to the tracking variables 
which have been combine to form the variables ‘Required Tracking Depth of IOIs’ and 
‘Required Tracking Depth of Recognition IOIs’ 
The following figures are a graphical depiction of the different tracking depths and detection 
ranges described in the list above.  It is important to remember that Figures 1.2 through 1.5 are 
only representative of an airborne asset’s tracking depth.  Figures 1.2 and 1.3 only apply to 
installations with a fixed outer perimeter (does not matter the type of perimeter).  First, Figure 
1.1, a depiction of detection ranges with respect to a border.   
Figure 1.1 depicts the all three of the detection ranges and tracking depths (vehicle, human, and 
recognition).  In order to make this page image less burdening to look at the entire next page has 
been devoted to it. 
                                                            
14
 It was important to list all four variables in the list above despite the fact that only two are used.  The reader now 
knows what variables where considered when creating each scenario and why those variables where chosen.   
20 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 1.1: Detection ranges and tracking depths 
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Figure 1.2: Offensive surveillance.  All offensive surveillance assets must orbit                                                        
the center of the perimeter so that their detection radius is tangent to it.  As a                                       
result, the tracking depth is oriented with respect to the center of the perimeter 
 
Figure 1.3: Defensive surveillance around a perimeter.  All airborne defensive assets                          
must operate such that the inner detection range is tangent to or inside the perimeter.                               
The required tracking depth is measured outwards from the perimeter 
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Figure 1.4: An example of offensive and defensive tracking depth along a border. The tracking depth is 
oriented with respect to the border 
 
Figure 1.5: An example of purely defensive tracking depth.  The tracking depth has an inner depth that 
inside or on the border itself.  The tracking depth is oriented with respect to the border 
 
Figure 1.6: An example of purely offensive tracking depth along a border.  The inner detection radius 
extends beyond the border.  The tracking depth is oriented with respect to the border 
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When assembled, the variables above form a table identical to Table 1.1 below (to make this 
table easier to read it was broken into two different rows.  The tables following each organization 
are displayed in this method while the master table at the end of this chapter is arrayed 
horizontally on two pages): 
Scenario Operator Surveillance 
Mission 
Objective Preconditions Type of 
Perim. 
Perim. 
Length 
Required 
Portability 
Rating 
Required Setup 
and Teardown 
Rating 
Required 
Endurance 
          
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Required 
Low 
Observ. 
Rating 
Required 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles 
Required 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans 
Recognition 
Range 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Vehicles 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Humans 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Recognized 
IOIs 
Surveillance 
Budget 
          
 
Table 1.1: An example of the scenario tables used in this 
 
At the end of this chapter there is a master table that contains the surveillance requirements of all 
three organizations.  This table is used in chapter 3 to aid in the design and marketing15 of the 
PSN.   
The first agency to undergo examination is U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the organization 
that has the most to benefit from the development of the PSN. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) – DHS 
Defensive Surveillance of Hard and Soft Perimeters – Border Protection  
CBP is one of 22 federal agencies that make up the recently formed DHS.  DHS is tasked with 
fulfilling five distinct missions:16  
• Prevent terrorism and enhancing security 
                                                            
15
 Not from a sales point of view but rather from a development one. This matrix will assist in determining what 
organizations might be interested in the PSN and what organizations / missions should be ignored during the 
development of it.  Simply put, the surveillance requirements of these organizations exceed the surveillance 
capabilities of the PSN, capabilities which are limited by the underlying concept on which the PSN was founded.      
16
 “Our Mission.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2013. 
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• Secure and manage our borders 
• Enforce and administer our immigration laws 
• Safeguard and secure cyberspace 
• Ensure resilience to disasters 
Of these five missions, CBP is the primary agency responsible for both ‘securing and managing 
our borders’ and the ‘enforcement and administration of our immigration laws’.  It should also 
come as no surprise that, while not the lead agency, CBP also plays an important role in 
‘preventing terrorism and enhancing security’.   These three missions place a high demand on 
CBP’s limited resources, especially when considering the physical types and domain CBP is 
responsible for monitoring.  This mission is conducted in the defense of both hard and soft 
perimeters, perimeters that are often defended by a combination of each (i.e., in some locations 
the U.S. – Mexico border is fenced while in other it is undefended).  Regardless of the type of 
perimeter being defended, CBP’s self-described mission remains the same: 
“U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for guarding nearly 7,000 miles of land 
border the United States shares with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of coastal waters 
surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the coast of Southern California. The agency also 
protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States Coast Guard.”17 
This undertaking requires a large surveillance network, without which the 61,000 employees of 
CBP would be unable to perform the task laid before them.  These employees are divided 
amongst the various mission teams, the largest of which is the U.S. Border Patrol.  Border Patrol, 
                                                            
17
 “Protecting Our Borders: This is CBP.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection, 
September 2012.   
25 
 
 
 
founded in 1924, is an organization that has doubled since 200418 to a force of over 22,000 in 
2013.19  According to the CBP, the two-part mission of Border Patrol is: 
“… preventing terrorists and terrorists weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from 
entering the United States...”20 
“… to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States… maintain borders that 
work - facilitating the flow of legal immigration and goods while preventing the illegal 
trafficking of people and contraband.”21 
These missions must be accomplished across vast land and seascapes.  Border Patrol’s domain, 
which is nearly identical to that of CBP, is described by them as being “…nearly 6,000 miles of 
Mexican and Canadian international land borders and over 2,000 miles of coastal waters 
surrounding the Florida Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico.”22 
Due in large part to the size of this domain, it is the Border Patrol agents who benefit the most 
from the implementation of new, more effective surveillance technology.  Unfortunately, recent 
attempts to implement new surveillance technology, particularly along the U.S. – Mexico border, 
have met with only mild success.   
                                                            
18
 Farley, R. (2011). Obama Says Border Patrol Has Doubled the Number of Agents Since 2004. 
Politifactcheck.com, May 2011. 
19
 Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures for 2012. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection, January 2013. p. 1 
20
 Border Patrol Overview. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection: Border Patrol, 
January 2011. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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According to DHS’ own assessments, in 2010 only half of the southern border and 2% of the 
northern border were deemed acceptably secure.23  This is despite the fact that CBP has spent 
over $5 billion in new fencing and technology. The fencing alone has cost billions – 
approximately $3 million per mile less the cost of maintenance for the 649 miles that have been 
constructed to date.24  Several billions more have been increasing the number of border patrol 
agents, expanding the force every year since 2001.  There are currently 21,970 Border Patrol 
agents in CBP, of which nearly 18,000 are tasked with monitoring the U.S.-Mexico border.  
Although the border is only marginally more secure now than it was in 2010, DHS has recently 
classified the southern border as acceptably secure.  It is important to note however that prior to  
 
                                  Figure 1.7: GAO analysis of CBP data25 
                                                            
23
 An acceptable level of border security is defined as possessing the capability detect, deter, and/or intercept 
violators at the border or shortly thereafter.  There is no mention as to how effective these capabilities must be, only 
that they exist.   
Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, March 2011. p. 2 
24
 Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Cost. U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 9, 2009. p. 4 
25
 Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and 
Resource Needs. US Government Accountability Office, December 2012.  p. 29 
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the border being declared secure, DHS changed the criteria defining what is and what is not 
secure.26  Nonetheless, issues remain.  GAO analysis of CBP data (Figure 1.7) shows that 
attempts to cross the southern border have sharply decreased over the past 5 years.  This same 
analysis states that the number of ‘got aways’ have declined as a percentage of total border 
violators, proof that the border is more secure27.  Analysis conducted in association with thesis 
suggests that the actual cause behind the increase in apprehensions and got aways is more 
complex.  In the same GAO report that quoted the DHS as having said the southern border was 
acceptably secure there was a comment from DHS acknowledging that part of their ‘success’ 
was a decrease in border violators, the suggested cause being the contraction of the U.S. 
economy.28  The result is a scenario in which the number of detected border violators drops from 
620,000 in 2006 to 193,000 in 2011 during which period the DHS increased the number of 
Border Patrol agents and pumped billions of tax payer dollars into surveillance programs.  
Analysis of the externalities/circumstances that contributed to a drop in the annual number of 
border violators is evidence enough to question the DHS’s claim that the border is acceptably 
secure.   At best, the circumstances surrounding DHS’s claim make the statement itself 
premature; hard proof that DHS has acceptably secured the border would be for them to do so 
under the same conditions that have prompted illegal immigration to rise in the past.  Once and 
                                                            
26
 Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, February 2013. p. 1 
27
 Despite the increase, less than 2/3rd of the known violators are intercepted and detained.  13% of violators 
successfully evaded Border Patrol agents and gained illegal entry while 20% avoided capture by re-crossing the 
border to Mexico.  These figures do not take into account the unknown number of violators who were not detected 
by the Border Patrol.   
Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
February 2013. p. 1 
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource 
Needs. US Government Accountability Office, December 2012. p. 29 
28
 Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
February 2013. p. 1 
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only once this scenario is faced and successfully countered can CBP declare victory and the 
southern border ‘acceptably’ secure. 
Far from being able to declare the border secure, there is in fact ample evidence to state just the 
opposite.  One of the statistics often quoted by both CBP and DHS are drug seizures which, in 
some cases (i.e., depending on the specific narcotic), have more than doubled.  What is often 
ignored is the production of narcotics, particularly in areas that commonly ship their product to 
the U.S. via the southern border.  The figures below highlight exactly that fact.  Table 1.2 shows 
 
                   Table 1.2: from DEA National Drug Assessment for 201129 
heroin production and seizure from 2004 to 2010.  While a first glance at production would have 
one think that, since the total amount of heroin produced has not risen sharply, heroin entering 
the U.S. has also not risen.  This could not be further from the case.  The majority of Afghani 
heroin is bound for Europe or Asia.  The major source of U.S. heroin is Mexico which has risen 
in production from 8 metric tons in 2004 to 50 in 2010, an increase of more than six fold, while 
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 National Drug Threat Assessment for 2011. U.S. Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Agency, August 2011. 
p. 27 
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seizures of heroin (total, POE and border) have risen by only about 30%.  Even if one just looks 
at the border, seizures have only risen 250%, marginal when compared to the 650% rise in 
production.  Marijuana seizures are another example of how CBP and DHS have lured 
themselves into developing a false confidence in their ability to interdict narcotics.  Tables 1.3 
and 1.4 show the production of marijuana and the seizures of various drugs from 2005 through 
2010 (tables overlap from 2006-2009). 
 
                   Table 1.3: Marijuana Production30 
 
                       Table 1.4: Narcotics seizures, 2006-201031 
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A recognizable trend appears when comparing the production and seizure of marijuana between 
the years 2006 and 2009.  During this period the seizure of marijuana has increased by roughly 
50% while the production has increased by 300%.  Both of these statistics suggest that the U.S. 
southern border may not be as secure as DHS and CBP claim.  
Regardless of whether DHS chooses to declare the southern border secure or not, there are still 
tens of thousands of border violators who go uncaught.  As long as this remains the status quo 
the southern border can never truly be declared secure.  There is however a much larger problem 
that, in the future, could present a greater problem to CBP than that which it now faces along the 
southern border. 
As the percentage of border violators successfully intercepted rises, those that can afford to enter 
via an alternate route will increasingly choose to do so.  Unfortunately, a disproportionately large 
number of those that have the financial freedom to do so are the worst of the worst – drug 
smugglers and terrorists.32  The lack of surveillance along the northern border will make it 
difficult to counter the problem of a shift in smuggling routes since the majority of the 
technology in use today is static, requiring months to years to erect.   Even worse is the fact that 
the northern border is significantly more difficult to monitor than the southern.  Not only is the 
northern border longer than the southern, it also contains thick foliage.  This foliage further 
inhibits the ability of both UAVs and long range border installations (e.g., SBInet33) to detect 
violators.  Finally, these individuals are much more adept at smuggling than the average border 
violator.  Despite a noticeable drop in total border incursions, the total amount of drugs 
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 Ibid. p. 50 
32
 A Line In The Sand: Countering Crime, Violence And Terror At The Southwest Border. U.S. Congress: House 
Committee on Homeland Security, November 2012. p. 4 
33
 SBInet is the single largest and most recognizable component of the SBI.  A detailed review of this system is 
conducted in Chapter 2. 
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smuggled across the border has risen – more so than many agencies responsible for stifling the 
flow of narcotics are acknowledge   These statistics are supported by U.S. citizens living along 
the border who report that, although the overall number of violators has decreased, encounters 
with smugglers have remained constant, if not increased.34    
Although CBP’s past attempts to secure U.S. borders have had mixed results, the organization 
may be at a crossroads.  With the cancellation of the SBInet program, CBP has been forced to 
implement an alternative program known as the alternative or post-SBI program.  This program 
is marked by the introduction of six contracts for assets developed around proven technology.  
These assets are:35  
• Mobile Security System (MSC) 
• Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 
• Air Support via the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 
• Long Range Handheld Thermal Imaging System 
• Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 
• Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) 
Each of these technologies, though still being tested by CBP, has so far proven effective.  With 
that in mind, only time will tell how effective they really are – every system has its pros and 
cons.   
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 “DHS Napolitano’ Touts Border Security.” CBS News, February 2013.   
35
 Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2011. pp. 37-43 
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Offensive Surveillance – Interdiction of Maritime and Airborne Smugglers 
The missions conducted by CBP that qualify as offensive surveillance are those which are in 
support of enforcement assets that intercept smugglers before they enter U.S. territorial waters.  
This mission also applies to surveillance assets operated by the CBP that monitor the territorial 
waters (and open water around those waters) of nations cooperating with the U.S. to combat the 
international narcotics trade.36  While some of the assets used in this role are dedicated to it 
(surveillance), others perform both surveillance and enforcement.  The organization within CBP 
that is tasked with the operation of aircraft and maritime assets is the Office of Air and Marine 
(OAM).  As of January 2011, OAM operated 267 aircraft and 301 marine vessels in support of 
their mission which is to:37 
• provide support to CBP’s anti-terrorism mission at U.S. borders including, air-to-ground 
interception of people and contraband illegally crossing land borders, air-to-air 
interception of aircraft, and air-to-water interception of transportation vessels.  
• provide support for CBP’s traditional work, such as border interceptions unrelated to 
terrorism and other DHS missions as well.  
• conduct air operations to support other federal, state and local needs, such as disaster 
relief 
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 “CBP Intercepts Cocaine Smugglers in Open Water” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection, January 2013.   
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 Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, March 2012. p. 1 
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In 2011 OAM logged 94,968 flight hours and 133,374 maritime hours, an average of 352 hours 
per air asset and 476 hours of maritime asset annually.38  This is an operation tempo that is a 
credit to OAM and CBP.  However, the operation of these assets comes at an annual cost in 
excess of $815 million on top of the $1.3 billion spent between 2006 and 2011 to modify OAM’s 
assets.39  Moreover, analysis of the capabilities provided by OAM assets revealed that, despite 
being a highly a potent surveillance system, it was unable to meet its 2011 operational goals.40  
More often than not, these goals were not met because of extreme environmental conditions that 
prohibited OAM assets from either deploying in the first place or negated their effectiveness 
after having arrived on location.  Finally, although OAM is increasing its use of advanced UAVs, 
these aircraft accounted for only 4,406 of the 94,968 hours flown in 2011.41 
Summary Analysis 
DHS has tasked the CBP with safeguarding the borders of America as well as points of entry 
(POE) inside U.S. borders.  Although CBP has increased its surveillance assets it still lacks the 
ability to sufficiently monitor the southern border, where it spends $4 billion of its $12 billion 
budget, and all but lacks the capability to effectively monitor the northern border (aside from 
POE’s).42  The CBP is pursuing the GAO’s recommendation of acquiring more mobile 
surveillance equipment (through the Mobile Surveillance Capabilities Program, or MSC) but that 
equipment has not yet been employed en mass nor has it been in the field long enough to be 
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 “2011 Air and Marine Milestones.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection: 
Office of Air and Maritime, December 2011.   
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 Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, March 2012. p. 1 
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considered a long term solution for CBP’s intelligence and surveillance gap.  This program is a 
diversion from prior trends, one that, despite not yet having been proven, is likely to be very 
successful.   Quotes related to CBP’s ability to seize narcotics are overstated.  CBP needs to 
expand its surveillance capabilities to include borders (e.g., northern and coastal) not currently 
monitored (via sensors that are capable of providing real-time, actionable intelligence).  It is 
however important to note that CBP has established a program, the Mobile Surveillance 
Capabilities Program, in an effort to utilize off the shelf, existing  
Criteria  
Based on audits, mission statements, and analysis of agency responsibilities, the CBP must 
possess: 
• surveillance assets capable of detecting border violators immediately upon entry, yielding 
actionable intelligence  
• surveillance assets capable of tracking border violators from the point of entry until the 
point of interception, a distance that in some areas along the southern border stretches for 
over 50 miles 
• surveillance assets capable of identifying border violators with enough detail to 
determine the nature of their incursion (i.e., determine whether they are smugglers or 
illegal immigrants) 
• the ability to quickly communicate the intelligence gathered via surveillance to 
enforcement assets that intercept border violators and potential violators in time to deter 
or detain them  
• surveillance assets that are inexpensive, mobile, and use off the shelf technology 
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• the capability to effectively monitor both the northern and southern borders 
simultaneously 
• operate across multiple Border Patrol sectors more effectively, using common 
surveillance and enforcement assets 
Condition 
CBP possesses: 
• surveillance systems that are mobile and capable of providing  surveillance via ground 
radar, high-end day time and low-light optics, thermal imaging, and night vision that 
utilizes various types of infrared (IR) optics 
• high-end, ground based surveillance systems that, with a single asset, are capable of 
detecting items of interest (IOI) at great distances, an example of which is the now 
cancelled SBInet 
• an extensive number of airborne and maritime assets including a small number of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s), many of which are equipped with forward looking 
infra-red (FLIR), thermal imagining, and radar 
• an increasingly large number of Border Patrol agents themselves providing mobile and 
fixed surveillance (Border Patrol sectors with advanced surveillance assets use a smaller 
percentage of their available agents in the classic role of mobile surveillance and border 
enforcement, less equipped sectors use more (39% versus 63% or more)43 
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 Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, March 2011. p. 15 
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• the ability to intercept border violators with varying degrees of success, success that is by 
the surveillance assets deployed and the location of the incursion (e.g., in limited, high 
traffic portions of the southern border that have excellent detection and enforcement 
capabilities IOI can be intercepted with high degree of confidence while  IOI using 
tunnels constructed in urban areas are considerably more difficult to detect) 
• an annual budget of approximately $12 billion44  
Scenario Table – Customs and Border Patrol 
Scenario Operator Surveillance 
Mission 
Objective Preconditions Type 
of 
Perim
. 
Perim. 
Length 
(m) 
Required 
Portability 
Rating 
Required 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Required 
Endurance 
Nogales Arizona: 8 
FLIR equipped 
SkyWatch towers 
guarding 10 miles 
of  the southwest 
border (16.1 km) 
CBP Defensive Deter/Overt 
Surveillance/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Soft 16100  3 3 N/A 
Single SkyWatch 
tower along the 
southern border 
equipped with STS 
12000 radar 
CBP Defensive Overt 
Surveillance/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Soft 12000  3 3 N/A 
Three FLIR 
equipped SkyWatch 
towers, east of El 
Paso, between 
Quitman mountain 
and the border 
CBP Defensive Overt 
Surveillance/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Soft 9000  3 3 N/A 
Three FLIR 
equipped SkyWatch 
towers west of El 
Paso 
CBP Defensive Overt 
Surveillance/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Soft 9000  3 3 N/A 
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Required 
Low 
Observ. 
Rating 
Required 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles from 
Border 
Required 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans from 
Border 
Required 
Recognitio
n Range 
from 
Border 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Vehicles  
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Humans  
Required 
Tracking Depth 
of Recognized 
IOIs  
Surveillance 
Budget 
1 1 2 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m 3000 m 300 m 10 m N/A 
1 1 2 -200 m 5000 m 7000 m 4000 m 2000 m 10 m N/A 
5 1 2 500 m 1500m 2000 m 2000 m 500 m 10 m N/A 
3 1 2 500 m 1000 m 2500 m 2000 m 300 m 10 m N/A 
 
Table 1.5: CBP scenario table 
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 “DHS Napolitano’ Touts Border Security.” CBS News, February 2013.   
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Protection of Critical Infrastructure – DHS   
Defensive Surveillance of Hard and Soft Perimeters – Critical Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure is defined by DHS as: “…the physical and cyber systems and assets so 
vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on 
our physical or economic security or public health or safety.”45  These assets provide services in 
the following public and private sectors:46 
 
Since its founding in 2002, the protection of critical infrastructure has been one of DHS’s 
primary responsibilities.  This responsibility was clarified in December 2003 when President 
George Bush released HSPD-7, a presidential directive outlining DHS’s mission and 
responsibilities as they pertain to safeguarding America’s critical infrastructure.47  Among other 
things, this directive stated that it was the responsibility of the Secretary of DHS to: “…serve as 
the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among 
Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector to protect 
                                                             
45
 “Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Department of Homeland Security, February 2013. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 “December 17th 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7.” White House, December 2003.   
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critical infrastructure and key resources.”48  This means that in some cases DHS can only assist 
in the protection of certain assets through collaboration, not take unilateral action to secure them.  
Nonetheless, DHS has made steps towards securing the assets in all 18 sectors outlined above 
through: the institution of new regulation, the formation of public-private partnerships, risk-
management, and the use of grants designed to assist private companies whom the DHS deemed 
‘worthy’.49   These tasks have been assigned to various organizations within DHS, each of which 
is responsible for various program(s) and/or grant(s).  The following are just a few of the 
programs and grants DHS has created since 2002:50 
• Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) 
• Urban Security Initiative (USI) 
• State and Regional Preparedness Program (SRPP) 
• Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) 
• Port Security Grant Program (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) 
These programs provide many services, two of which are funding and vulnerability assessment.  
The latter is a service provided by the DHS which assesses the vulnerability of an asset.  Based 
on that assessment the vulnerability and assessment team (VAT) makes recommendations to the 
owner/operator on how to reduce their vulnerability.  The owner/operator then decides whether 
or not to act on the recommendations made, usually basing their decision on available funding.  
In order to make sure that more recommendations made are actually implemented, DHS provides 
financial assistance through one of its many grant programs.   This funding is traditionally 
                                                            
48
 Ibid. 
49
 “Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Department of Homeland Security, February 2013. 
50
 Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and 
Other Critical Infrastructure. U.S. Government Accountability Office, December 2005. p. 60 
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allocated based on the criticality of the asset and the financial contribution the owner of the asset 
is willing to make with respect to the overall cost of implementing the recommendation.  One of 
the most common recommendations made by VATs is the installation of additional surveillance 
equipment in the form of sensors and cameras.   
Providing surveillance services have never been a task explicitly assigned to DHS, it has 
however been an implicit part of the services they provide.  When making their 
recommendations, a VAT has the liberty to recommend specific technologies (e.g., thermal, IR, 
etc.) but not manufactures.  Their clients however are not required to use the technologies 
recommended by VATs.  As a result, those owners/operators who do implement the 
recommendations made use a variety of different surveillance devices, driving up the cost of 
doing so.  To make matters worse, there are not only different organizations providing grants and 
assessments for each type of critical infrastructure, there are multiple organizations providing 
grants within each class of infrastructure.  An example of this chaos is the fact that there are 
three different organizations providing grants to the owners/operators of ports.  In this case, the 
three organizations are: the Coast Guard, Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).  Making this a particularly 
bad scenario is the fact that these three organizations each have their own criteria defining how 
they allocate grants, leading to a situation in which the most significant security needs are not 
addressed.51  Nonetheless, vulnerability assessments are performed, grants awarded, and the 
surveillance capabilities of critical infrastructure assets improved.   
                                                            
51
 In the case of the ODP, the criteria that determined how grants are awarded have changed significantly over the 
past decade.  In the past, a private company was awarded a security grant based on the priority of that request as it 
was assigned by DHS (use of a ranking system) and the amount that company was willing to contribute.  As of 
2006, a company’s worth is now taken into account.  The more a company is worth, the more that company is 
expected to pay, which in some cases is 100%.   
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Unfortunately these improvements, in addition to being costly, have yielded mixed results.  In 
one case a chemical plant was equipped with cameras that were linked via the internet to both the 
installation’s internal security and/or local law-enforcement (LE).52  This highly sensible and 
effect use of cameras is contrast by the use of insufficient thermal cameras at ports.  In 2011 the 
GAO reported that some organizations who have implemented thermal cameras as part of their 
port’s surveillance package did not install units that were capable of detecting small watercraft, 
the type of vessel most likely to be used by both terrorists and smugglers.   
Summary Analysis  
Various agencies and programs within DHS (e.g., FEMA, BZPP, etc.) and other, independent 
agencies (e.g., Coast Guard) have been tasked with addressing the vulnerabilities of U.S. critical 
infrastructure through mutual cooperation, and the provision of grants and vulnerability 
assessments.  A key element in the success of their mission is ensuring that the surveillance 
needs of these assets are met.  This task has only been met with mild success due to the massive 
number of government programs involved and the inconsistent allocation of resources towards 
the most critical of assets.   
Criteria 
Based on audits, mission statements, and analysis of the responsibilities assigned to DHS, DHS 
is required to: 
                                                            
52
 Homeland Security: DHS is Addressing at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority is Needed. U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, June 2006. p. 9 
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• serve as the principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of 
efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the 
private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources   
• support risk management; enhanced domain awareness; training and exercises; expansion 
of recovery and resiliency capabilities; and further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond 
to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices and other non-
conventional weapons; and competitively award grant funding to assist critical 
infrastructure in obtaining the resources required to support the National Preparedness 
Goal’s associated mission areas and core capabilities53 - conduct security assessments via 
VATs that assist the public and private sectors in determining their surveillance needs  
• ensure that the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure are addressed by providing both 
grants and vulnerability assessments – funding to help both the public and private sectors 
pay for their surveillance needs in accordance with the VAT’s recommendations 
Condition 
DHS: 
• is continuing to foster communication between local law-enforcement, federal agencies, 
and the owners/operators of critical infrastructure assets 
• is providing vulnerability assessments that make specific recommendations on how to 
decrease the vulnerability of a critical infrastructure asset via the installation or upgrade 
of surveillance equipment 
                                                            
53
 “FEMA: Port Security Grant Program.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, June 2012. 
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• has instituted grant programs that award hundreds of millions of dollars per year in 
financial assistance to the owners of critical infrastructure, assistance which used to 
encourage owners to implement the recommendations made by VATs 
• is not overseeing the process of implementing recommendations as well as they could, 
leading to scenarios in which some of this nation’s most critical assets are left with 
considerable vulnerabilities (to include surveillance) 
• is not allocating grants based purely on the criticality of an asset but instead with respect 
to the  capability of an asset to provide for its own defense, leaving many of this nation’s 
most critical assets highly vulnerable to attack and/or penetration (by terrorists and 
smugglers respectively) 
Scenario Table – Critical Infrastructure  
Scenario Operator Surveillance 
Mission 
Objective Preconditions Type of 
Perim. 
Perim. 
Length 
Required 
Portability 
Rating 
Required 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Required 
Endurance 
Civilian Port 
Complex 
DHS Defensive Deter/ 
Detain 
N/A Soft 16100 m 3 3 N/A 
 DHS Defensive Deter/ 
Detain 
N/A Soft 12000 m 3 3 N/A 
Three FLIR 
equipped 
SkyWatch towers, 
east of El Paso, 
between Quitman 
mountain and the 
border 
DHS Defensive Deter/ 
Detain 
N/A Soft 9000 m 3 3 N/A 
Three FLIR 
equipped 
SkyWatch towers 
west of El Paso 
DHS Defensive Deter/ 
Detain 
N/A Soft 9000 m 3 3 N/A 
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Required 
Low 
Observ. 
Rating 
Required 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles 
from Border 
Required 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans 
from Border 
Required 
Recognition 
Range from 
Border 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Vehicles 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Humans 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Recognized 
IOIs 
Surveillance 
Budget 
1 1 2 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m 3000 m 300 m 10 m N/A 
1 1 2 -200 m 5000 m 7000 m 4000 m 2000 m 10 m N/A 
5 1 2 500 m 1500m 2000 m 2000 m 500 m 10 m N/A 
3 1 2 500 m 1000 m 2500 m 2000 m 300 m 10 m N/A 
 
Table 1.6: Critical Infrastructure scenario table 
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Military – Department of Defense (DoD) 
The organizations that compose the U.S. military are referred to as “departments”, which when 
combine form the DoD.54  These three departments are the Air Force, Army, and Navy.  The 
Marines, despite commonly thought of as a forth department, are a subdivision of the Navy.  All 
three of these departments have extensive surveillance demands that are an implicit part of the 
mission each department is required to perform.  These demands require the use of surveillance 
assets capable of capable of detecting a variety of rapidly evolving threats, making the job of 
countering them far more difficult, at least on paper, than those of facing DHS and CBP.  
Fortunately for the military, the type and quality of surveillance assets available to them far 
outpaces those in use by CBP and DHS, assets which are available (by comparison) on a 
moment’s notice.  While the military does perform a wide variety of missions, one of the most 
common is the defense of static installations, a mission that requires the use of surveillance 
assets nearly identical to the ones used in the defense of critical infrastructure.  With that in 
mind, the first topic discussed is the defensive surveillance of permanent installations. 
Defensive Surveillance of Hard Perimeters – Permanent Installations 
Permanent installations with hard perimeters are common to all three departments.  In most 
cases, these installations have very similar, if not nearly identical, surveillance needs.  The 
individuals responsible for making sure the surveillance needs of their installation are met are the 
commanders of the installations themselves.  These commanders face many of the same 
limitations facing the owners of civilian infrastructure, the two most prominent being adequate 
                                                            
54
 Departments are different from branches.  There are five branches: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast 
Guard.  The Marines report to the Department of Navy.  The Coast Guard, which is not a DoD organization, reports 
to DHS.   
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assessment to determine the vulnerabilities of a given installation and the funding to implement 
changes that adequately address those vulnerabilities.    
When it comes to the DoD, the most pre-eminent organization that conducts vulnerability 
assessments is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  The DTRA sends out balance 
survivability assessment teams (BSAT) that provide a service similar to the one provided by 
DHS’s VATs.  These teams conduct what they refer to as a balance survivability assessment 
(BSA): a comprehensive review of an installation’s vulnerabilities to physical and cyber-attacks.  
In addition to the run of the mill assessment conducted by VATs, BSATs will typically conduct a 
red team assessment – a type of assessment in which the vulnerabilities of an installation are test 
by having a red team (friendly units/personnel posing as the enemy) attempt to breach or 
otherwise defeat the defenses of that installation.  After having conducted these assessments, the 
BSAT makes recommendations to the installation’s commander on how to reduce the 
installations vulnerability.  More often than not, surveillance is one of the recommendations 
made by BSATs.  Though they are not required to act on these recommendations, most 
commanders who request a BSA of their installation do the best they can to do so (George C. 
Baker, personal communication, March 9, 2013) [1].55    
Acquiring the funding needed to implement the recommendations made by BSATs is always an 
issue.  Commanders have very little control over their installations budget, leaving those 
commanders who do wish to implement recommendations made by BSATs with one of two 
choices: apply for DoD grants or pay for it themselves.  If no financial aid is awarded, the 
commander of an installation must either allocate money from their pre-existing budget or 
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 All of the facts contained within this paragraph were obtained via an interview with Dr. George C. Baker that was 
conducted on March 9, 2013  
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choose not to implement the BSAT’s recommendations.   The cost to implement these 
recommendations can vary wildly depending on the specifics of the recommendation itself 
(George Baker, personal communication, March 9, 2013) [2].56 
Standard surveillance recommendations made by BSATs can be broken down into two broad 
categories: personnel and hardware.  Personnel recommendations deal with the use of manpower 
to reduce an installation’s vulnerability by increasing the number, route, and outfitting of patrols 
(e.g., increase the number of security guards, increase the frequency of patrols, utilize canines, 
modify procedures to increase accountability for security guards, etc.).  Hardware 
recommendations, with respect to surveillance, deal specifically with the installation, upgrade, 
re-allocation, and integration of surveillance hardware.   The types of hardware recommended 
ranges from increased lighting to the installation of ground based radar and thermal cameras.  
This hardware can either be fixed (e.g., security camera mounted on the wall of a building) or 
mobile (mobile, man-portable ground radar).  The upside to using fixed hardware is that the 
surveillance assets installed provide useful intelligence that mobile assets cannot.  For example, 
an installation’s POE (for vehicles) can be equipped with a remotely operated, under vehicle 
inspection system.   These systems consist of multiple cameras embedded in the pavement that 
are capable of detecting smuggled and potentially dangerous devices  (e.g., a bomb, weapons, 
computer hacking hardware, etc.).57  Using cameras such as these allows an installation’s 
security personnel to conduct an otherwise risky search from the safety of their guard house, far 
from the suspect vehicle. Largely because of their cost, immobility, and the time required to 
install, assets like the under vehicle inspection system are only implemented at fixed 
installations.  
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 Ibid.  
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 “Gatekeeper – Automatic and Under Vehicle Inspection Systems.” Army-Technology.com, 2012. 
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Another way of reducing an installation’s vulnerabilities is to increase the effectiveness of 
surveillance assets by making those assets more intelligent.  Making them more intelligent refers 
to improving their identification and communication capabilities.  Intelligent identification refers 
to a whole class of capabilities, nearly all of which are software related, that aid in managing the 
operator’s workload and identifying IOIs.  For example, one of the capabilities intelligent 
identification adds is the ability to identify IOIs it detects as being relevant or irrelevant to the 
human operator/security personnel.  If relevant, the system would alert a human operator, if 
irrelevant the system would simply ignore the IOI it detected.   The second capability that is an 
essential component of an intelligent surveillance system is improved communication between 
the different components of that system, communication which requires networking.  A modern, 
intelligent, and networked surveillance system is capable of:  
• motion detection 
• classifying an IOI detected (e.g., person, animal, car, etc.) 
• discerning between IOIs of interest to the operator and those which the operator would 
deem ‘false alarms’ 
• discerning between IOI that are within the installation’s perimeter and those outside of it 
(e.g., a camera mounted on the rooftop of an embassy that points towards the outer wall 
and main gate, outside of which is a sidewalk and busy street.  The system needs to 
ignore any IOI detected outside of the wall and gate despite the fact that people and 
vehicles outside the gate are visible to the camera 24/7) 
• communicating from one sensor to another that an IOI has been detected, after which all 
surveillance equipment capable of viewing that IOI automatically pan and tilt to do so 
(known as smart surveillance) 
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• tracking a single IOI from one sensor to the next, ideally doing so on a 2D overlay of the 
installation and surrounding area 
• linking an installation’s sensor feed in real time from the installation itself to nearby 
security or LE assets 
All of the features and capabilities above can be easily implemented as part of an installation’s 
surveillance package so long as that installation has either a hard or soft perimeter.  While some 
of these features and capabilities cannot be used to monitor a dynamic perimeter, some can.  
Unfortunately, doing so would require the development of a system that is much more flexible 
and easy to setup than that which is required for a use in an installation that has either a hard or 
soft perimeter.  Further complicating matters is the fact that an intelligent surveillance system 
monitoring an installation with a dynamic border must also be equipped with wireless power and 
communication.   
Defensive Surveillance of Soft and Dynamic Perimeters – Tactical Airfields and Forward 
Operating Bases (FOB) 
The Air Force operates almost exclusively from permanent installations while the Army and 
Marines operate extensively from installations with hard, soft, and dynamic perimeters.  There is 
however one instance in which all three services perform a similar mission – the establishment of 
tactical airfields and FOBs.  These are temporary installations typically constructed close to the 
front lines, and in some cases, behind enemy lines.  Tactical airfields, like the one shown in 
Figure 1.10, allow transport aircraft to insert large numbers of troops and their heavy equipment 
where the enemy least expects it.  They may also be used as a temporary airfield from which 
short-range attack and close air support aircraft and helicopters operate.  FOBs are similar to 
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tactical airfields in that they sometimes have an airfield or helipad.  What makes them unique is 
that they perform a wider variety of missions than tactical airfields.  It is common for FOBs 
fulfill the role of a: command and control station, staging area for ground forces and close air 
support (CAS), fire support base (artillery), and resupply depot.  A good way of think about 
tactical airfields vs. FOBs is that a tactical airfield can morph into a FOB.  A FOB on the other 
hand cannot morph, via the addition of an airfield, into a tactical airfield; it simply becomes a 
FOB with an airfield.  This is not a text book definition and others may disagree with it.  It is 
based on the author’s time in the Air Force as a loadmaster on C-5 aircraft58.    
 
             Figure 1.8: C-130 Hercules landing on a tactical airfield59 
                                                            
58Several of the loadmasters the author served with have operated from tactical airfields in support of Tanker Airlift 
Control Elements (TALCE).  TALCE is defined as a “…composite organization tailored to support airlift missions 
transiting locations where command and control, mission reporting, or support functions, as required, are 
nonexistent or require augmentation”. 
Global Security: Glossary I, Abbreviations and Acronyms. Global Security.org, March, 2013. 
59
 “Tactical airfield landing” Wyoming Air National Guard: 153rd Airlift Wing, Cheyenne, WY, March 2013.  
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Both of these installations require ground forces to establish and maintain.  The Army and 
Marines can and do establish both without assistance whereas the Air Force requires assistance 
to do so.  Regardless, when either installation is initially established it will have a soft perimeter.  
If the airfield or FOB in question becomes semi-permanent it may transition towards having a 
hard or soft perimeter.  Regardless of the scenario, tactical airfields and FOBs established using 
only airborne assets (ground troops and their equipment that are inserted via helicopters and/or 
aircraft) have nearly identical surveillance requirements. 
FOBs and tactical airfields can and have been established in a variety of environments ranging 
from deserts to thick forests, each of which challenge surveillance systems operating in them 
with unique atmospheric and climatological challenges.  A truly capable surveillance system 
should be easily transportable and capable of functioning, day and night, in any environment.  
With this in mind, any surveillance package used by airborne troops to establish the initial 
perimeter of a FOB or tactical airfield should: 
• be capable of functioning day and night in all environments for a predestinated  length of 
time60 without (e.g., forest, desert, tundra, etc.) and atmospheric conditions (e.g., fog, 
rain, sandstorms, etc.) 
• consist of individual components/assets that are lightweight and man-portable61 
• consist of  sensors designed with an emphasis on the detection62 of IOIs (as opposed to 
the identification of them) regardless of the environment 63 
                                                            
60
 Those sensors that are deployed several kilometers from the airfield will need to operate without maintenance or 
resupply until supplies are delivered.  The time taken before these supplies are delivered could range from a single 
day to more than a week (data is approximated, no published timeframe could be found).. 
61
 Installations established in a ‘hot zone’ are initially secured by troops who likely have limited or no supply lines, 
particularly if the installation being established is done so behind enemy lines.  Either way, there is a premium 
placed on both the volume and weight of any gear carried by these troops.   
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• be capable of using existing military power sources and support/maintenance equipment 
Although similar to FOBs without an airfield, any installation with an airfield must take into 
account additional considerations.  A typical airfield will have a runway that is 3,500-4,500ft 
long with enough space for one or two large aircraft (if the airfield is used for transports, if not it 
may be much smaller, particularly if it only operates helicopters or vertical or short takeoff and 
landing (VSTOL) aircraft).  When establishing an airfield, both the security of the airfield and 
that of the aircraft must be taken into account.  To do so requires the establishment of a very 
large perimeter, particularly along the route taken by aircraft during takeoff and landing.  Ideally, 
the surveillance system employed should be able to detect IOIs out to a range that completely 
prohibits the use of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS).  This is a fairly large area 
considering the fact that most MANPADS have a range of 3.2 miles.64  These conditions require 
any surveillance system deployed by airborne troops in support of a newly established 
installation with airfield should: 
• be capable of detecting IOIs well beyond the maximum range, relative to the airfield, of 
any MANPADS believed to be deployed in the area  
• be able to be quickly deployed, ideally before the airfield itself becomes operational 
The requirements for newly established airfields and FOBs not constructed by airborne troops 
have nearly identical requirements to those above.  The primary difference between the two is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
62
 Detection is more important when establishing an FOB or tactical airfield due to the rural environment in which 
most of these installations are established.  The potential threat posed by any IOI will require enforcement assets to 
intercept all IOI detected, regardless of their intention (think of the perimeter of a tactical airfield as that of any 
permanent military installation – visitors are not welcome!).  
63
 The sensors deployed will vary depending on the environment (e.g., a desert airfield may use ground based radar 
while an airfield established in the jungle may rely on thermal cameras).   Regardless of the environment and 
sensors employed, every non-sensor component should be generic (e.g., interface, networking, setup and teardown, 
etc.).   
64
 “MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems” U.S. Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, July 27, 2011.   
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the fact that ground forces are not nearly as limited by or concerned about the weight and size of 
the surveillance system being deployed.  Nonetheless, any surveillance system used to secure a 
dynamic perimeter will need to be extremely mobile, easy to setup, and easy to tear down.   
When an installation transitions from having a dynamic perimeter to a soft or hard one, the 
requirements of that installation’s surveillance system change as well.  As the perimeter of an 
installation becomes permanent, less of an emphasis is placed on the mobility of that system.  
There is however a tradeoff. The more permanent an installation is the more likely an enemy is 
to know the location and vulnerabilities of it.  Because of this, surveillance systems monitoring 
soft and hard perimeters must be more capable than those monitoring dynamic ones.  For 
example, the longer an installation’s perimeter is in place the more important it is to have quality 
surveillance – surveillance which can detect, identify, and classify IOIs at the same range 
previous, more tactical, systems could only detect them.   
Defensive Surveillance of Hard and Soft Perimeters – Geopolitical Borders   
Depending on whether or not it has a physical barrier, geopolitical borders may have either a 
hard or soft perimeter.  The defense of geopolitical borders has always been one of the U.S. 
military’s primary missions, a mission which had an early emphasis on the protection U.S. 
borders.  This mission has evolved over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries to such an extent 
that, at present, most of the focus is now centered on the protection of foreign borders.  
Regardless of the border protected, the overall mission remains the same.  Unfortunately this 
mission is not explicitly stated by the military; it is however a mission that can be derived based 
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on historical precedence.65   Analysis of this precedence suggests that the mission of the military 
is to: 
• prevent contraband, border violators, terrorists and terrorists weapons (including weapons 
of mass destruction) from crossing borders 
• enhance border security 
• secure and manage borders 
• deter the enemy from taking offensive military action 
• repel attacks made by the enemy 
• defend friendly assets within the designated border from airborne attacks, whether those 
attacks are made by aircraft or missiles (e.g., the use of Patriot missile systems to shoot 
down Scud missiles fired at Israel during the first Persian Gulf War)66 
As it was with DHS, surveillance an integral part of the broader mission of border protection.  
The major difference between the two is that military forces are far more concerned than their 
DHS counterparts with the detection, tracking, and identification of IOIs long before they cross 
or even approach the border.  While there are a few DHS assets, such as maritime patrol aircraft 
and vessels, that attempt to detect, identify, and track IOIs before they enter U.S. territorial 
waters and/or airspace, there are no DHS assets that do so when monitoring land borders.  Like 
the DHS, the military also attempts to detect, identify, and track maritime and airborne IOIs 
approaching a maritime perimeter; the military however must do the same for land borders.  
Unlike the DHS, military assets must also protect against the threat of rapidly approaching 
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 The specific cases analyzed are the protection of: the Saudi Arabian and Israeli borders during the first Persian 
Gulf War, Afghan-Pakistan border currently still under protection, the Korean Demilitarized Zone still under 
protection, and U.S. air and maritime ‘space’ during the Cold War. 
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 The reason for a distinction between this mission and the one above it is that this mission specifically applies to 
attacks made against assets within the perimeter that can be intercepted by or with the assistance of border defenses. 
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enemy aircraft and ground forces.  Fortunately for the DoD, their budget is considerably larger 
than that of the DHS ($553.0 vs. $43.2 billion)67       
The ability of the military to secure a border depends on the border in question, the number of 
friend forces deployed along that border, and the surveillance technology in use by those forces.  
The sheer number of troops that are often deployed to a warzone gives them a decisive edge over 
the DHS.  Despite this, the military is not all that more effective in securing borders than DHS.  
One way to demonstrate this fact is to examine the narcotics imported to the U.S. from Mexico 
versus the narcotics exported from Afghanistan to Pakistan (in this case, smuggling is used as a 
gauge from which the relative surveillance capabilities of each organization can be 
approximated).  Although the DHS has made progress towards securing the southwest border, it 
has failed to secure other POE, including seaports and airports.  By comparison, military forces 
in Afghanistan have no ports and fewer airports to monitor, have access to more advanced 
technology, and have many times the personnel at their disposal.  Despite these advantages, 
Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium, most of which is smuggled across 
the border to Pakistan.68  This comparison gives rise to the question: why is the military, in 
certain cases, less capable of securing land borders than the less equipped DHS? 
There are many scenario specific reasons as to why the DHS is capable of doing more with less, 
but only one reason that is directly related to the surveillance equipment employed by each 
organization.69  The surveillance equipment used by the DHS is larger, more robust, and in many 
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 “Department of Defense Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2012.” Office of Management and Budget, 2012. 
“Department of Homeland Security Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2012.” Office of Management and Budget, 2012. 
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 National Drug Threat Assessment for 2011. U.S. Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Agency, August 2011. 
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 Some of the scenario specific reasons are: DHS personnel have more knowledge and experience, particularly in 
the case of CBP, than soldiers deployed to Afghanistan; DHS stationed along the southern border are monitoring 
more level terrain; the region along the southern border is much easier to navigate, largely due to the roads, than the 
54 
 
 
 
cases more, more capable than that used by the military.  Why?  Although their equipment is less 
advanced, the surveillance equipment possessed by DHS is not designed for universal 
deployment along a variety of borders70, nor is not limited by its size and weight.  As a result, the 
DHS can build permanent installations while the military is forced to use more tactical and 
mobile equipment.  Moreover, military objects defended by soft perimeters do not benefit from 
the installation of infrastructure/defenses that have a symbiotic relationship with surveillance 
assets (e.g., triple layer fencing along the southern border allows surveillance assets to focus on 
the border’s more permeable segments).  This (symbiotic) relationship maximizes the 
capabilities of surveillance in two ways.  First, it enables an installation’s surveillance assets to 
provide more extensive surveillance of high threat regions via the installations of a greater 
number of fixed assets in those locations.  Second, these barriers slow the advance of intruders, 
allowing mobile surveillance assets to cover greater ground than they otherwise would.  
However, as was stated above, the relationship established by the deployment of both barriers 
and surveillance assets is a symbiotic one.  Regions in which surveillance assets saturate the 
landscape will require the establishment of far fewer barriers.  As a result, those regions of the 
perimeter can be defended more extensively by them, increasing their effectiveness (i.e., 
assuming the availability of barriers remains constant, less barriers in one region allows for the 
greater use of them in another).   More importantly, the installation of multiple barriers in a 
single location can act as a force multiplier.  The imposing site of so many barriers in one 
location can act as a deterrent to would be intruders, reducing the total number of threats 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
rural region between Afghanistan and Pakistan; soldiers are required to work with their Afghan counterparts who 
have proven to be extremely corrupt; interdicting narcotics smugglers has become less of a goal given the 
dependency southern Afghans have on the harvesting of it (doing so only encourages them to support the Taliban 
more fervently). 
70
 DHS has equipment specifically developed for use along the U.S-Mexico border.  Military equipment is most 
often not tailored to function in specific location; rather it is designed to be flexible, allowing for its deployment in 
multiple theatres.   
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attempting to breach that installation over time.  Finally, the establishment of a critical number or 
mass of barriers may effectively neutralize any possibility of threats breaching them, enabling 
the security personnel and surveillance assets defending that installation to concentrate their 
efforts along other regions of the perimeter (as the adage goes “he who defends everything 
defends nothing” (Fredrick II, aka Fredrick the Great)).  
Defensive Surveillance of Dynamic Perimeters – Fleet Defense 
The Navy has very unique surveillance demands that are tied to the mission of fleet defense.  
Both while in port and when at sea, naval fleets depend on surveillance systems to provide the 
intelligence necessary to take pre-emptive action against would be threats.  Some of the assets 
used to provide intelligence in the defense of a naval fleet include radar, sonar, manned aircraft 
and helicopters, and UAVs.  However, most of these assets are used in defense of the fleet while 
it is underway.  There are scenarios in which the ships are not underway but those scenarios are 
few and far between.  One such example is the use of thermal imaging equipment to monitor the 
waters around ships that are either in port or in the close proximity of one.  This type of 
equipment can be used to detect personal watercraft and/or small boats approaching naval ships 
that may be, as was the case with the USS Cole, terrorists armed with high explosives.  This is 
one of the few examples of video surveillance aiding in fleet defense, and in this case, an 
example of surveillance that could be performed by surveillance assets stationed at the port itself 
or onboard maritime security vessels (e.g., port security, Coast Guard, etc.).  With this in mind, it 
is clear that the mission performed by naval assets at sea fall outside the scope of this chapter 
(surveillance provided when in port is more closely related that of critical infrastructure, not fleet 
defense).  Moreover, the surveillance equipment used by naval vessels at sea are in an entirely 
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different class than those examined so far and are designed to fulfill a mission that is very 
different from that of the PSN).  
Defensive and Offensive Surveillance of Dynamic Perimeters – Special Forces (SF) 
SF is a very broad term that describes a whole range of groups that engage in special operations 
missions.  The personnel who operate within these groups under take the most covert, high risk, 
and high reward missions there are.  Some of examples of U.S. groups designated as SF are: 
Navy Seals, Army Green Berets, and the CIA Special Operations Group.71  The surveillance 
requirements demanded by SFs, in this subsection, are broken down into two familiar categories: 
Offensive and Defensive. 
Offensive surveillance is the type of surveillance undertaken either before an operation is 
launched or during an operation that is underway.  However, surveillance gathered while an 
operation is underway can only be deemed offensive if that surveillance is directly related to the 
completion the successful completion of that mission (i.e., surveillance gathered for the sole 
purpose of gathering information and/or surveillance gathered by the SF’s team in support of 
their assigned objective). An example of this would a SFs team conducting surveillance of a 
compound immediately prior to the storming of that compound.  This type of surveillance can be 
provided via satellites, airborne assets, and personal surveillance equipment used by the SFs 
personnel themselves.  The second type of offensive surveillance, that which is conducted prior 
to the launch of an operation, may be provided via satellite, airborne assets, and human 
intelligence (HUMINT) just to name a few.  This type of surveillance can only be conducted 
prior to the launch of an operation but is surveillance that gathers intelligence which is critical to 
                                                            
71
 Washington, Douglas Waller. “The CIA’s Secret Army.” Time Magazine, February, 2003. 
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the planning and successful completion of that operation.  The intelligence gathered prior to the 
launching of Operation Neptune Sphere is an excellent example.  Prior to the launch of the U.S. 
Navy’s SEAL Team 6, intelligence was gathered on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 
Abbottabad, Afghanistan via three (known) sources: HUMINT provided by CIA operatives on 
the ground, satellites, and UAVs flying overhead.72   
Defensive surveillance provided to protect SFs personnel is so closely related to offensive 
surveillance that the line between the two is blurred at best.  For the sake of this thesis, defensive 
surveillance with respect to SFs is any surveillance which sole purpose is warning SFs teams of 
threats.  This type of surveillance is the most dynamic of all surveillance covered in this chapter.  
The type of surveillance assets and scenarios in which those assets are used can vary from one 
operation to the next.  With that in mind, an example would be the use of thermal cameras to 
guard the coastal region where SFs using ridged inflatables made landfall.  The SFs that came 
ashore will want to hide their equipment, but even if they do so they it may be discovered.  Even 
if it is not discovered, they may have been spotted coming ashore.  Either way, the enemy may 
be waiting to ambush them upon return.  The SFs team that came ashore could, theoretically, 
counter this ambush by detecting the enemy as they approach the region they came ashore via the 
use of concealed thermal cameras, cameras which are uplinked in real-time to the SFs team 
itself.   
Offensive Surveillance using Mobile Assets 
At first sight it would appear that offensive mobile surveillance assets (e.g., aircraft, satellites, 
unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), etc.) perform an entirely different mission than that of the 
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PSN.  However, as will be seen in chapter 5, there are variants of the PSN that provide a static 
form of offensive mobile surveillance that is capable of competing with its static brethren.  
Mobile or static, these assets fulfill a similar mission: the gathering of intelligence.  Prior to the 
launch of any mission it is almost certain that attempts will be made to acquire intelligence; 
intelligence which can be used to assist in the successful completion of that mission. One form of 
gathering this intelligence is through the use of mobile assets capable of providing offensive 
surveillance.  Airborne assets, both manned and unmanned, and satellites (though not technically 
airborne they are assets that provide similar capabilities from a similar ‘perspective’) are the two 
most common mobile assets used by the military to provide this type of surveillance (ignoring 
operational HUMINT).   . 
Of these two, satellites have the edge in terms of vulnerability.  There are very few nations and 
organizations that are capable of taking out a satellite.  An additional benefit of satellites is that 
they are capable of surveying large areas in a short time and at fairly rapid intervals.73  This type 
of surveillance has its benefits but also its drawbacks.  First, the resolution of the imagery 
provided by a satellite is not as high as that provided by assets closer to the ground (e.g., UAVs 
and manned aircraft).  Second, the interval during which a satellite passes over a given region 
can be easily predicted by the enemy.  This makes it much easier for the enemy to hide mobile 
assets.  These are all deficits which can be overcome by the use of UAVs.  UAVs can loiter over 
a single area for hours at a time, can take higher resolution pictures at shallower angles than 
satellites, and can arrive and depart the target area according to the operator’s needs (as opposed 
to satellites and their predictable orbits).  
Offensive Surveillance using Static Assets 
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There are very few static assets used to provide offensive surveillance, particularly when the 
only ones examined in this chapter are assets against which the PSN can compete or augment 
(e.g., the PSN is designed to fulfill the same role or augment the capabilities of ground based 
radar spying on foreign aircraft as they take off and land hundreds of miles within an adversaries 
border).  The only two that perform a mission remotely similar are micro-unattended ground 
sensors (UGS) and fixed surveillance cameras that are either operated on scene by covert 
personnel or remotely operated.   
UGS come in many forms, but the ones that are most likely to provide offensive surveillance 
detect subtle sounds and/or movement around the sensors.  Thousands of these sensors would be 
spread out behind enemy lines creating a large network.  These sensors communicate amongst 
themselves and with friendly forces in friendly territory to determine the location of the 
approximate location of each sensor.  A visual representation of this network would look like a 
fine mesh covering the area over which the sensors were dropped.  When the data is gathered, it 
forms a network that can track objects (vehicles, personnel, etc.) as they pass through that 
network.  This type of surveillance allows friendly forces to know the movement, location, and 
quite possibly the strength of enemy forces.   
Although 100% fixed, remotely operated surveillance equipment is sometimes used behind 
enemy lines odds are they are micro-cameras that fulfill a different role than that of the PSN (or 
rather the concept on which the PSN is based).  Man portable surveillance assets that are similar 
in size to the PSN do provide offensive surveillance, but the majority of those (that the author is 
aware of) are operated on scene.  This use of surveillance equipment could be considered mobile 
or static, depending on how often it is moved.  Ultimately there are only two attributes that 
determines whether or not a man portable and operated surveillance asset is classified as static. 
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First, the asset must be large enough to be considered as an alternative to the PSN (i.e., a mini, 
indoor sensor used to spy in the room next door doesn’t count).  Second, whether or not the asset 
in question gathers intelligence while it is in transit.  Generally speaking, an asset designed to 
fulfill a role similar to the PSN is mobile if it gathers intelligence while on the move, static if it 
only gathers intelligence when fixed in place. 
Scenario Table – Military 
Scenario Operator Surveillanc
e Mission 
Objective Preconditions Type of 
Perim. 
Perim. 
Length 
Required 
Portability 
Rating 
Required 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Required 
Endurance 
Generic fixed base 
(Air Force base, 
Army fort, Navy 
base) equipped with 
long-range FLIR, 
Thermal Fence, and 
radar 
All 
branches 
of the 
military 
Defensive Deter/Detai
n/Active 
Intercept 
N/A Hard Varies, 
est. of 
20000  
2 2 N/A 
Geopolitical border 
– Afghanistan / 
Pakistan  
Army/ 
Air 
Force 
Defensive Detain/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Soft 12000  4 5 N/A 
Surveillance of a 
tactical airfield in 
the desert via the 
use of ground based 
radar and short-
range FLIR 
Air 
Force 
Defensive Detain/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Soft/ 
Dynamic 
Varies, 
est. of 
9000 
8 8 N/A 
Surveillance in 
Afghanistan/ 
Pakistan via the use 
of UGS 
Army/ 
CIA 
Offensive Covert 
Surveillanc
e 
N/A Soft 8000  10 N/A Varies, est. 
of 3650 
Surveillance of SF 
during infiltration 
and exfiltration 
SF Defensive Covert 
Surveillanc
e/ Detain/ 
Active 
Intercept 
N/A Dynamic Varies, 
est. of 
500 
10 10 Varies, est. 
of 0.1 
Barry M. Goldwater 
Range Yuma, AZ 
Equipped w/ STS-
12000 radar 
Marine/ 
CBP 
Defensive Overt 
Surveillanc
e/ Active 
Intercept 
N/A Hard 
/Soft 
Est. 
35000 
1 1 N/A 
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Requir
ed Low 
Observ. 
Rating 
Required 
Detection Range 
of Vehicles from 
Border 
Required 
Detection Range 
of Humans from 
Border 
Required 
Recognition  
Range from 
Border 
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Vehicles  
Required 
Tracking 
Depth of 
Humans  
Required 
Tracking Depth 
of Recognized 
IOI 
Surveillanc
e Budget 
1 1 2 1000 m 1500 m 2000 m 3000  300  10  N/A 
4 2 2 -200 m 5000 m 7000 m 4000  2000  10  N/A 
1 1 2 500 m 1500m 2000 m 2000  500  10  N/A 
4 2 5 500 m 1000 m 2500 m 2000  300  10  N/A 
5 5 5 500 m 200 m 50 m 100  30 5 N/A 
1  1 12000 6000 N/A 10000 8000 N/A N/A 
 
Table 1.7: Military scenario table 
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                         Figure 1.8: Chapter 2 master scenario table 
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Chapter 2: Analysis of Existing and Proposed Systems 
Features, Capabilities, and Market 
There are a whole range of surveillance systems currently in use by each and every one of the 
organizations examined in the previous chapter, most of whom operate multiple systems.  
Moreover, many of these organizations have one or more surveillance systems which have either 
been recently retired or are currently under development.  Each of these systems typically 
employs a variety of different surveillance assets, assets which in some cases are used by more 
than one system.  These assets are one of several components that, when combine, form a 
surveillance system.  Over the course of this chapter these systems and their components will be 
analyzed to determine the features, capabilities, and market each of them possess.  Some of the 
programs reviewed in this chapter are still under development, which means the contract for 
them has yet to be granted.  In this case there are usually multiple manufactures submitting 
surveillance systems in hopes of winning the contract associated with that program.  When this is 
the case, the first thing discussed is the program itself.  Following this introduction, the various 
surveillance systems developed for that program are reviewed.  Some of the assets and 
equipment reviewed in this chapter are sometimes employed both on larger assets as well as 
stand-alone systems/equipment.  This type of equipment will be accounted for at the end of the 
assets chapter in two subsections entitled man-portable and standalone.    
For reasons that are obvious, the surveillance assets and equipment reviewed in this chapter 
represent only a fraction of the total number of assets and equipment that are either in service, 
testing, or have been recently retired.  The assets and equipment chosen for review have been 
selected based on the following criteria: 
• the extent to which  an asset is or has been used  
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• the impact resulting from the use of an asset 
• the historical importance of an asset 
• how the performance of an asset ranks relative like assets (e.g., the Predator and Darkstar 
are both large UAVs) 
• the relationship between an asset and the condition/capability of an organization 
discussed in chapter 1 – assets eluded to or mentioned explicitly in chapter 1 are more 
likely to be reviewed 
• how well an asset compares with another, already chosen asset (i.e., an asset may be 
selected for review primarily because it is in the same class as another, already chosen 
one; allowing for comparison between the two).  
The need to develop a working database of assets and equipment has placed additional 
restrictions on which will be selected for inclusion and which will not.  Originally, the hope was 
to develop a database that models a full range of surveillance assets, from UAVs to those that are 
man-portable.  Recent research has numerous systems that are similar to the PSN, so numerous 
that even some of those will not be included.  Based on this revelation, only those assets that are 
similar to the PSN (in both terms of cost and service) have been reviewed in this chapter.  
However, the variables and descriptions of them remain unchanged.  This means that, if time 
allows, it is possible to add additional assets.  
In addition to the criteria above, those assets and equipment designed by FLIR have been granted 
special consideration.  FLIR, one of the largest manufactures of DoD and CBP assets and 
equipment, recently purchased ICx Technologies (ICx), another major manufacturer of assets 
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and equipment employed by the DoD and CBP.74  The decision to give priority to FLIR and ICx 
assets and equipment is even more reaffirmed given the fact that FLIR was the major supplier of 
equipment used on/by ICx assets in the years preceding FLIR’s acquisition of them.   
Note: for the sake of this thesis, a distinction will be made between goods manufactured by these 
two companies despite the fact that ICx is a subsidiary of FLIR.   
Conducting a thorough review of these systems is a necessary step in the design of the PSN.  
Depending on the surveillance asset being reviewed and the information that is available, the 
review of each will assist in determining: 
• what features and capabilities customers expect in their surveillance systems 
• what features can be harnessed for application onboard the PSN  
• what capabilities the PSN must possess in order to succeed where current systems have 
failed 
• whether existing systems are compatible with the PSN (i.e., co-operable) 
• the ease with which an organization can transition from the use of their existing system 
towards that of the PSN  
• how much organizations are willing to spend developing new surveillance systems 
• the return, in terms of surveillance capability, customers expect from their financial 
investment 
The review of surveillance systems in this chapter is broken down into two parts: surveillance 
assets and surveillance equipment.    
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Surveillance Assets 
The first part of the review process involves looking at the surveillance assets themselves.  This 
review examines the chassis of the asset completely stripped of the actual surveillance equipment 
that can be or is installed on it.  The review includes a general list of potential surveillance 
options, but nothing more.  The review of each asset is concluded with a summary.  Each 
summary is a condensed restatement of the most pertinent information within each asset’s initial 
review.75  Following the summary is a table that quantifies the data/capabilities of each.  The 
variables quantified in this table are: 
Name of Asset:  The name of the surveillance asset or system being rated  
Surveillance Mission: Indicates whether the surveillance conducted by an asset is offensive or defensive.  If an 
asset is capable of both, both are listed in the table 
Portability Rating: Indicates how portable an asset is.  This rating is based on the size and weight of an asset.  If an 
asset changes size and/or weight when it is being deployed, the size and weight of that asset in its stowed 
configuration is the data that should be entered.  Finally, The portability of each system is rated on a scale from 1 to 
10 with 10 being the most portable 
Mobility Rating: The ability of an asset to traverse rough terrain based on the published capabilities of the asset in 
question and its design features (e.g., self-propelled vs. towed, wheel vs. tracked).  This rating is takes into account 
the terrain rating of a particular scenario, rough terrains demand assets with higher mobility ratings.  Mobility is 
rated on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the most mobile 
Note: Both mobility and terrain rating take are effected by the terrain rating from chapter 2.  Moving forward, it is 
important to remember that ‘required terrain rating’ and terrain rating’ are not exclusive to one another, as is the 
case with other, seemingly ‘linked’ ratings 
Setup and Teardown Rating: This variable represents the maximum time and manpower required to initially setup 
and then later repackage an asset.  Both the time and manpower to do so are rated on a single scale from 1 to 10 with 
10 requiring the least time and manpower  
Endurance Rating: The time, in days, that a surveillance asset can operate without resupply or maintenance 
Low Observability Rating: Low observability rating is used to quantify how detectable, both when active and 
passive, a surveillance asset is with respect to other assets.  Low observability is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 
being the least detectable 
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derived from the analysis of data contained in the review.  
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Ratio of Active to Inactive Service: The ratio between the time an asset is actively performing its mission versus 
total time (e.g., a UAV that can fly for 10 hours but needs 14 hours of service to redeploy has a ratio of 10/24, or 
5/12.  Another example is a system that can operate for 12 days but needs 2 days of service to redeploy has a ratio of 
12/14, or 6/7).  Assets that can operate continuously but require refueling and/or servicing to do so receive a rating 
of 1.0 as long as that asset can operate continuously while being serviced and/or refueled.  Irregular service (e.g., 
repairs, upgrades, etc.) are not accounted for in this ratio 
Operating Cost per Month: Total cost to operate an asset (e.g., manpower, maintenance, fuel, servicing etc.).  This 
cost is calculated assuming the operational tempo of the asset under review is maximized. (e.g., a UAV takes off, 
lands, is serviced and/or receives regular maintenance, and takes off again without delay).  Operating cost per month 
is rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 representing the least expensive 
Asset Cost: The cost of a single surveillance asset 
Once all of the asset reviews are complete the review of surveillance equipment begins. 
Surveillance Equipment 
Whereas surveillance assets only looked at the chassis of assets, surveillance equipment only 
looks at the actual hardware that can be mounted on those chassis.  The review of this equipment 
is broken down into sub-sections according to the type of equipment under review (e.g., thermal 
imaging vs. Radar).  The reviews that follow are labeled according to their name and 
manufacturer.  The reviews themselves are very brief.  These reviews only contain information 
describing the strength, weaknesses and deployment for each piece of equipment.  At the end of 
each review is a table that quantifies that equipment’s capabilities.  The variables quantified in 
this table are:   
Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the effect terrain has on the capabilities of surveillance 
equipment.  The main requirement that determines what terrain rating is required of a piece of equipment is 
‘required terrain rating’ from chapter 2.  This rating does not take into account how an asset’s surveillance 
capabilities are inhibited on a terrain by terrain basis, only the general effect terrain has on an asset’s surveillance 
capability relative to other assets.  This rating varies on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the most capable of 
assets, those which are the least affected by terrain 
Foliage Rating: Foliage rating is used to quantify the effect foliage has on the surveillance capabilities of 
surveillance equipment.  As with terrain, the specific type and density of vegetation is not taken into account.  
Instead, this rating represents the extent to which any foliage inhibits the surveillance capability of an asset relative 
to other assets.  Foliage is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing an asset whose surveillance capabilities 
are least affected by foliage 
Detection Range of Vehicles: The range a surveillance asset can detect vehicles  
67 
 
 
 
Detection Range of Humans: The range a surveillance asset can detect humans 
Identification Range of Vehicles: The range a surveillance asset can detect vehicles  
Identification Range of Humans: The range a surveillance asset can detect humans 
Identification of Recognized IOIs: The range a surveillance asset can identify vehicles or humans in enough detail 
to determine their intent (e.g., a smuggler vs. a farmer).by terrain 
Equipment Cost: The cost for a single piece of surveillance equipment 
Master Table – Surveillance Assets and Equipment in Harmony 
At the end of this chapter there is a master table that contains a listing of the most common asset-
equipment combinations.  These combinations are labeled in this table under a column titled 
“Equipment Specific Asset” (e.g., a SkyWatch with STS-3000 radar and long-range FLIR would 
be titled “SkyWatch Equipped with STS-3000 and long-range FLIR”.  The capabilities recorded 
in the master table for each asset-equipment combination is based on the maximum capability of 
each piece of equipment used by that asset (e.g., if the STS 3000 radar has a detection range of 3 
km and the FLIR only 2 km, the detection range recorded for that particular asset-equipment 
combination is 3 km.  That said, since the radar has no ability to identify IOI, the value recorded 
in that row for identification is that of the FLIR).  The unique surveillance qualities (e.g., the 
height of one asset vs. another) are accounted for in other asset-specific variables such as terrain 
rating.  This table contains three additional variables that can only be quantified once an 
equipment specific asset has been chosen.  The headings for these variables are: 
Surveillable Area of Detection: The total area, in meters, an asset can provide full time surveillance capable of 
detecting and tracking of IOI.  Area does not account for terrain (e.g., mountains limiting the coverage of ground 
radar).  This variable applies almost exclusively to airborne assets76, the surveillable area is calculated in one of two 
ways.   Depending on the type of surveillance being performed, airborne assets will either fly a circular or linear 
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less of an effect.  The reason behind having this object is to take into account the total area an asset can survey 
‘nearly uninterrupted’.  The speed of airborne assets is substantially greater than that of ground or maritime assets, 
thereby allowing them to cover more ground in a short period of time (hence the ‘nearly uninterrupted’). 
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path.  If an asset is providing either defensive or offensive surveillance around an installation or objective with a 
perimeter then the type of flight path flown is circular (i.e., orbital).   
The surveillable area of detection is based on that assets detection range and the size of the perimeter being 
surveyed.  If the mission performed is defensive surveillance, the surveillance asset flies a circular orbit that has a 
radius (from the center of the perimeter) that is equal to the radius of that perimeter plus that asset’s detection range.  
The total surveillable area flown on a defensive mission is equal to:  =  − 		
 where r is the orbital radius 
and a is the radius of the perimeter (see Figure 2.1 for a visual).  If the mission is offensive surveillance, the total 
surveillable area flown on a defensive mission is equal to:  =  + where r is the orbital radius and b is the 
radius of the surveillance asset (see Figure 2.2 for a visual).   
If the asset is providing either offensive or defensive surveillance of a border, the total area that asset can survey is 
based on the asset’s airspeed and detection range.  The length of an assets detection range is based on the distance 
that asset, while flying a straight flight path that is parallel to the border, can fly before turning around and tracking 
along its path in such time that an IOI traveling at 50 km/h would only have travelled from the fringe of the assets 
detection range to a half way across the total width of the detection area (i.e., from the very border to just under the 
airborne asset).  This calculation can be summarized as: 			
	/	50	/ℎ

	/	2
	∗ 	 of 
the asset in km/h.  For defensive surveillance, the asset flies so that its detection range just makes contact with the 
border (see Figure 2.3 for a visual).  For offensive surveillance, the asset flies along the border itself. (see the 
Figure 2.4 for visual). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Defensive perimeter surveillance 
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Figure 2.2: Offensive perimeter surveillance
 
Figure 2.3: Defensive border surveillance
 
Figure 2.4: Offensive border surveillance 
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Terrain Rating: Terrain rating is used to quantify the effect terrain has on the capabilities of surveillance assets.  
The main requirement that determines what terrain rating is required of an asset is ‘required terrain rating’ from 
chapter 2.  This rating does not take into account how an asset’s surveillance capabilities are inhibited on a terrain by 
terrain basis, only the general effect terrain has on an asset’s surveillance capability relative to other assets.  This 
rating varies on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the most capable of assets, those which are the least affected 
by terrain 
Equipment Specific Asset Cost: The per unit cost of a single surveillance asset.  Any systems that require more 
than one asset to operate must record the cost of each asset in its own row77 
When assembled, the variables above form a table identical to the one below: 
Equipment 
Specific 
Asset 
Mission 
Type 
Port. 
Rating 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Endurance 
Rating 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans 
Recognition 
Range 
Surveillable 
Area of 
Detection 
Mobility 
Rating 
          
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Low 
Observ 
Rating 
Ratio of Active 
to Inactive 
Service 
Resiliency 
Rating 
Personnel 
Cost Per 
Month 
Estimated Maintenance 
and Resupply Cost Per 
Month 
Total Operating 
Cost Per Month 
Acquisition 
Cost Per 
Asset 
         
 
Table 2.1: Sample performance table for surveillance assets 
 
This table is the same one used to rate the capabilities of individual assets and equipment.  Depending 
which is being reviewed, the unused columns are marked N/A. 
Surveillance Assets 
The reviews conducted in this chapter are limited to the generic platform of the asset itself.  The 
features and surveillance equipment that can be or is installed are listed, but nothing more.  
Following the review of these assets is a table containing the data/capabilities of this equipment.  
The master table at the end of this chapter contains a listing of the most common asset-
equipment combinations.  These combinations are labeled in the scenario title (e.g., a SkyWatch 
with STS-3000 radar and long-range FLIR would be titled “SkyWatch Equipped with STS-3000 
and long-range FLIR”.  The capabilities recorded in the final table for each asset-equipment 
combination is based on the maximum capability of each piece of equipment used by that asset 
                                                            
77
 This is referring systems that cannot operate without multiple components, but components that do not always 
share a set ratio between the two (or greater).  For example, a system  may require sensors an a communications 
uplink.  If, in scenario one, the system uses 5 sensors per uplink the cost will be different than in scenario two which 
uses 15 sensors per uplink.  To counter this problem, both the sensor and uplink must be logged as different 
surveillance assets.  The uplink does not need to have all attributes filled out, only those which pertain to the 
complete system itself (in this case the range it can communicate with sensors and its per unit cost). 
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(e.g., if the STS 3000 radar has a range of 3 km and the FLIR only a detection range of 2 km, the 
detection range recorded for that particular asset-equipment combination is 3 km.  That said, 
since the radar has no ability to identify IOI, the value recorded in that row for identification is 
that of the FLIR).  The unique surveillance qualities (e.g., the height of one asset vs. another) is 
accounted for in other asset-specific variables such as terrain rating. 
Mobile Surveillance Capabilities Program (MSC)                                                                   
recently awarded contract: U.S. CBP 
The MSC program is the first of two large contracts handed out by CBP after the cancellation of 
SBI.  This contract, which was initially valued at $45 million, has risen in value of $102 
million.78  According to CBP, the goal of the MSC program is to develop and deploy assets that 
can:  
“…provide area surveillance in rural, remote areas over a range of 8 to 12 kilometers. 
Capabilities are detection, identification, and tracking IOI until successfully ending in a law 
enforcement conclusion. Sensory equipment may include electro-optical/infrared cameras; 
ground surveillance radars; laser range finders; laser illuminators; global positioning systems; 
and command, control, and communication systems. The mobile nature of MSC allows Border 
Patrol to relocate surveillance assets based on changes in threat patterns and provides area 
coverage.”79   `                
This system employs the use of vehicles to rapidly deploy and redeploy advanced sensor 
equipment, equipment which is either towed behind or mounted on the delivery vehicle.   This 
setup makes the MSC the most mobile, high-end surveillance asset CBP possesses – discounting 
                                                            
78
 Hock, Jessica. “FLIR Purchases ICx Technologies for $274 million.” Oregon Business, August 16, 2010.   
79
 IT Program Assessment: Customs and Border Protection Mobile Surveillance System. U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security: Office of the Chief Information Officer, March 2012. p. 1 
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their air and marine assets.  A key distinction between the MSC and other surveillance assets 
deployed by CBP is the manned nature of the system.  All but one of the potential contractors 
examined in this thesis put forward concepts which were manned, including the contractor who 
eventually won – FLIR.  FLIR’s entry, codenamed SkyWatch, is a derivative of the SkyWatch 
tower which has been manufactured by ICx for over a decade now.80 
SkyWatch Manned Mobile Security System                                  
developed by ICx 
According to FLIR, there are currently 100 SkyWatch towers is service along the northern and 
southern borders, with additional towers in use with LE.81  Unlike some of its competitors, 
SkyWatch is not a self-propelled system.  It is towed to an area and then setup.  Despite this 
shortcoming, SkyWatch is a proven, modular, upgradable, and mobile surveillance system.  The 
only down sides to this system is that it is expensive, manned82, limited in its ability to see over 
rough terrain, and difficult if not impossible to deploy on rough terrain.  The core component of 
the SkyWatch system is the tower, one version of which can been Figure 2.5 on the next page.  
These towers come in three models: generic, Sentinel and Frontier.  The only major differences 
between the two final assets are that the Frontier is designed for longer deployments, can carry a 
wider variety of sensors, and is better equipped to function as command and control center (than 
the Sentinel). 
                                                            
80
 ICx is a recently purchased and now wholly owned subsidiary of FLIR, one of the world’s premier manufacturer 
of military grade surveillance equipment. 
81
 White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 4 
82
 Some SkyWatch towers are manned, some are not.   Based on research conducted into their use by CBP, I have 
come to the conclusion that the majority of the towers operated by CBP are manned. 
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Figure 2.5: SkyWatch towers in use by CBP.  Note the second tower on the right, and what is              
likely a third even further down the road83   
The generic SkyWatch towers have been in production for over 10 years.  These towers are not 
equipped with the high-end sensors available on the other two nor were these the models that 
won the MSC contract.  With that in mind, the Sentinel and Frontier did compete for it.  These 
two towers are the same height (25ft), can be ordered with either a one or two person cab, and 
can be equipped according to the needs of the operator.84  Some of the features typically found 
on the Sentinel and Frontier towers are:85 
• short and medium range radar 
• thermal cameras 
• public address systems 
• ability to record data from all monitoring devices 
• ballistic resistant plating 
                                                            
83
 White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 1 
84
 SkyWatch data sheet and brochure.  FLIR, February 2013. p. 2 
85
 Ibid. p. 2 
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• solar and diesel power 
• command and control suite 
• communications technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite, etc.) 
When equipped with the right combination of these features, the SkyWatch Frontier, the model 
that has been purchased by CBP, is an exceptionally effective system that should be capable of 
fulfilling the goals expected of it as winner of the MSC contract.   Unfortunately, if Figure 2.5 is 
any indicator, it appears that some of these towers have either not been equipped with the 
necessary features or the installed features are not being fully utilized.86   
Figure 2.5 depicts several SkyWatch towers arrayed side by side along a rural road.  The MSC 
program stated that a single MSC asset should have rural area surveillance capabilities that 
enable it to detect and identify IOI at a range of 8 to 12 km.  This is clearly not the case with the 
CBP towers depicted in Figure 2.5.  If this image is any sign of how these towers will be 
deployed in the future then their deployment is and will continue to be a misappropriation of 
resources.  Finally, these towers are not cheap.  It was reported that a LE version, which lacked 
both radar and FLIR cameras, was purchased for $119,000 by the San Diego Police Department 
using funds provided to them via a miscellaneous DHS grant.87  Considering the type of sensor 
systems (e.g., radar, FLIR, etc.), armor, and communications employed on the CBP versions of 
SkyWatch Frontiers, it would not be surprising if the generic legacy towers cost $250,000 or 
more.  One this is certain: the fixed price of each ‘stripped’ tower purchased by the U.S. 
government.   
                                                            
86
 It is not clear what type of tower is depicted in Figure 2.5.  If these are the generic, legacy towers that have been 
around for over a decade, the deployed with which they have been deployed would make more sense.  However, it 
does appear that these towers have been upgraded with high-end imaging equipment.  It is important to acknowledge 
that this picture was taken from a 2013 ICx white paper on border surveillance, something that suggests these are the 
newer models. 
87
 Davis, Katrina. “Police to buy mobile observation tower.” U-T San Diego, March 2, 2009. 
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In 2005 ICx signed a contract with the General Services Administration (GSA).  This contract 
fixed the acquisition cost of various ICx assets purchased by the government from 2006-2012.  
In this document there are several assets reviewed in this chapter, seven of which are different 
versions of SkyWatch towers:88 
• SW ‐ 1002 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Sentinel $73,171.28 
• SW ‐ 1003 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier $87,770.78 
• SW ‐ 1005 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier ‐ Level National Instituted of Justice (NIJ) 
III Antiballistic Cab $139,806.17 
• SW ‐ 1006 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier ‐ Level NIJ IV Antiballistic Cab 
$165,149.50 
• SW ‐ 2003 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier (two man cab) $110,402.78 
• SW ‐ 2005 PLATFORMS SkyWatch Frontier 2 Man ‐ Level NIJ III $165,013.24 
Examination of pictures taken clearly show that the type of towers purchased by CBP are the 
$165,013 2 man Frontiers with NIJ level III ballistic protection.89  However, many of these could 
be legacy towers that have been upgraded with a new cab containing , which when outfit with 
various types of equipment, could run well over half a million dollars.  The seventh and final 
‘version’ of interest described in the previous paragraph is product MSS‐MSP‐LR PLATFORMS 
Mobile Sensor Platform $737,546.39.  There is very little information surrounding this system 
which, since it is included in this document, predates the MSC contract.  Nonetheless, the 
                                                            
88
 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE AUTHORIZED FEDERAL SUPPLY 
SCHEDULE PRICE LIST, CONTRACT NUMBER:GS-07F-0117U, U.S. General Services Administration, 
2005. p. 111 
89
 Figure 2.5 highlights the use of this ballistic protection.  The standard Frontier cab is flush with the windows; 
cabs outfitted with ballistic plating are not flush and noticeably protrude from the cab. 
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additional info in this document confirms that a 2013 MSC equipped SkyWatch would cost at 
least $750,000, if not more.90   
Summary 
The SkyWatch has the potential to meet the criteria expected of it as the winner of the MSC 
contract, only time will tell.  The cost of an individual SkyWatch tower is a major deficit.   
However, the fact that these towers are based on platforms already possessed by CBP should 
make their integration with other assets easier than it otherwise would be.  In the long-term, the 
decade-old SkyWatch towers could be outfit to MSC standards for less than the cost of a new 
Frontier or Sentinel.  When it comes to mobility, SkyWatch is the most mobile high-end 
surveillance system possessed by CBP.  Unfortunately, its mobility and ability to provide 
surveillance over large areas has limitations, limitations which may inhibit or completely 
prohibit its use in mountainous terrain.  Perhaps the most appealing feature of SkyWatch is its 
ability to act as a mobile command and control center, a capability that CBP did not possess 
before institution of the MSC program.   
Features and Capabilities:  
• mobile 
• 1 to 3 person crew 
• 8-12 km detection and identification radius (on relatively level terrain) 
• 2-3 km detailed identification radius (est., on relatively level terrain) 
• capable of operating for 300 hours without resupply91 
                                                            
90
 The cost estimate of $750,000 is based on an in depth review of the ICx/GSA contract.  This contract includes all 
options, including sensors and communications equipment that would be used on an MSC equipped SkyWatch.   
91
 The actual endurance of all assets reviewed in this chapter depend on what sensors are equipped.  
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• short-range radar (capable of detecting both individuals, ground vehicles, and 
ultra-lights) 
• thermal, IR, and conventional cameras 
• public address systems 
• ability to record data from all monitoring devices 
• ballistic resistant plating 
• solar and diesel power 
• command and control suite 
• communications technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite, etc.) 
• per unit cost: $80,000 to $750,000 
Performance Matrix:  
Asset or 
System 
Mission 
Type 
Port. 
Rating 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Endurance 
Rating 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans 
Recognition 
Range 
Surveillable 
Area of 
Detection 
Mobility 
Rating 
SkyWatch Def.    N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Low 
Observ
Rating 
Ratio of Active 
to Inactive 
Service 
Resiliency 
Rating 
Personnel 
Cost Per 
Month 
Estimated 
Maintenance and 
Resupply Cost Per 
Month 
Total Operating 
Cost Per Month 
Acquisition 
Cost Per Asset 
        N/A 
 
Table 2.2: Performance matrix for SkyWatch  
 
ThreatSTALKER Surveillance System (TSS)        
developed by Telephonics  
The TSS, see Figure 2.6 below, is an evolved version of the system developed by Telephonics 
Corp. in its bid to win the MSC contract.  The first noticeable difference between this system and 
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                    Figure 2.6: ThreatSTALKER with partially retracted sensor suite92 
SkyWatch is that TSS is self- propelled.  This system has the capability to be outfit with all of 
the same sensors used by the SkyWatch.93  It does however lack some of the command and 
control capability94 and cannot remain on sight as long without resupply (diesel tank is not as 
large).  The entire system, which weighs 3,800lbs, sits on a two axle, flatbed truck that itself 
weighs 6,500lbs.  Although Telephonics lost the MSC contract, the TSS’s comparatively low 
weight and extreme mobility make it an excellent choice for operators who work in a more 
dynamic environment, such as the U.S. military.95   
The second major difference between the TSS and SkyWatch is that TSS is only designed to 
accommodate two operators.  These operators are required to work from a 15” display that can 
                                                            
92
 Telephonics: Ground Surveillance Radar and Long Range Systems. Armed Forces International, 2012. Accessed 
March 3, 2012 from: http://www.armedforces-int.com/suppliers/air-traffic-control-systems.html 
93
 Mobile Surveillance Capability. Telephonics Corporation, 2012. p. 2 
94
 ThreatSTALKER still has the ability to act as a command and control vehicle, one that could be equipped to 
mirror the capabilities of SkyWatch.  However, SkyWatch’s superior ergonomics and its ability to sustain long-term 
deployments make it a better choice for use as a command and control asset 
95
 Oddly enough, different variants of the SkyWatch towers are already in service with the military while no 
information exist that suggest the military has purchased a single TSS.  One possible explanation of this phenomena 
is that the military already has multiple contracts with both FLIR and ICx. 
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be used from inside or outside the vehicle.96  By comparison, the SkyWatch system can carry up 
to three operators in a much larger space, all of whom interface with a display much larger than 
that equipped on TSS.  Moreover, these operators are able to use their own eyes to survey the 
terrain, a feature not found on the TSS.   
Summary 
TSS is a system that fulfills the gap between semi-mobile assets like SkyWatch and completely 
mobile, less equipped assets.  Although not the ideal asset for sustained surveillance, it is ideal 
for scenarios in which a more mobile, yet still very capable, surveillance asset is required.   
Features and Capabilities 
• highly mobile 
• 2 person crew 
• 8-12 km detection and identification radius (on relatively level terrain) 
• 2-3 km detailed identification radius  (est., on relatively level terrain) 
• short-range ground radar  
• thermal cameras 
• electro-optical cameras 
• ability to record data from all monitoring devices 
• ballistic resistant plating 
• solar and diesel power 
• 150 hour endurance without resupply 
• command and control suite 
                                                            
96
 “Telephonics: Ground Surveillance Radar and Long Range Systems.” Armed Forces International, 2012. 
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• communications technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, cellular, satellite, etc.) 
• per unit cost: not available, likely $200,000 or more 
Performance Matrix: 
Asset 
or 
System 
Mission 
Type 
Port. 
Rating 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Enduranc
e Rating 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans 
Recognition 
Range 
Surveillable 
Area of 
Detection 
Mobility 
Rating 
TSS Def.    N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Low 
Observ 
Rating 
Ratio of 
Active to 
Inactive 
Service 
Resiliency 
Rating 
Personnel Cost 
Per Month 
Estimated 
Maintenance and 
Resupply Cost Per 
Month 
Total Operating 
Cost Per Month 
Acquisiti
on Cost 
Per 
Asset 
        N/A 
 
Table 2.3: Performance matrix for the TSS 
 
Cam-V Mobile Security System                                         
developed by Advanced Security Products (ASP)  
The Cam-V, developed in Texas by ASP, stands out from its competitors, SkyWatch and TSS, in that it is 
entirely unmanned.  Indications are that the Cam-V was ruled out as a potential candidate for the MSC 
contract early on, but this in no way diminishes the worth of the system.  It is however considerably less 
capable than both the SkyWatch and TSS.  Moreover, there is the possibility that the Cam-V will win or 
at least be considered for another one of CBP’s outstanding contracts, the Integrated Fixed Tower 
program (IFT). 
The Cam-V can be outfit with an array of sensors from static, long distance IR cameras to FLIR cameras.  
These cameras are mounted on a 23ft mast (see Figure 2.6 below), not far off the 25ft mark set by
TSS and SkyWatch.
97
  Unfortunately, the Cam-V cannot be equipped with either radar or high-end FLIR. 
This limits its nighttime detection of IOI to roughly 2,000ft and identification to only 500ft.
98
  It also lacks 
the command and control capabilities of the other two systems.  Despite these drawbacks, the Cam-V 
                                                            
97
 Cam-V Mobile Security System Spec-Sheet. Cameras Onsite, 2013 p. 2 
98
 Ibid. p.2 
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does have two distinct advantages over both 
the TSS and SkyWatch: endurance and 
cost.While TSS and SkyWatch measure their 
endurance by the hour (30 to 150), the Cam-V 
can operate a full month without support.99  This 
makes the Cam-V an ideal choice in regions that 
require considerable effort to setup, maintain, 
and take down a surveillance system.  
Unfortunately, being unmanned the Cam- V may 
be a more tempting target for vandals than its 
competitors.  The system is equipped with an 
automated alarm and motion detection that, 
when triggered, audibly warns those who 
approach with either a siren, pre-recorded 
message, or a live message sent from an off-site 
operator.  However, if vandals/threats ignore this 
warning it may only give them further cause to 
take out the system (particularly at night when it 
may otherwise be hard to see).100  With this in 
mind, the Cam-V cost between $39,000 and                                   
$70,000101, considerably less expensive than 
                                                             
99
 Gunter, Ford. “Local Firms Mobile Surveillance 
System Could be Border Solution.  Houston Business 
Journal, 2012. 
100
 Ibid. p. 2 
101
 When considering cost it is more reasonable to 
presume that CBP would purchase the highest trim 
Cam-V possible since it is the only one that has 
both the TSS and SkyWatch.102       
 
Figure 2.7: Cam-V fully deployed103
                                                                                           
capabilities remotely approaching those of either the 
TSS or SkyWatch. 
102
 Gunter, Ford. “Local Firms Mobile Surveillance 
System Could be Border Solution.  Houston Business 
Journal, 2012. 
103
 The Cam-V in the picture is equipped with 
defensive dome security cameras, low-equality 
thermal imaging equipment, and standard (high-
quality) long-range day time optics.  
Cam-V Mobile Security System Spec-Sheet. Cameras 
Onsite, 2013 p. 1 
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Summary 
The Cam-V is an excellent choice for mobile surveillance in almost any terrain.  Its most 
defining and appealing feature is also the one that is the most inhibiting: like the SkyWatch, it is 
not a self-propelled.  The advantage the Cam-V has over the SkyWatch is that it is smaller, a 
quality that makes it less expensive, easier to transport, and easier to deploy.   The size of the 
Cam-V means that nearly any vehicle operated by the military, public, or private sectors is 
capable of transporting it from location to location.   
Performance Matrix: 
Asset or 
System 
Mission 
Type 
Port. 
Ratin
g 
Setup and 
Teardown 
Rating 
Endurance 
Rating 
Detection 
Range of 
Vehicles 
Detection 
Range of 
Humans 
Recognition 
Range 
Surveillable 
Area of 
Detection 
Mobility 
Rating 
Cam-V Def.    N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Terrain 
Rating 
Foliage 
Rating 
Low 
Observ 
Rating 
Ratio of Active 
to Inactive 
Service 
Resiliency 
Rating 
Personnel 
Cost Per 
Month 
Estimated Maintenance 
and Resupply Cost Per 
Month 
Total Operating 
Cost Per Month 
Acquisition 
Cost Per 
Asset 
         
 
Table 2.4: Performance matrix for the Cam-V 
 
Important Information Regarding the Reviews of the Remaining Assets 
The task of rating surveillance assets required far more time than initially expected.  As a result, 
the only assets that have undergone intense review are those above.  The following assets and 
programs are brief descriptions that, at most, include a picture of the system.  In most cases 
however there is only a sentence or two for each.   
Integrated Fixed Tower Program (IFT)                                       
outstanding contract:  CBP  
IFT is the second of two large, outstanding contracts up for award by CBP as part of the post-
SBI initiative.  The driving force behind the acquisition of these towers as described by DHS is:                    
83 
 
 
 
“…to provide commercial-off-the-shelf/government-off-the-shelf 
solutions for deployment at fixed, elevated sites, hereafter referred 
to as integrated fixed towers that would provide automated, 
persistent, wide area surveillance, the detection, tracking, 
identification, and classification of illegal entries.”104   
The concept behind the IFT is the use of unmanned towers, towers which are almost exclusively equipped 
with radar, and in most cases radars manufactured by ICx.  The exact range and cost of an individual IFT 
system depends on the asset’s manufacturer and equipment installed (e.g., STS-350, STS-1400, STS-
12000, etc.) on it, but the current contract is for $98.1 million105.  The following are a few of the entries 
submitted for consideration by CBP (Cam-V is not included in this review but is a possible contender): 
Integrated Fixed Tower Border Surveillance System (IFTBSS)                                     
developed by Telephonics 
 
 
             Figure 2.8: Telephonics IFTBSS network demonstration106 
                                                            
104
 “Integrated Fixed Towers.” Federal Business Opportunities Office, January 2011. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 “Ground Surveillance Systems IFT” Telephonics, March 2013. 
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Cerberus Unmanned Surveillance Tower System                                
developed by ICx  
 
 
                   Figure 2.9: Cerberus IFT in the deployed position107  
 
Summary 
The IFT contract is similar to the MSC but may be an even more valuable and effective 
surveillance asset, particularly when the scenario requires a rapidly deployable system that can 
be delivered via a medium sized transport aircraft (e.g., C-130). 
                                                            
107
 “ICx Technologies Inc.” Security Technology News, April 2013. 
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Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) and Agent/Man Portable Security System (APSS)  
Both the RVSS and APSS are contracts that CBP funded as part of the alternative SBI program.  
The primary difference between the two is that one is man portable while the other is remotely 
operated.  Both assets are intended to provide surveillance via the use of electro-optical cameras 
(e.g., thermal, image intensifying, simple low-light digital). 
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
The use of UAVs by both CBP and the military has risen considerably over the past decade.  
Current use of UAVs in places like Afghanistan outpaces the manufactures ability build them, a 
fact which has taken what was once a low production asset and turned it into a virtual assembly 
line of relatively inexpensive surveillance assets.108    Not only are UAVs less expensive to 
purchase, they are also far less expensive to operate than manned aircraft.  The cost of acquiring 
and operating them has dropped low enough to allow for their use by organizations, like CBP, 
that have been traditionally unable to acquire the same expensive, high-end surveillance assets 
used by the military.  The surveillance capability of UAVs varies widely depending on the type 
of asset and the equipment installed on it.  The UAVs presented in the next few pages are from 
more than one ‘class’ of asset; some of them cost less than a million dollars while others that are 
far more capable and survivable cost tens of millions of dollars and are capable of both detecting, 
tracking, and engaging IOIs.  The first of these unmanned aircraft to be introduced is that which 
has become the most recognizable in the world, the Predator.   
                                                            
108
 Cost is relative to that of a manned aircraft capable of delivering a similar level of surveillance.  
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General Atomics RQ-1 (AKA MQ-1A) Predator 
 
 
            Figure 2.10: RQ-1 taking off in Afghanistan109 
General Atomics MQ-9 (AKA the MQ-1B) Predator  
 
 
             Figure 2.11: MQ-9 armed with laser guided bombs110  
                                                            
109
 “Factsheet: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” U.S. Air Force, November 5, 2008. 
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Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel 
 
 
Figure 2.12: RQ-170 rendering based on images of a RQ-170 shot down over Iran
111
   
                
 
Manned Surveillance Aircraft and Helicopters           
Similar to UAVs, many models of manned aircraft have been developed by multiple 
manufactures and are in service with multiple organizations.  The aircraft and helicopter 
presented on the next page represent only a small fraction of those currently in service.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
110
 “Factsheet: MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Air Force, January 5, 2012.  
111
 “Iran Shows Film of Captured US Drone.” BBC World News, December 8, 2011. 
88 
 
 
 
Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion 
 
 
Figure 2.12: P-3 at Lockheed Martin’s Greenville facility112 
UH-60 Blackhawk 
 
 
Figure 2.13: CBP UH-60 at Dover Air Force Base Dover, DE113 
                                                            
112
 “Greenville Operations.” Lockheed Martin, April 2013.  
113
 “Customs Blackhawk from Tucson Air Branch at Dover A.F.B. to provide air security.” Customs and Border 
Protection, April 2013. 
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Additional Surveillance Assets  
The surveillance assets below are either platforms that do not fall within one of the prescribed 
categories or they are assets which augment other assets in an indirect manner. 
Micro-UGS 
FLIR Thermal Fence                             
ICx Deployment Rapid Deployment Software 
Micro-UAVs 
                                                    
Reviews of Surveillance Equipment 
Preliminary Introduction to Surveillance Technologies 
The surveillance equipment reviewed in this chapter are organized into sections based on the 
type of technology each them uses.  Prior to a review of the individual pieces of surveillance 
equipment is a brief introduction to the parent class to which that equipment belongs.  First 
however is an introduction to some broader technologies that apply across the board to two or 
more of these sections.  
Generic Technologies: 
Optical Zoom: This is the type of magnification used by most of the daytime optics sold to 
consumers.  It functions by adjusting the focal length.  The quality/resolution of the image 
generated by this type of camera is the same regardless of whether it is zoomed or not.  The only 
things that reduce the quality of a camera using optical zoom is the size of the lens, the quality of 
the lens, and atmospheric conditions.114 
                                                            
114
 There are other limitations that could be taken into account if using optical zoom in a place like space.  These 
however are the variables that most affect optical zoom under standard atmospheric conditions (on or close to the 
Earth’s surface). 
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Digital Zoom: This is the type of zoom used on commercial cell-phones.  The image being 
magnified has a preset resolution that is defined by the number pixels in that image.  Digital 
zoom does not sharpen the overall image itself, it only magnifies the individual pixels that make 
up the larger image.  As the digital zoom of an image increases the quality/resolution of that 
image decreases.  
 
Surveillance Equipment 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)  
This technology is used in surveillance components to generate an image day or night.  FLIR is 
synonymous with thermal imaging.  Cameras that employ this technology create an image based 
on the subtle differences in temperature of the objects in that cameras field of view (FOV).115  
This technology is excellent at detecting and identifying objects at night or in cooler regions.  
The closer the temperature of the surrounding terrain is to that of the IOI the more difficult it is 
to detect and identify that IOI.116  FLIR cameras range in price from several thousand to over a 
hundred thousand dollars, depending in large part on the resolution of the camera (which is 
directly related to the number of thermal reflectors, the truly expensive part of thermal cameras).   
Since FLIR cameras create an image without needing to generate their IR light they are 
extremely energy efficient.117   
Some examples of FLIR equipment and their cost are: 
FLIR 432-0010-01-00 MD-324 Static Thermal Night Vision Camera - $3,036 
                                                            
115
 “What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 2013.   
116
 Email correspondence with PTZ systems. 
117
 “What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 2013.   
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PTZ M-1D - $4,000-$15,000 
Pelco / Schneider Electric - ESTI335-5N - Ip/analog P/t Thermal Camera 384x288 Res, 
120/230vac, 35mm Lens, Pedestal Mount - $16,327 
Samsung Techwin - SCB-9051 - Analog Thermal Imaging Camera, 20x240 - $8,721 
Samsung SCB-9080 50mm Lens 1.2Km Range Weatherproof  - $7,479 
US Night Vision ATAC 360º Wireless Pan/Tilt 000615 - $6,995 
Unfortunately there wasn’t enough time to gather and present data on all this equipment.  The 
important thing to take away from this section is that the FLIR/thermal equipment shown here is 
expensive, very expensive.  Most of the equipment above, despite being expensive, is only 
capable of detecting humans inside of 800m and recognizing them inside of 200m.   
 
Infrared LED Imaging (IR LED) 
IR LED cameras (aka Near-Infrared Illumination cameras) are day time cameras that, when used 
at night, transition from seeing in color to only black and white.118  These cameras rely on IR 
light generated by the camera itself.  This light is generated by several LEDs that surround the 
camera.  Typical IR LED cameras can only see between 50 and150ft at night.  Moreover, the 
image generated is low quality and the power required to run them is high (because they generate 
their own IR light).119  The advantage to using IR LED cameras is that they are extremely cheap 
compared to other night vision cameras, ranging in price from $35 to $500.   
 
                                                            
118
 “How Night Vision Works.” Sofradir EC Night Vision Systems, 2013.   
119
 “What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 2013.   
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Image Intensifying  
Cameras that employ image intensifying technology are nothing more than extremely sensitive 
daytime cameras.  These cameras are usually referred to as Night Vision Goggles (NVG).120  An 
NVG camera works by magnifying the miniscule amount of visible light present at night to such 
an extent that it produces an image.121  The image produced by NVG cameras is the classic green 
and black usually used by military forces on the ground or in the air (e.g. the large binocular 
goggles used by helicopter pilots to see at night).  The short coming of these cameras is that they 
do not work well in environments almost completely void of ambient light (e.g., in the desert that 
is hundreds of miles from the nearest city on a moonless night).122  The picture quality generated 
and viewable distance NVG cameras can see varies depending the generation of NVG used.  
High-end NVG cameras are Gen-3 with illuminators, also known unofficially as Gen-4.  One of 
the major benefits of using NVG technology is that it can be combine with traditional devices to 
generate clear, optically zoomed, images, the type of technology perfect for use as either a 
spotting or rifle scope.  This technology is less expensive than thermal but substantially more 
than IR LED (several hundred to several thousand dollars).  Finally, these cameras/optics are 
typically only used by military and law enforcement personnel.   
There wasn’t enough time to catalogue even a few of image-intensifying cameras on the market, 
but they are a serious technology to consider when creating a new breed of surveillance systems.  
However, after a careful review of the surveillance equipment on the market it was found that 
not a single one of them that uses image-intensifying technology are designed for use as a fixed, 
defensive surveillance system.  This fact suggests that there may be some downside to using 
                                                            
120
 Ibid. 
121
 “How Night Vision Works.” Sofradir EC Night Vision Systems, 2013.   
122
 Ibid. 
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them in this manner, a downside that the research performed in the writing of this thesis has 
failed to uncover. 
 
Ground Based Radar 
There are many varieties of ground based radar, each of which has its limitations.  Some of these 
radars are over 30 m tall and have a range of 80 km, others are man portable and have a range of 
only a few hundred meters.  Similarly, some radars are capable of detecting a man slowly 
crawling while others can detect objects moving through dense foliage several km away.  All of 
these radars have one thing in common: they are all only capable of detecting and tracking IOIs.  
The following is a list of radars made by ICx, each of which is named according to the maximum 
range of that particular system (e.g., a STS-350 has a range of 350m).  Unfortunately, the STS-
350 is the only system for which procurement and operational cost could be found. 
STS-350  
 
 
                                                  Figure 2.14: STS-350 ground based radar123 
                                                            
123
 White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 6 
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The prices below only reflect the cost of the radar itself, not the additional equipment that is 
required to make it operational.  Also, these prices have been taken from the company webpage 
which was advertising a buyback and upgrade program which means they may or may not be the 
standard price or the price that ICx has negotiated with some of its larger customers. 
Trade in value per STS-350 radar (regardless of condition) - $13,450.  
New STS-350 EP model radar with trade - $15,990.  
New STS-350 ER (700m) model radar with trade - $18,990.  
All new STS-350 & STS-350ER radars include the latest hardware and software and a full 12-
month limited warranty 
STS-1400 
 
 
                                         Figure 2.15: STS-1400 ground based radar124 
                                                            
124
 White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 6 
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STS-12000 
 
 
                                     Figure 2.16: STS-12000 ground based radar125 
 
Summary Analysis and Matrix 
As was the case with many of the assets and equipment that were slated for review in this 
chapter, there was not enough time to build a chapter matrix.  However, the information logged 
for the first three assets and the research performed into the IFT program and various types of 
equipment provide enough information to continue on to the next chapter.  Instead of filling out a 
performance table for every piece of asset and equipment examined in this section, that 
information will be estimated when it is required for either comparison between chapters 1 and 2 
or when input (with respect to the performance of a surveillance system) into a surveillance tool 
is required.   
 
 
                                                            
125
 White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. p. 7 
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Chapter 3: Analysis   
So far the only research performed has been on existing systems and organizations that use those 
systems.  This chapter takes that information and uses it to synthesize a surveillance asset 
capable of replacing or augmenting existing systems; systems that are capable of filling the gap 
that exist between an organization’s needs (criteria) and the capability of the surveillance asset 
(s) currently employed by them (condition).  The first step in this process is to analyze the data 
gathered in chapters 1 and 2. 
Analysis of Chapters 1 and 2 
The reviews conducted in the first two chapters have revealed the requirements of organizations 
that use surveillance systems, the assets in use by them, and the capabilities of those assets.  
These reviews contain a large amount of information, most of which is used later in this thesis.  
For now, the relevant information contained in these chapters is found in the master tables at the 
end of each.  Analysis of these two tables paints a picture of how surveillance systems are 
currently used, the weaknesses that result from the way in which they are deployed, and what 
existing surveillance assets are ideal for each scenario (with respect to those that are currently in 
use).   
Tooling up the Analytical Process 
An analytical tool has been developed to make this analysis faster and easier than it would 
otherwise be.  This tool is the Scenario Specific Optimization of Surveillance Assets (SOSA, 
SSOSA just doesn’t sound right).  SOSA provides the user with ability to perform three 
functions.  First, it generates a topographic map for each of the scenarios in chapter 1, a map that 
includes the detection ranges and tracking depths of the assets used.  This map is useful in 
determining how effective the current assets are and how resilient that system is.  These 
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scenarios are preprogramed with the actual surveillance assets used in the real world.  Simply 
select the scenario in sheet 2 and view the map in sheet 4.  The second function provided by 
SOSA is the ability to customize the surveillance assets used in each scenario.  If the user would 
like to choose a different set of assets to perform the same scenario -specific surveillance he or 
she can do so.  There is a button above the scenario selection column that, when pressed, clears 
the current assets but leaves both the scenario itself.  The third and final function provided by 
SOSA is the ability to automatically optimize the placement and type of surveillance assets for a 
specific scenario – either a preloaded scenario or one that is created by the user.  Despite being a 
useful and robust tool, SOSA is virtually useless if the user in not aware of the operational 
knowledge specific to each scenario. 
So what is operational knowledge and where does it come from?   Operational knowledge is 
defined as the knowledge of the role played by surveillance assets in each scenario with respect 
to the broader mission.  Furthermore, it is important to know the tactics used to accomplish that 
mission so long as those tactics are influenced by the surveillance provided by the assets used in 
each scenario.  Some of this information is contained in the first chapter, the rest will be 
provided in the pages to come.  Each of the scenarios outlined in chapter 1 are depicted in this 
chapter using SOSA.  Following this depiction is the scenario specific requirements from chapter 
1 and the capabilities of the assets, from chapter 2, employed in those scenarios.  
Note: Due to the large number of scenarios and the variety of those scenarios (in terms of both 
the type of assets employed and the type of perimeters they are deployed along), the scenarios 
depicted in this chapter have been limited to those that employ only ground based, fixed assets.  
Moreover, the types of perimeters depicted have been limited to geopolitical borders and 
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exfiltration/infiltration points of SF personnel.  Several of the other scenarios will be discussed, 
just not in the same detail as those that are depicted using SOSA.126 
Each of the scenarios that modeled by SOSA are done so in one of two ‘formats’.  The first is the 
most basic.  These are scenarios whose titles include the surveillance assets AND equipment 
installed on them in their heading (e.g. SkyWatch w/ STS-3000 radar and short-range FLIR).  
When these scenarios are selected from the interactive sheet, SOSA automatically selects those 
assets and their placement on the map.  The second type of scenario by SOSA is more complex.  
These are scenarios which have no asset or equipment associated with them.  When these 
scenarios are modeled the surveillance assets and equipment used will either be selected by the 
author or selected by SOSA (via its built in optimization function).  The following page is a 
screen capture of SOSA’s main interactive sheet, Table 3.1. (not the final tool, only a beta-
design).  Immediately following the interactive sheet is Figure 3.1, an example of the map 
generated by SOSA using its sensor-optimization function. 
Findings  
Ideally, a surveillance network is composed of systems that provide all three capabilities: 
detection, tracking, and recognition.  Unfortunately, most networks are far from ideal.  In cases 
where incomplete surveillance networks (those that are lack one of the three capabilities) are 
deployed the overall mission of the organization operating those assets is jeopardized / 
threatened.127  In some scenarios this is an acceptable and wise decision128.  Then there are 
                                                            
126
 SOSA is in the process of being modified so that both enclosed perimeters and mobile assets can be modeled.  
Doing so will allow the user to perform all three functions of SOSA in the same manner those functions are used 
with the current scenarios.   
127
 In the context used, jeopardized / threatened does not refer to absolutes.  For example, an organization is 
conducting a mission that has a 99.9% probability of complete success with all three capabilities.  The lack of any 
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Table 3.1: Interactive page of SOSA. This is the page where the user inputs the variables required to 
generate either a custom scenario or one that is sensor-optimized 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
one of the three may reduce the probability of complete success by anywhere from 0.1% (or some number 
impossibly close to 0) to 99.9%. 
128
 An example of this would be expanding a manned radar network from 350m to 1400m.  At 350m it is borderline 
possible to recognize an IOI with handheld optics, increasing the recognition capability would make no sense. 
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Figure 3.1: Existing sensor network using legacy SkyWatch towers, STS-1400ER FST, and augmented 
by a choice of STS-1400ER / Cam-V 
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instances in which one or two of these capabilities are unavailable.  There is however one 
capability that modern surveillance systems lack more than any other.  
Analysis of the master tables from chapters 1 and 2 has revealed that the single greatest 
capability that modern surveillance networks lack is recognition.  Figures 3.1 highlights an 
example of scenarios in which this capability is not provided.  The surveillance network modeled 
in this figure resembles that which is currently deployed along a 10 mile stretch of the U.S.’s 
southern border.  The overlap in the detection coverage (both human and vehicular) provided by 
surveillance systems in this scenario is proof that the systems that makeup this network are 
capable of detection IOIs day or night.  However, observation of the recognition range (labeled 
human specific ident. range in this figure) highlights the fact that there are huge gaps in this 
networks capability to recognize IOIs, particularly along the border itself (as opposed to further 
inland from it).  This figure is representative of many scenarios in which the surveillance 
network deployed lacks the ideal capability to recognize IOIs.  What this figure fails to illustrate 
is the degree to which recognition assists in the completion of an organization’s primary mission 
from one scenario to the next.   The exact consequences of deploying a surveillance network 
with insufficient recognition capabilities varies according to the scenario, but the cost can of 
doing so is always measured in terms of resources (funds, personnel / hardware) and the success 
of the mission.  The loss of resources is easily quantified; the success of a mission is not.  
Success however is dependent on two other variables: resources and time.  The following 
example illustrates this dynamic.   
If recognition is lacking, the enforcement assets responsible for enforcing the region under 
surveillance will be unaware of the intent or number of IOIs detected.  Since the operators of 
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surveillance networks often send enforcement assets that are capable of overwhelming the IOI 
encountered, the number and capability of those assets may be inappropriate for the given 
scenario.  Doing so costs the operators time and resources (in this case it is funds, personnel, and 
hardware).  The loss of time and resources leads to (i.e., indicative of) the tying down of 
enforcement assets that could otherwise be used to intercept additional IOI, IOI which may have 
been discovered only after detection of the first.  The inability to engage fewer IOIs is the most 
direct impact that the loss of time and resources has on the successful completion of the overall 
mission.  In addition to the – the ability to discern whether or not an IOI is a false positive. 
Scenarios in which an IOI is inaccurately classified as a threat is an event commonly referred to 
as a false positive.  It is one thing to send too many enforcement assets in response to the 
detection of an IOI; it is something else entirely to dispatch those assets when the IOI detected is 
of no consequence whatsoever.  Doing so not only waste time and money, it leaves the operators 
extremely vulnerable to the use of decoys.  With this in mind, the capability to provide range-
specific recognition is the only way to determine with absolute certainty whether or not an IOI is 
a false positive.   
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Chapter 4: Design and Features of the PSN 
Design History of the PSN 
Introduction 
The final design of the PSN put forward later in this chapter is far from what was originally 
envisioned.  Research into the variety and capability of surveillance assets and equipment (and 
the organizations that use them) has been the primary motivation behind the dynamic design of 
the PSN.  Nonetheless, the original concept and the requirements that are the foundation of hit 
have never changes, save one.  The original requirements are:  
• portable  
• modular  
• upgradable  
• rapidly deployable  
• inexpensive  
• reusable 
• original 
History 
The requirements above have all been challenging to integrate into the final design.  However, 
one has been far more difficult to integrate than the others – originality.  The originality of the 
PSN was consistently challenged at every turn.  The design the PSN changed every time research 
revealed that it was not original – every time it was revealed that the then current design had 
already been or was under development.   This first part of this section is a record of how the 
design of the PSN changed from its original incarnation to what it is now.  The history described 
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in this section does not account for minor revisions, only those which led to a redesign of the 
then current system, versions which, at the time, were thought to have been the final design. 
The Original Concept – MSC Version 1.0 
Originally the PSN was called the Mobile Sensor Network (MSN).  The founding requirements 
were the same, but the name was different.  This system was designed around the idea that a 
single thermal sensor was capable of detecting and tracking multiple IOI, and that this sensor 
could be developed and implemented for considerable less than those already on the market.  A 
key component of this concept was that the multitude of relatively cheap thermal sensors used 
would be capable of talking to one another after deployment, tracking an IOI as it progressed 
through the area of detection.  These sensors had to be capable of being deployed by vehicles, 
naval vessels, aircraft, and personnel within a short period of time in any terrain (e.g., tropical 
forest, mountains, deserts, etc.)  The air dropped sensors had to be capable of being dropped and 
guided to specific points on the ground using GPS or triangulation (3G).  In an effort to make the 
design even more original and effective, the design of the sensors had to deployable with as a 
bundled package.  This package was to include a mobile command center and a large number of 
sensors that were all contained in a 20ft cargo container, the type of container that could be 
deployed via cargo aircraft or on board a naval frigate (in particular the U.S. Navy’s new Littoral 
Combat Ship, or LCS) similar to the one shown in Figure 4.1 on the next page.   
MSC Version 2.0 
It was discovered during initial research that the function of integrating multiple, low-end 
thermal cameras had already been developed by companies like FLIR.  FLIR developed software 
that takes their sensors and integrates them into a vast network capable of tracking an IOI from 
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once sensor to the next.  At this point the original design of the MSN, though challenged, was 
still original – it was still highly portable, air deployable, and included a mobile command center. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: U.S. Navy LCS-1 Freedom and LCS-2 Independence129 
Moreover, the requirement that the sensors themselves be inexpensive was given a higher 
priority than during than originally planned.  Research had shown that it would be too expensive 
to airdrop guided sensors.  The only alternative would be to airdrop unguided ones.  To make an 
unguided sensor network effective aircraft would need to deploy a large number of sensors.  As 
the required number of sensors increased the price of them was required to decrease. 
Unfortunately, further research revealed that even this design lacked enough originally to 
proceed.  There were already systems that were air deployable that, despite not being thermal, 
                                                            
129
 LCS-1 and LCS-2 are the first ships in their own separate sub-class of LCS (hence two very different ships being 
referred to as LCS) 
Littoral Combat Ships, United States of America. Naval-Technology.com, April 2013. Accessed April 20,  2013 
from: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/littoral1.html 
106 
 
 
 
enabled the tracking of IOI across a region of interest.  At this point it was thought that these 
sensors were different enough that the MSN’s ability to identify an IOI as belonging to a 
particular class (e.g., car vs. person vs. deer).  What killed this version of the MSN was research 
into small, unmanned UAVs equipped with thermal sensors.  Some of these UAVs, though more 
expensive than the MSN, are capable of seeing through fairly thick foliage to the extent that they 
are capable of identifying IOI as belonging to a particular class.  In an unrelated case, it was long 
after discovering the capability of UAVs that the MSN was renamed PSN.  Research revealed 
that CBP had just finished awarding the MSC contract to ICx.  It was decided that the acronyms 
and requirements of these two systems were too similar to proceed.  The decision to rename the 
MSN was reaffirmed when it became clear that a large portion of this thesis would be presented 
at a conference attended by a large number of CBP personnel, personnel who may associate the 
MSN with the MSC. 
PSN Version 1.0 
The first incarnation of the PSN was a derivation of the MSN.  This version of the PSN was the 
first version with the additional conceptual requirement that the PSN be capable of recognition.  
The PSN still used thermal cameras, but this time they were used in a different way.  First, the 
thermal cameras used by the PSN did not need to be high-end, they need only be capable of 
detecting and tracking IOI at a distance of equal to or greater than fifteen hundred feet.  These 
low end thermal sensors, called parent sensors (P-sensors), were to be connected via Wi-Fi to a 
network of traditional cameras, or child sensors, (C-sensors) capable of optical zoom.  The 
thermal sensors would detect IOIs and then send a signal to the optical camera that tells them the 
correct pan, tilt, and zoom to take a picture of the IOI.  Using this system would allow the cheap 
acquisition of both tracking (via the thermal sensors) and identification (optical sensors).  This 
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design put life back into the originally envisioned capability of being deployed via aircraft or 
helicopters.  Whereas small UAVs and thermal sensors were both capable of detection and 
tracking, only this version of the PSN was capable of recognition.  Unfortunately, they would 
only be capable of doing so if the P-sensors dropped by aircraft were a smaller and less capable 
version of their man portable counterparts.   
 
 
Figure 4.2: P-Sensor deployed (note the size of 
the arms and panels, which attach to the top of 
the second tier of cylinders, not the first as in 
other options) – thermal, solar, and 8ft 
telescoping mount 
 
Figure 4.3: C-Sensor option 1 – IR and solar 
 
 
Figure 4.4: C-Sensor option 2 – camera, flash, 
and solar 
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The demise of this version of the PSN began with the discovery of networks in which thermal 
and radar were used to detect IOIs and long-range cameras, equipped with large spot lights built 
in to them, were used to identify them day or night.  Radar proved to be far better at detecting 
IOIs than thermal, at least on flat, devoid of foliage.  Still, hope for this version (the 3rd, possibly 
4th version depending on how you count it) remained despite the unavoidable use of radar and 
thermal for detection.  One of two actions could be taken: embrace radar and integrate it into the 
design of the PSN or exploit the advantages thermal sensors have over radar.   
                                             
                                          Figure 4.5: FLIR EnforcIR130 
 
PSN Version 2.0: Radar or Thermal 
Radar and thermal each have their advantages.  Radar can cover a larger area than low end 
thermal sensors but it cannot see through thick foliage nor can it work in rough terrain as well as 
thermal sensors.  The decision was made to embrace the advantages of thermal sensors.  A plan 
was developed that highlighted the use of thermal sensors on mountainous, uneven terrain as 
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 Ranger MS-UC EnforcIR Brochure, FLIR Systems, 2013. p. 1 
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                       Figure 4.6: FLIR Ranger III131 
well as terrain that was covered by thick foliage.  The cost and tracking ability of IOI through 
this terrain was mapped and proven to have its advantage over radar – at least until more 
research was performed into the capabilities of ground radar.   
Ground radar capable of detecting humans through thick foliage has been around since the late 
1960’s.  It was deployed by the U.S. in Vietnam as a way of detecting Vietcong attacking FOBs.  
This technology has evolved over the decades to such an extent that nearly all mid and long 
range ground radars are capable of doing so.  To make the design PSN 2.0 even less original was 
discovery of sensor networks that use radar to detect IOIs and high end cameras equipped with 
spotlight s for identification.  This deployment of radar and sensors was the second blow to what 
is a design that’s foundation was three fold: the ability to see through foliage; the use of long 
rage sensors to detect and track IOIs complimented by flash cameras for identification; and the 
use of thermal sensors and flash sensors on mountainous terrain.  Version 2.0 was not dead yet, 
only limping along.    
                                                            
131
 Ranger MS Illuminator, FLIR Systems, 2013. p. 1 
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Version 2.0 was officially killed when research uncovered software developed by FLIR that 
coordinates the use of radar, thermal cameras, and flash cameras to provide full coverage in any 
terrain.132  At this point it seemed like the time to throw in the towel.  All the good ideas had 
already been thought of, nothing else remained.  That is when research was performed into the 
price, resilience, and long term deployment of the surveillance assets examined thus far. 
During this stage of development it was projected that the PSN P-sensors would cost $8,000 to 
$12,000 while the C-sensors would cost $700 to $1,000.  It was thought that the cost of the 
proposed system would be similar to that of current equipment (e.g., radar, long-range thermal), 
the advantage of the PSN being that it is capable of both identification and detection whereas 
existing systems could only detect IOIs.  The estimated cost of these systems was based on the 
advertised price of similar, commercially available, systems.  It turned out that these systems 
were incredibly more expensive than originally thought.  This meant that once again the entire 
design of the PSN was a viable option.  Despite the fact that it shares similar capabilities with 
existing systems it can do so for a fraction of the price.   
PSN Version 3.0: Cost 
The debate was finally settled, the final version of the PSN would be: thermal sensors for 
detection, flash for illumination, traditional daytime optics for recognition, and communication 
between the P-sensors and C-sensors accomplished via the use of narrowband Wi-Fi.   
The only thing left to do was conduct assessments to determine the exact cost of each component 
and to conduct mock deployments.  During the course of conducting these assessments two 
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things became obvious: each component, particularly the C-sensors, would cost much more than 
expected and the PSN itself would take too long to deploy.   Each of the C-sensors required a 
laser range finder and an auto focus camera.  Furthermore, the telemetry and focus required by 
each C-sensor to take a viable picture of an IOI meant that C-sensors and P-sensors need to work 
in unison (an expensive proposition).  Although not impossible, the cost to implement these 
changes negates any advantage the PSN once had over existing systems.   
Despite having already been proven impractical, further analysis of the PSN 3.0 was conducted 
in an effort to determine if the current version had any other flaws.  This analysis revealed that 
the PSN took too long to deploy.  The most laborious aspect of deployment was aligning the 
narrowband Wi-Fi installed on each of the sensors, a design flaw that plagued this and nearly 
every other previous version of the PSN – rendering them all defunct.   
PSN 4.0 
The only way to make the PSN viable was to address the flaws inherent to the prior version and 
all those that preceded it.  The only problem was that there seemed to be no one way to address 
even one of the problems at hand (the need for cheap auto focusing camera, a faster way to align 
the narrowband Wi-Fi and coordinate the operation of the C-sensors with the P-sensors).  There 
seemed to be only one solution: get rid of the C-sensors entirely.  The decision to do so was the 
last major step that culminated in the PSN’s final design.   
The Design of PSN 4.0  
The PSN 4.0 is designed to function as an all-inclusive system, as opposed to the PSN 3.0 which 
had both C-sensors and P-sensors.  The same equipment installed on the two sensors that makeup 
PSN 3.0 has been combined in the design of the PSN 4.0 to form a single system.  Doing so 
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removed the extremely expensive hardware and software required to integrate the operation of 
multiple sensors.  When fully assembled, the specifications of the PSN are (all dimensions are 
visible in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9): 
• 50.0cm (19.7”) tall (dimension 1) 
• 12.7cm (5”) diameter (dimension 2) 
• 13.5cm (5.3”) tall (dimension 3) 
• 19cm (7.5”) wide (dimension 4) 
• 27.9cm (11”) long/depth (dimension 5) (length does not include stakes which are 
removable)
  
 
Figure 4.7: Mount 
          
      Figure 4.8 
 
        
 
       Figure 4.9 
 
  Figure 4.10: Complete system
The drawback of creating a combining all of the sensory equipment into a single system is that 
the cost of acquiring the number of systems needed to construct a viable network has risen 
dramatically.  The single greatest reason costs have risen is that each PSN 4.0 system must have 
a thermal camera installed on it, whereas the PSN 3.0 only required one thermal camera for 
Dimension 2 
          Dimension 4 
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every three or four systems (one P-sensor for every three or four C-sensors).  More information 
on this topic, the deployment and operation of the PSN, is discussed in chapter 5.   
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Chapter 5: Deployment of the PSN 
Variations and Outfitting 
The PSN has been designed in such a way that it enables those who deploy it to gain maximum 
flexibility with minimal effort, a necessity in a world where surveillance requirements can vary 
greatly from mission to mission.  This flexibility (i.e., feature) is all the more important when 
looking back at one of the original goals outlined in the introduction: the development of a 
system that can be used by multiple organizations (in an effort to reduce costs).  In the case of 
the PSN, the flexibility it provides its operators comes from its modular design.  Though 
modular, the current design is limited to a few configurations, or variations, which are defined 
according to how each is outfit with an array of different components. 
All variations of the PSN share a similar set of core components: lower mount and associated 
hardware (e.g., battery), digital camera, rangefinder, and infrared camera.  The only thing that 
changes from one variation to the next is the number of flashlights installed on the sensor and the 
decision of whether or not to equip it with certain, key options.  It is also important to note that 
every PSN sensor is intended to run using the same software.  This enables every PSN built to be 
capable of being modified so as to take full advantage of all options, deployment scenarios, and 
flashlight variations.  Figures 5.1 through 5.7 illustrate the four different ways a PSN can be 
outfit with flashlights.   Figure 5.1 shows the variation of the PSN that has been presented thus 
far.  Since the lower mount used in this figure is identical to that used by every PSN 
manufactured (independent of the variation), the rest of the variations presented in this section 
(and the figures of them) only illustrate the upper assembly. 
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                                      Figure 5.1: 4 flashlights 
 
Figure 5.2: 6 flashlights 
 
Figure 5.3: 6 flashlights 
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Figure 5.4: 2 flashlights 
 
Figure 5.5: 2 flashlights
 
Figure 5.6: no flashlights 
 
Figure 5.7: no flashlights
Each of the four variations above can be equipped with one of four options: one or more 
narrowband Wi-Fi transmitters, solar panels, compact telescoping upper mount, and extra-long 
telescoping upper mount (e.g., the pole on which the upper assembly rests).  The narrowband 
Wi-Fi transmitters enable the PSN to communicate with deployed flashlights over a longer 
distance (without the need for Wi-Fi in the flashlights); solar panels dramatically increase the 
time a PSN sensor can remain in the field without needing to be recharged / have its battery(s) 
replaced; and the use of a telescoping upper mount allows the PSN to operate from a higher 
vantage point.  Other than cost, the use of the compact or extra-long telescoping upper mounts is 
the only options that have potentially negative side effects.   
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When the compact telescoping upper mount 
is equipped it reduces the size of battery that 
can be carried in the lower mount (the center 
of the lower mount is hollowed out to 
provide room for the pole to retract into).  
The extra-long telescoping upper mount is 
both easier to detect and is more 
cumbersome to transport and deploy - the 
actual pole is several feet long and must be 
carried separately from the sensor itself.  
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate how PSN 
sensors look when equipped with solar 
panels and an extra-long upper mount.133    
 
Figure 5.8: 2 flashlights and solar 
                                                            
133
 No figure was generated to show the use of a 
compact telescoping pole since the use of that pole 
would look similar to that of a regular PSN (taller by 
approximately 6” but with the added ability to 
collapse completely into the lower assembly).   There 
would be a figure illustrating the use of directional 
Wi-Fi but difficulties arose when attempting to 
generate the model. 
 
Figure 5.9: 2 flashlights and extra-long upper 
mount134 
                                                            
134
 Total elevation between the ground and the sensor 
when using the extra-long upper mount is 2.5m vs. 
the standard 0.5m 
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The final component that determines a specific systems unique variation is the type of flashlight 
used.  All PSN are equipped with a flash light that is capable of being staked into the ground or 
used on the sensor itself.  All of these flashlights have rotating heads, identical battery supplies, 
and bulbs (LEDs).  Options that can be installed on these flashlights include solar panels, Wi-Fi 
transmitters (as opposed to just a Wi-Fi receiver), and sirens (audible alarm).  Figures 5.10, 5.11, 
and 5.12 illustrate what these options look like when installed on a standard PSN flashlight. 
 
Figure 5.10: Solar stored 
 
Figure 5.11: Solar deployed 
 
Figure 5.12: Wi-Fi transmitter
Deployment and Operation 
Each variant of the PSN can be deployed and operated in a multitude of different ways.  The way 
in which a specific system or network of systems is deployed and operated depends on the 
mission, the type of systems being deployed, and the number of systems on hand.  Off the two, 
deployment is least complex. 
Deployment 
Deployment of the PSN can be done in two different configurations, both of which depend on 
the location of the flashlights used to illuminate IOIs at night.  The first way is deploy each PSN 
system as a single unit.  This configuration places all of the flashlights on the system itself.  A 
single PSN system deployed  in this manner is capable of detecting, tracking, and recognizing 
IOIs during the day according to the maximum effective range (usually between 200m and 
400m) of each piece of equipment installed (i.e., digital camera, rangefinder, and thermal 
camera).  At night, the maximum detection and tracking range depends solely on the thermal 
camera.  Night time recognition depends on the type of digital camera and number of flashlights 
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mounted on the upper assembly.  A standard digital camera, effective when used with a moderate 
amount of ambient light (early dawn, late dusk), is estimated to be capable of taking high-quality 
night time images of IOIs at the following, flashlight dependent, ranges: 
• 0 flashlights: 0m 
• 2 flashlights: 115m 
• 4 flashlights: 145m 
• 6 flashlights: 160m 
Although these distances are only rough estimates, they are estimates derived from the testing of 
a flashlight similar in capability to ones intended for use on PSN systems (1200 lumens).135  The 
testing of this flashlight was done in near total darkness at ranges up to 150m.  A single 
flashlight was more than capable of completely illuminating IOI at over 100m, in some cases 
130m.  The estimates for the effective ranges of night time recognition of IOIs presented in this 
section are highly conservative; estimates that take into account the effect various atmospheric 
phenomena have on a flashlight’s ability to effectively illuminate an IOI at night.  These ranges 
(yellow = 115m, blue = 145m, red = 160m) are illustrated in Figure 5.13 below, a mock 
deployment of the PSN around a military installation with a hard perimeter.  
 
                      Figure 5.13: Mock deployment of the PSN around a military base with a hard perimeter 
                                                            
135
 See the appendix for a detailed description of this flashlight.  
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The second type of deployment may or may not have flashlights installed on the upper 
assemblies.  What makes this deployment unique is that there are two or more flashlights 
deployed on the ground at a distance from the primary system.  These flashlights can be 
deployed in a variety of configurations at ranges between 35m to 250m from the nearest (PSN) 
system.    The primary disadvantage of doing so is that, regardless of the distance between the 
flashlights and the primary system, it requires far more flashlights than a standalone system.  The 
exact number of flashlights required depends on the orientation of them and how far the 
operators want to extend the range at which a PSN can recognize IOIs. A rough approximation 
of the number of flashlights needed to extend this range is illustrated in Figure 5.14.  Even when 
deployed at extremely short ranges (<20m), this configuration has its advantages - it removes the 
flash from the primary system, making it harder to detect.  Figure 5.13 illustrates the mock 
deployment of flashlights, depicted by the small yellow circles, around a network of PSN 
systems.   
 
Figure 5.14: Flashlights required for extended range recognition vs. the detection range      
of a STS-350 radar 
Figure 5.13 goes even further; it compares the deployment of four STS-350 radars against that 
of a PSN network with four systems.  The shaded region represents the detection range and 
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tracking area of a single STS-350 radar.  In this scenario the PSN is capable of detecting and 
tracking IOIs at 300-400m, approximately the same range as the STS-350.  The final aspect of 
deployment is the orientation those flashlights deployed in the field, which, after study, suggest 
that many more flashlights are required than the number indicated in Figure 5.13 (to illuminate 
IOIs at the ranges in that figure in such a way that any IOI that falls inside that range is 
recognizable). 
Flashlights must be oriented so that they illuminate the front side of all IOIs that close within the 
rangefinders specified range.  If the front side is not illuminated the camera onboard each 
primary system will be unable to see the IOI at night.  There are several ways of accomplishing 
this, none of which is the ‘perfect solution’.  The number and orientation of flashlights depends 
on the area needing illumination.  However, the fact of the matter is this: the numerous unique 
paths from which IOIs can approach a camera’s activation range (as set by the rangefinder) make 
it difficult to illuminate the front of them (IOIs) unless many flashlights are used (see Figure 
5.14).  With that in mind, the most effective way of using deployed flashlights is when the region 
being monitored is less than 30◦ wide.  The use of flashlights in this type of scenario makes it 
much easier to properly illuminate approaching IOIs.  Figure 5.15 illustrates an example of the 
PSN deployed under these conditions.   
Deployment and Operation 
The operation of a PSN system begins with the engagement process.  The generic process by 
which the PSN engages (detect, track, and recognize) IOIs, regardless how that network is 
deployed, is as follows: 
1) The thermal camera detects the heat signature indicative of an IOI  
2) The thermal camera tracks the IOI, using the pan and tilt mechanist to keep the IOI in the 
very center of the thermal cameras display 
3) As soon as the thermal camera begins to track the IOI, the laser rangefinder starts 
measuring the distance between the IOI and the PSS (the rangefinder is fixed to the upper 
assembly, directly below the thermal camera) 
4) The focus of the camera, which is located directly below the rangefinder, is adjusted so 
that it is constantly in focus.  This is accomplished by linking the focus of the camera to 
the distance measured by the range finder 
Steps 5 and 6 when the PSS is operating during the day: 
5) At a predetermined, user defined distance the camera takes a series of digital photographs 
(still frames, not video) 
6) These photographs are relayed to a local or regional command and control center (the 
type of communication equipment used depends on the needs of the operator) 
Steps 5 through 7 when the PSS is operating at night: 
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5) At a predetermined, user defined distance the upper assembly broadcast a signal via 
narrowband Wi-Fi (or via different methods discuss later in this section) to all flashlights 
(both those on the PSS itself and those in the field) connected to that specific system 
telling them to turn on for a short period of time (usually between 1/5th and 1 second).   
6) The camera takes a series of digital photos a fraction of a second after the upper assembly 
tells the flashlights to turn on 
7) These photographs are relayed to a local or regional command and control center  
The operation of a PSN system and the overall network to which it belongs depends on the 
deployment of those systems and the options installed.  The actual operation of each system is 
identical to that which is described in steps 1 through 4 on the previous page.  Following step 4, 
the operation of each system is unique.  The following are descriptions are examples of how 
various PSN networks operate according the deployment of the systems that make up each 
network and the options installed on them (the individual systems).   
Example 1: Operation of a standalone PSN system or standard, Wi-Fi equipped, PSN with 
flashlights installed in the field 
The operation of this example is identical to the steps outlined above. The only exception to this 
operation is when the flashlights used are equipped with sirens.  If they are, the sirens will sound 
as soon as the flashlights are triggered.  These sirens will continue to emit sound until the preset 
time has elapsed (time varies based on user input, but would most likely vary from a few seconds 
to several minutes). 
The only limitation of this system is that the W-Fi installed on it has a very short range (max of 
35-40m, but usually less).  This means that if flashlights are deployed in the field they are only 
capable of extending the night time recognition range of a PSN system by exactly that distance, a 
distance which is trivial given the recognition range of a standalone system (max of 160m).  
However, there is an operational advantage to deploying flashlights in the field using Wi-Fi - it is 
by far the easiest and least expensive method of doing so.   
Example 2: Operation of a narrowband Wi-Fi equipped PSN with flashlights in the field 
Example 3: Operation of a standard, Wi-Fi equipped PSN with Wi-Fi transmitter equipped 
flashlights in the field 
Estimating the Cost of a Single PSN System 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The type of equipment intended for deployment on PSN assets was and has always been off the 
shelf and commercially available.  Knowing this information made it possible to predict, within 
reason136, what the price of each variant of the PSN would be.  Research into the cost of various 
models of ground based radar, thermal sensors, and even high end flash optics opened another 
door for the PSN.  Regardless of whether it is competing against high-end radar suites that cost 
$150,000 and up or against thermal cameras costing between $50,000 and $100,000, the PSN is 
capable of providing superior recognition for a fraction of the cost.  The PSN is also more 
capable at detecting, tracking, and recognizing IOIs than low-radars that cost $75,000 and up 
(radars may cost only $20,000, but the supporting equipment needed to make them operational 
increases the price a minimum of two times over).137  Even more surprising was the cost of high-
end cameras equipped with spotlights.  Many of these systems (in use with CBP and the military) 
cost $50,000 or despite the fact that they’re use is augmented with other assets, usually radar.  
When standing on their own these cameras can see 2-3 km during the day, their ability to 
recognize IOIs at night via the use of their spotlights is limited to 1.5 kilometers (usually less, ½ 
to 1 kilometer).  The financial advantage of using the PSN is clear; when compared against 
existing systems, the PSN can perform equally as well on flat terrain, better on thickly foliated 
terrain, and far better on mountainous terrain while doing so for a fraction of the cost.   
The resilience of the PSN also gives it an advantage over existing systems.  When a single, more 
capable asset fails, all of the surveillance capability provided by that asset is lost with it.  If one 
or two PSN fail the PSN is still capable of performing its mission.  This alone is a reason to 
                                                            
136
 See chapter 5 for more information and details regarding the PSN’s estimated cost. 
137
 A GSA contract between the federal government and ICx listed the acquisition cost of entire STS-350 systems, 
which use $15,000-$20,000 radars, at between $45,000 and $80,000. 
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seriously consider the PSN over traditional, high end optics.  Intermingled with the benefit of 
resilience is that of endurance.  Expensive, high-end optics require a significant amount of 
power.  If they are deployed in remote terrain they will require some type of local support.  If 
they are battery powered they will eventually need their batteries replaced.  Even if they are 
equipped with solar panels to provide additional endurance, it is unlikely that the operation of the 
spotlight will be able to last long without some type of external charging.  The PSN on the other 
hand is a network that deployed over a large area.  Each individual camera and the lights 
associated with it is unlikely to be used more than once a night, perhaps even once every few 
days.  One small solar panel would be capable of sustaining power for years (panel generates 
equal to or greater than the average power consumed).  To make things even more plausible, 
each unit would be equipped with batteries that, on a full charge, can power each asset for over a 
month.  This type of reserve ensures that the solar panels used by the PSN will never run out of 
power, despite the degradation of the panel itself.  Finally, the number of PSN systems that are 
deployed within a given interval is higher than that of conventional spotlight/camera.  This 
means that, despite the fact that companies like FLIR can setup a network to optimize coverage, 
on mountainous terrain the capability of that network to completely cover every bit of that terrain 
is less than the PSN.   
Considering the information above and the fact that the PSN has met or exceeded all of its 
requirements, it can be declared that the objectives declared in chapter 1 have been fulfilled.  The 
PSN 4.0 is a marketable surveillance system that, in addition to fulfilling its stated requirements, 
provides niche surveillance capabilities that not provided by existing systems: nearly 100% cover 
in mountainous terrain and the use of thermal cameras purely for the detection (and never 
identification) of IOI. 
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Glossary 
a – Acceleration  
ad – Deceleration  
A – Area  
Ad – Area of sensor perpendicular to its velocity 
Adp – Area of a parachute perpendicular to its velocity 
Adpf – Total area of a parachute when lying flat 
Ads – Area of a deployed sensor perpendicular to its velocity 
Ap – Area of a parachute perpendicular to its velocity 
APSS – Agent Portable Security System 
ASP – Advanced Security Products 
BSAT – Balance Survivability Assessment Team 
BZSS – Border Zone Surveillance System 
CAS – Close Air Support 
Cd – Coefficient of Drag 
Cdp – Coefficient of drag for a parachute 
Cds – Coefficient of drag for a sensor 
CBP – Customs and Border Protection 
C-Sensor – Child Sensor 
CAP – Combat Air Patrol 
CAS – Close Air Support 
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d – Diameter  
ddp – Diameter of deployed parachute 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DoD – Department of Defence 
DTRA – Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
Ek – Kinetic energy 
Ep – Potential energy 
EM – Electromagnetic 
EO – Electro-optical 
F – Force  
Fg – Force of gravity 
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FLIR – Forward Looking Infrared 
FOB – Forward Operating Base 
GAO – Government Accountability Office 
HC – Heavy camera 
HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
IFT – Integrated Fixed Tower 
IFTBSS – Integrated Fixed Tower Border Surveillance System 
IOI – Item of Interest 
k – Spring constant 
127 
 
 
 
LAPES – Low altitude parachute extraction system 
lp – Length of a single section/beam/rectangle of a cross parachute 
LC – Light camera 
LE – Law Enforcement 
M - Mass 
MSC – Mobile Surveillance Capabilities 
ODP – Office of Domestic Preparedness 
OAM – Office of Air and Marine 
P – Momentum  
POE – Point of Entry 
P-Sensor – Parent Sensor 
PSN – Portable Sensor Network 
RRAP – Regional Resiliency Assistance Program 
RF – Radio Frequency 
RVSS – Remote Video Surveillance System 
Sd – Stopping distance  
SBI – Secure Border Initiative 
SBInet – Secure Border Initiative Network 
SDT – Sensor Development Tool 
SRPP – State and Regional Preparedness Program 
t – Time  
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TALCE – Tanker Airlift Control Element 
tb – Time to go from impact to zero velocity for the batteries, spikes, part 1, and part 3 
tc – Time to go from impact to zero velocity for the camera, part 2, and associated electronics 
TSS – Threat Stalker Surveillance System 
UAS – Unmanned Aerial Surveillance System 
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGS – Unattended Ground Sensor 
UGV – Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
USI – Urban Security Initiative 
Vdi – Velocity of a descending sensor at impact 
Vdt – Terminal velocity of a descending sensor 
VAT – Vulnerability Assessment Team 
VSTOL – Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing 
W – Work  
wp – Width of a single section/beam/rectangle of a cross parachute 
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Appendix i – Matrix Definitions and Ratings 
 
Chapter 1 – Scenario Specific Surveillance  
 
Portability Requirements Rating:  The portability requirements associated with a specific scenario.  These 
requirements represent the maximum size and weight of surveillance assets that can be used in a particular scenario.   
These requirements are rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most portable. The approximate translation of 
this scale into real world requirements is as follows:138 
 
1) No portability requirements at all.  Major components can be assembled on site with no respect given 
to their size and weight. 
2) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via cargo ship 
 
3) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via heavy transport aircraft 
4) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be transportable via cargo ship  
5) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be transportable via heavy transport aircraft     
6) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via large, wheeled combat truck 
(e.g., deuce and a half) 
7) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be deliverable to the battlefield via transport aircraft (e.g., 
airdrop or low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES)139.  This level of portability also applies to 
manned surveillance aircraft and UAVs which are required to take off and land from a permanent airfield 
8) Fully assembled surveillance asset(s) must be transportable via large, wheeled combat truck 
9) Fully assembled surveillance assets must be transportable via light truck or in a small trailer capable of 
being towed by a light truck (e.g., HMMWV (aka 129umvee or hummer) or commercial pickup). 
10) Most stringent portability requirements.  Every component of a surveillance asset must be man-
portable.   
Setup and Teardown Requirements Rating: The time and manpower requirements associated with a specific 
scenario.  These requirements represent the maximum time and manpower allotted to initially setup and then later 
repackage a particular scenario’s surveillance assets.  These requirements are rated on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 
requiring the least time and manpower. The approximate translation of this scale into real world requirements is as 
follows: 
                                                            
138
 Every asset with a rating of 2 or higher must also be capable of ground transport via 20 ft or 40 ft shipping 
containers.  If this requirement were not imposed the surveillance assets used may be too large or heavy to be 
deployed where they are needed. 
139
 LAPES is a system used by transport aircraft for the delivery of equipment that is too heavy for conventional 
airdrop.  An aircraft delivering cargo to the battlefield via LAPES will fly very low to the ground, perhaps even 
touching it with its main (rear) landing gear.  The cargo and a parachute attached to the rear of it are then pushed 
out the rear of the aircraft (cargo is mounted on a pallet designed specifically for LAPES).  The aircraft then gains 
altitude and flies away while the cargo it deployed skids across the ground, eventually coming to a stop (the 
parachute attached to it aids in slowing the cargo as it skids across the terrain).  
“Lockheed C-130 Hercules.” The Aviation Zone, March 2013. 
130 
 
 
 
1) The least stringent rating.  Scenarios that receive a rating of 1 are in no rush to setup their surveillance assets.  
These assets may require hundreds of workers years to construct/setup and once having done so can never be 
redeployed (i.e., surveillance assets that are themselves permanent installations)   
2) Scenarios that require any surveillance asset(s) deployed be capable of redeployment, but ones that were not 
necessarily designed or initially deployed with the intention of doing so (redeployment). This type of asset may 
require dozens of personnel months to either setup or redeploy.   Redeployment may require the fabrication of new 
parts and/or the laying of a new foundation.  Finally, the initial setup and redployment of these assets may require 
the installation of supporting infrastructure, such as power and communications lines 
3) Scenarios that require the use of surveillance assets designed to be redeployable, but ones that often serve as 
permanent installations.  The setup and redeployment of these assets may take a dozen individual between one week 
and a month to accomplish   
4) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than a week.  These types 
of assets have command and control centers that require more time to deploy and redeploy than the sensors 
themselves (approximately a week for the command and control center compared to a few hours for the sensors).  
Deployment, redeployment, and the addition of sensors is more common than the redeployment of the entire asset 
5) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than 24 hours   
6) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than 6 hours.  This rating 
also applies to satellites with circular and polar orbits that, depending on their altitude and type of orbit, can provide 
surveillance at intervals of between 90 minutes and 6 hours140 
7) Scenarios that require the deployment and redeployment of surveillance assets in less than an hour.  This rating 
also applies to the use of in theatre (forward deployed) or on the scene maritime assets, UAVs and manned aircraft, 
the rational being that the time required for these assets to arrive is approximately 1 hour (Depending on the 
scenario, the time required to arrive on scene could take anywhere from a few minutes to several hours.  An 
approximation of 1 hour was chosen to simplify the rating system)  
8) Scenarios that require any surveillance asset(s) used consist of sensors that are networked to a mobile command 
and control center. The time required to deploy and redeploy these assets is dependent on by number of individuals 
deploying the network, the number of sensors deployed, and the distance those sensors are from the command and 
control center.  The sensors used by these assets must be capable of linking to the mobile command and control 
center within minutes of their deployment 
9) Scenarios that require any surveillance asset(s) utilized be capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 
15 minutes by a maximum of one or two individuals 
10) The most stringent rating.  Scenarios that receive a rating of 10 require the use of surveillance asset(s) capable of 
being deployed and redeployed by a single person in less than one minute.  The sensors used by these assets must be 
linked immediately following their deployment to an interface possessed by the operators (individuals who deployed 
the sensors) 
Terrain Rating:  Terrain rating is used to quantify the type of terrain in which a particular scenario takes place.  
Another way of thinking about this rating is to interpret it as the mobility requirements for assets operating in this 
scenario. The terrain quantified is only that terrain which falls within the scope of that scenario (e.g., terrain beyond 
                                                            
140
 “What is the Orbit of a Satellite?” Space Today Online, March 2013.   
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a given scenario’s required distance of detection or identification is irrelevant).  This rating varies on a scale from 1 
to 5 with 5 being the most uneven.  An approximate translation of this scale into real world topographic 
features/landscapes is as follows 
Scenarios with a terrain rating of: 
1) take place on completely level ground  
2) take place on slightly uneven terrain with infrequent, small, rolling hills and/or depressions 
3) take place on uneven terrain with a high frequency of small rolling hills, a high frequency of small, rolling 
hills, and/or a high frequency of shall but steep changes in elevation 
4) take place on highly uneven terrain with a high frequency of large hills  
5) take place on mountainous terrain with large, frequent changes in elevation 
Foliage Rating:  Foliage rating is used to describe the type and density of vegetation in which a scenario takes 
place.  Both the type and density of foliage are represented by a single variable.  In addition to describing type and 
density, this rating defines how much the foliage present inhibits the operation of surveillance assets.  Foliage is 
rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most surveillance inhibiting 
Scenarios with a foliage rating of: 
1) take place on a landscape with short grass or none at all, on which only the occasionally patch of thick 
vegetation is present.  This type of foliage does not inhibit surveillance equipment whatsoever 
2) take place on a landscape with tall grass and the occasional tall trees.  This type of foliage may inhibit 
surveillance assets that are operating at ground level but should not inhibit those that are operating several 
meters or more above the grass (the higher the asset is the further it can detect and identify IOIs) 
3) take place on a landscape with short or tall grass that is surrounded by large, dense patches of trees.  This 
type of foliage inhibits surveillance assets in a manner identical to that of rating 2.  However, in addition to 
the inhibiting effects of rating 2, the foliage present on this landscape can greatly inhibit an asset’s ability to 
detect and identify IOIs at long range 
4) takes place on a thickly forested landscape composed of boreal or temperate vegetation.  This type of 
foliage can vary from location to location.  It can greatly inhibit the abilities of a surveillance asset to detect 
and identify IOIs at both short and long ranges.  However, the right assets used in the right locations can 
make the detection and identification of IOI at all ranges possible (e.g., the use of ground cameras to see 
through forests with thick canopies but little to no foliage close to the ground)  
5) take place on a thickly forested landscape composed of subtropical or tropical vegetation.  This type of 
vegetation makes it nearly impossible to detect and identify IOIs unless they either leave the forested 
region or approach uncomfortably close to the surveillance asset  
Note: The foliage ratings above are just a guide.  In most cases the foliage present in a particular scenario will 
not perfectly match one of the descriptions above.  If this is the case, choose the rating from the list above that 
best matches the surveillance restrictions present in the new scenario  
Chapter 2 – Rating of Individual Surveillance Assets 
 
Portability Rating: Indicates how portable an asset is.  This rating is based on the size and weight of an asset.  If an 
asset changes size and/or weight when it is being deployed, the size and weight of that asset in its stowed 
configuration is the data that should be entered.  Finally, this rating takes into account the terrain type of terrain an 
asset can traverse (e.g., self-propelled vs. towed, wheel vs. tracked). The portability of each system is rated on a 
scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most portable 
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1) No portability requirements at all.  Major components can be assembled on site with no respect given to their size 
and weight. 
2) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via cargo ship or larger 
3) Every component of the surveillance asset(s) used must be transportable via heavy transport aircraft or larger 
4) Fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via cargo ship or larger 
5) Fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via heavy transport aircraft or larger   
6) Every component of the surveillance asset is capable of being transported via large, wheeled combat truck (e.g., 
deuce and a half) or larger 
7) Fully assembled surveillance asset capable of being delivered to the battlefield via aircraft (e.g., airdrop or low-
altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) or larger.  This level of portability also applies to manned surveillance 
aircraft and UAVs which are required to take off and land from a permanent airfield   
8) Fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via large, wheeled combat trucks or larger 
9) The fully assembled surveillance asset is capable of being transported via light truck or a small trailer towed by a 
light truck (e.g., HMMWV (aka a humvee or hummer) or commercial pickup) or larger 
10) Every component the surveillance asset is man-portable  
Setup and Teardown Rating: This variable represents the maximum time and manpower required to initially setup 
and then later repackage an asset.  Both the time and manpower to do so are rated on a single scale from 1 to 10 with 
10 requiring the least time and manpower.  The following is a description of that scale: 
1) Impossible to redeploy this asset.  The only way to relocate an asset with a rating of 1 is to scrap the existing asset 
for components that can be used in the new one.  
2) This type of asset requires dozens of personnel months to either setup or redeploy.   Redeployment of this asset 
will require the fabrication of new parts and/or the laying of a new foundation.  Finally, the initial setup and 
redeployment of this asset may require the installation of supporting infrastructure, such as power and 
communications lines 
3) This type of asset has been designed to be redeployable, but to do so requires so much effort that it is often used 
as a permanent installation.  The setup and redeployment of this asset may take a dozen individuals between one 
week and a month to accomplish   
4) The deployment and redeployment of this asset takes less than a week.  This type of surveillance asset has a 
command and control center that requires more time to deploy and redeploy than the sensor network it is linked to 
(approximately a week for the command and control center compared to a few hours for the sensors).  Deployment, 
redeployment, and the addition of sensors is more common than the redeployment of the entire asset 
5) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 24 hours   
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6) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 6 hours.  Satellites with circular or polar orbits 
that, depending on their altitude and type of orbit, can provide surveillance at intervals of between 90 minutes and 6 
hours are also receive a rating of 6141 
7) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than an hour.  Forward deployed or on the scene 
maritime assets, UAVs and manned aircraft are rated at 7; the rational being that the time required for these assets to 
arrive is approximately 1 hour (Depending on the scenario, the time required to arrive on scene could take anywhere 
from a few minutes to several hours.  An approximation of 1 hour was chosen to simplify the rating system)  
8) This type of asset consists of sensors that are networked to a mobile command and control center. The time 
required to deploy and redeploy this asset is dependent on by number of individuals deploying the network, the 
number of sensors deployed, and the distance those sensors are from the command and control center.  The sensors 
used by this asset must be capable of linking to the mobile command and control center within minutes of their 
deployment 
9) This asset is capable of deployment and redeployment in less than 15 minutes by a maximum of one or two 
individuals 
10) This type of asset is capable of being deployed and redeployed by a single person in less than one minute.  The 
sensors used by these assets must be linked immediately following their deployment to an interface possessed by the 
operator(s) (individuals who deployed the sensors) 
Mobility Rating:  The ability of an asset to traverse rough terrain based on the published capabilities of the asset in 
question and its design features (e.g., self-propelled vs. towed, wheel vs. tracked).  This rating is takes into account 
the terrain rating of a particular scenario, rough terrains demand assets with higher mobility ratings.  Mobility is 
rated on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 being the most mobile 
Assets with a mobility rating of: 
1) are capable of traversing slightly uneven terrain with infrequent, small, rolling hills and/or depressions 
2) are capable of traversing uneven terrain with a high frequency of small rolling hills, a high frequency of 
small, rolling hills, and/or a high frequency of shall but steep changes in elevation 
3) are capable of traversing highly uneven terrain with a high frequency of large hills  
4) are capable of traversing mountainous terrain with large, frequent changes in elevation 
5) are airborne and not at all limited by terrain.  These assets include manned aircraft, UAVs, and satellites 
Foliage Rating:  Foliage rating is used to quantify the effect foliage has on the surveillance capabilities of a 
surveillance asset.  As with terrain, the specific type and density of vegetation is not taken into account.  Instead, this 
rating represents the extent to which any foliage inhibits the surveillance capability of an asset relative to other 
assets.  Foliage is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing an asset whose surveillance capabilities are least 
affected by foliage 
Assets with a foliage rating of: 
1) can operate effectively in a landscape with short grass or none at all, on which only the occasionally patch 
of thick vegetation is present 
2) can operate effectively in a landscape with tall grass and the occasional tall trees   
                                                            
141
 “What is the Orbit of a Satellite?” Space Today Online, March 2013.   
 
134 
 
 
 
3) can operate effectively in a landscape with short or tall grass that is surrounded by large, dense patches of 
trees   
4) can operate effectively in a thickly forested landscape composed of boreal or temperate vegetation   
5) can operate in a thickly forested landscape composed of subtropical or tropical vegetation.  This asset may 
have its surveillance capabilities inhibited but not the extent that it is incapable of providing effective 
surveillance   
Note: The foliage ratings above are just a guide.  In most cases the foliage present in a particular scenario will not 
perfectly match one of the descriptions above.  If this is the case, choose the rating from the list above that best 
matches the surveillance restrictions present in the new scenario 
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Appendix ii – Off the Shelf Components Compatible for Use Onboard the PSN 
 
Thermal Cameras 
 
FLIR First Mate II and First Mate II MS - $1,900 - $3,000 
 
These are thermal cameras manufactured by FLIR that are designed for use by mariners.  The 
resolution of the thermal images the First Mate II and First Mate II MS are 240 x 180 and 
320x240 respectively.  Depending on which is purchased, these cameras are capable of detecting 
(and distinguishing between other IOIs detect) humans at between 1100 and 1500ft and small 
vehicles at between three and four thousand feet.  Both units of them are capable of running for 
over 5 hours on 4 AA batteries and can be operated continuously for years without malfunction 
or harming the camera in any way.142  
 
 
 
                             Figure ii.1: Handheld FLIR thermal cameras143 
                                                             
142
 Information pertaining to the continuous operation of these units was acquired via email with FLIR customer 
service, a fact which online research reaffirmed. 
The rest of the information on these two units was acquired from: 
“First Mate II & First Mate II MS Handheld Thermal Night Vision Cameras.” FLIR, April 2013. 
143
 Ibid. 
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PTZ M1-D Micro Thermal Camera - $4,000 - $15,000 
 
Despite the fact that it isn’t a standard, inexpensive, and commercially available thermal camera, 
the M1-D is a product worth considering.  It is a self-contained system that, in a dome only 4.5” 
wide, has a thermal camera, standard daytime digital camera, and rangefinder.  The hardware 
cost between four and six thousand dollars, but does not include a controller.  The cost of 
purchasing the camera and all of the ancillary equipment needed to make it work is between 
approximately twelve and fifteen thousand dollars.  Despite having performed a large amount of 
online research and successfully contacting the manufacturer via email, it is difficult to  
 
 
                                                   Figure ii.2: PTZ M1-D thermal camera144 
 
determine what, if any, additional equipment (that equipment which drives the price beyond the 
cost of the camera itself) would be required to use the M1-D in the construction of a sample PSN 
system.  It is probable that the cost of using the M1-D will be prohibitive even if none of this 
equipment is required; it may be more expensive and difficult to program around an already 
                                                             
144
 “M1-D Micro Thermal FLIR PTZ Camera.” SPI Infrared, April 2013. 
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developed system than it is to construct and program one from scratch.  Moreover, these cameras 
are manufactured by a single company which is based in China.  Using a single, foreign supplier 
may drive the price up and put US operators at unacceptable risk (e.g., the threat of a virus 
embedded in the hardware, yes hardware, of the circuitry inside the camera).  
 
Rangefinders 
 
Unfortunately there wasn’t enough time to catalogue any commercially available laser 
rangefinders.  However, research has confirmed that there are many different makes and models 
of them available on the commercial market.  The majority of these rangefinders, which cost 
between $150 and $500, are used for either hunting or golfing.  All of them are capable of 
ranging IOI the size of a person out to 300m, while some (over half) do so at distances of over 
750m – far beyond the detection distance of all the thermal cameras being considered for use in 
the construction of the PSN. 
 
Flashlights 
 
Barska  
 
1200 Lumen High Power LED Tactical - $130-$150 
 
Only a few flashlights were tested for use with the PSN, the most capable being the Barska High 
Power LED Tactical Flashlight, or BTF (not an official acronym).  The BTF was purchased at a 
retail price of $130, is made from aircraft quality aluminum, has a maximum diameter of 2” and 
a handle diameter of approximately 1”.  The small size of both the lens and handle make this an 
ideal component for inclusion in the construction of a PSN system.  Perhaps the most impressive 
aspect of this flashlight is that it can, on just two AA batteries, operate continuously on its 
brightest setting (1200 lumens) for 45 minutes. 
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Testing revealed that a single flashlight is capable of illuminating an area 10m wide at distances 
approaching 150m.  However, at 150m the light may not be enough to capture a good, high-
quality image of an IOI.  At shorter distances, 90-100m, the flashlight was able to successfully 
illuminate objects to such an extent that (at night when using this flashlight) an individual (using 
only their mk 8 sights) is capable of seeing all the detail they would be able to see during the 
day.  These tests suggest that two flashlights would be able to provide this level of illumination 
at distances between 115-130m, all the while illuminating a much larger area.   The only problem 
with estimating the performance and/or cost of using this flashlight in the construction of a PSN 
system is the unknown cost of modifying it to the specifications required for use on a PSN 
system. 
 
 
                              Figure ii.3: Barska 1200 lumen flashlight145 
                                                            
145
 “1200 Lumen High Power LED Tactical Flashlight.” Barska, April 2013.  
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Appendix iii - Dimension and Mass of Each Sensor and Component 
(using 6061 T6 aluminum for all “plates and tubes”) 
 
Part 1A: 4.25” x 0.25” plate (0.164 kg), two 4.25” x 0.125” plates (0.082 kg each), twelve 3.8” x 1.5” x 
0.125” sheets (0.018 kg each) = 0.462 kg
 
Figure iii.1: Part 1A – Top 
 
Figure iii.2: Part 1A - Bottom
Part 1B: 4.25” x 0.25” plate (0.164 kg), three 4.25” x 0.125” plates (0.082 kg each), eighteen 3.8” x 1.5” 
x 0.125” sheets (0.018 kg each) = 0.652 kg 
 
Figure iii.3: Part 1B – Top  
 
Figure iii.4: Part 1B – Bottom
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Part 2A: 4.5” x 1” plate (0.704 kg) 
 
Figure iii.5: Part 2A Top 
 
 
Figure iii.6: Part 2A Bottom 
Part 2B: 4.5” x 1” plate (0.352 kg) 
 
Figure iii.7: Part 2B Top 
 
Figure iii.8: Part 2B Bottom 
Part 3A: 3” x 8” x 0.25” tube (1.692 kg), 4.5” x 13.5” x 0.125” tube (1.031 kg), 4.5” x ½” plate (0.352 
kg), 0.75” x 14” rod (0.606 kg) = 3.682 kg
 
Figure iii.9: Part 3A – Top 
 
Figure iii.10: Part 3A - Bottom 
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Part 3B: 3.5” x 8” x 0.125” tube (xxx kg), 4.5” x 13.5” x 0.125” tube (1.031 kg), 4.5” x ½” plate (0.352 
kg), 0.75” x 14” rod (0.606 kg), four 1.25” x 0.5” x 8” x 0.125” U-shaped (xxx kg),  four 1” x 0.5” x 8” x 
0.125” (xxx kg), four 0.75” x 0.25” x 0.125” (xxx kg) = xxx kg
Part 4A: 2.5” x 8” x 0.25 tube (0.332 kg), 4.5” x ½” plate (0.352 kg), 4.5” x 7.5”, x 0.125” tube (0.573) = 
1.553 kg
 
Figure iii.11: Part 4A Top 
 
Figure iii.12: Part 4A Bottom
Part 5: two 4” x 0.125” plates (0.070 kg), ¾” x 2” rod (.039 kg) = 0.179 kg 
 
Figure iii.13: Part 5 – Top 
 
Figure iii.14: Part 5 - Bottom
Part 6A: batteries (0.284 kg each for 11,000 mah batteries), three spikes (0.068 kg each), camera and lens 
(0.284 kg), three springs (0.243 kg average each) = 1.59 kg with 3 batteries, 2.442 kg with 6 batteries, and 
3.294 kg with 9 batteries 
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Part 6B: batteries (0.284 kg each for 11,000 mah batteries), three spikes (0.068 kg each), camera and lens 
(1.0 kg), three springs (0.243 kg average each) = 2.306 kg with 3 batteries, 3.154 kg with 6 batteries, and 
4.196 kg with 9 batteries  
Part 7: parachute and cord = 0.680 kg 
Mass Calculations for the Entire Assembly Less Batteries, Camera, Springs  
Mass of the assembly with 9 batteries and 6A = 10.885 kg 
Mass of the assembly with 6 batteries and 6A = 9.843 kg 
Mass of the assembly with 9 batteries and 6B = 11.021 kg    
Mass of the assembly with 6 batteries and 6B = 10.559 kg 
Assembled Sub-Components
 
Figure iii.15: Part 1A with 3 batteries installed 
 
Figure iii.16: Part 5 with camera dome installed 
 
Figure iii.17: Part 2B w/ Spikes 
 
Figure iii.18: Part 2B w/ Spikes Profile 
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Fully Assembled Air Drop/Tactical P-Sensors            
Option 1: 100% waterproof w/ FLIR, 3G, and Wi-Fi 
 
Figure iii.19: Deployed Air Drop Sensor 
 
Figure iii.120: Stowed Air Drop Sensor 
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Fully Assembled Ground Sensors 
Option 1: 100% waterproof w/ FLIR, 3G, and Wi-Fi 
 
Figure iii.21:Option 1 
Stowed 
 
Figure iii.22: Option 1 Deployed 
Option 2: FLIR, 3G, Wi-Fi, solar and telescoping sensor array (9.5ft sensor and 
communications) 
 
 
Figure iii.23: Option 2 deployed (note the size of the arms and panels, which attach 
to the top of the second tier of cylinders, not the first as in other options) 
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Fully Assembled C-Sensors (camera sits approx. 15” above the ground, 12” for center tube, 2” 
support shaft, from camera bottom to lens) 
 
Option 1: IR, Wi-Fi, all-terrain mount, solar 
 
 
 
    Figure iii.24: Option 1 Deployed 
 
Option 2: Optical zoom with flash, all-terrain mount, solar 
 
 
 
     Figure iii.25: Option 2 deployed – front 
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Appendix iv – Equipping Air Dropped Sensors and the Sensor Development Tool  
 
At the end of this appendix there is a printout from an Excel spreadsheet that was created to 
enable the quick testing of various sensor configurations.  This spreadsheet, sometimes referred 
to as the Sensor Development Tool (SDT), can determine the G forces at impact and terminal 
velocity of sensors based on their configuration (what components are installed) and the selected 
parachutes specifications.  The resulting info is compared against the known tolerances of the 
equipment carried by each sensor.  Based on this comparison, adjustments to the design of the 
parachute are made to attain a velocity that is less than or equal to Vdt.146  In addition to assisting 
in the design and selection of a parachute, this spreadsheet was designed to be a highly dynamic, 
time saving tool. 
The spread sheet associated with this appendix uses a variety of constants including: the mass of 
various components, Cd estimates for each type of parachute, and the suspension travel allotted 
by various components.  The ability to alter these values without having to modify the rest of the 
spreadsheet makes it much easier know how a sensor will perform if modification are made.  
Without this spreadsheet any change in the design of the sensor would require recalculating 
many of these values from scratch.   The detail put into the development of this spreadsheet has 
enabled it to serve functions beyond its intended use.  For example, the process of actively 
updating the specification of various components (e.g., cameras, shocks, etc.) was originally very 
tedious, now all of that can be done by changing values in this one spreadsheet.  Nonetheless, the 
primary purpose of this spreadsheet is to assist in the design of parachutes.  The following pages 
                                                            
146
 Vdt is used because there are several different velocities being calculated when deploying an air dropped sensor.  
Further confusing the matter is the fact that some variables, such as terminal velocity and impact velocity, are 
actually representing the exact same value.  However, they need to be given distinct variables since, despite 
representing the same value, they are a function of different variables.  This will become clear later in the 
appendix.  In this case Vdt is used as the variable to represent the terminal velocity of the descending sensor. 
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provide brief introductions to the various physics at work in this spreadsheet, organized by the 
sub-chapter based on the value that sub-chapter sought to derive.   
 
Calculating Average Deceleration Through Impact 
(assuming constant deceleration through impact) 
 
The deceleration through impact is quite possibly the most important value to consider when 
constructing an air dropped sensor.  This value is usually given in terms of ‘G’s’, nomenclature 
which stands for G-forces or gravitational forces.  One gravitational force is equal to 9.81 m/s2, 
the acceleration of imparted on objects by the Earth when those objects are at sea-level.  With 
this in mind, G-forces calculated in this section will be done so using the SI unit of m/ss.  After 
this task has been accomplished, these values will be converted into G-forces in an effort provide 
a more tangible value, one that is more easily comprehended by the average person than m/s2. 
What makes the calculation of the average deceleration so important is that it provides a 
reference point for the design of the sensor itself.  Each component in a sensor is rated to 
withstand a maximum sustained deceleration.  These components are shielded against near 
instantaneous deceleration by devices designed to dampen the impact of going from terminal 
velocity to a complete stop in only a fraction of a second.  These ‘dampeners’ work by extending 
the time it takes for various components of the sensor to come to a complete stop.  
Unfortunately, there is little room to increase the existing dampening of the sensor.  These 
limitations imposed by the compact design of the sensor and the desire use as many components 
from the standard sensor as possible.  As a result, the average deceleration through impact must 
be controlled by altering the sensor’s impact velocity, which in this case is also the sensor’s 
terminal velocity.   
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Terminal velocity is the speed at which the force imparted on an object by gravity is equal to the 
force of drag.  When an object reaches this velocity it will cease to accelerate.    This section uses 
both known and derived values to determine what the terminal velocity must be to ensure that the 
sensor’s various sub-components are not subjected to deceleration that exceeds the specified 
tolerance of each sub- component.    Meanwhile, the design of the sensor itself leaves little room 
for modifications that reduce the  
The first step in calculating the terminal velocity of a sensor based on its average deceleration 
through impact is determining what the stopping distance, Sd, is for each sub-component of the 
sensor itself. The following is taken directly from the spreadsheet: 
Component & Unsprung Length (m) Component Travel (m) LC Low G LC High G  HC Low G 
LC Synthetic Cushion / 0.0064 0.0032 Yes Yes No 
HC Synthetic Cushion / 0.0128 0.0064 No No Yes 
Main Shock Absorber / 0.381 0.1778 Yes Yes Yes 
Stakes / 0.2032 0.1524 Yes Yes Yes 
High G Battery Shocks / 0.0889 0.0445 No Yes No 
LC Shocks / (0.0381) 0.0191 Yes Yes No 
Battery Cushion (0.0128) 0.0064 Yes Yes Yes 
 Total Sensor Travel Sd (m) 0.3525 0.3525 0.3366 
 Total Battery Travel Sd (m) 0.1588 0.2033 0.1588 
 
Table iv.1: Average deceleration per component 
The table above is broken down by component and sensor variant.  In this case, sensors vary 
based on their payload and the magnitude of deceleration (or G’s) that sensor is designed to 
endure.  The three variants are: Light Camera Low G, Light Camera High G, and Heavy Camera 
Low G.  The total Sd of each sensor is located at the bottom of the table.  Using these values, a 
hypothetical value for the velocity of the sensor at impact (Vdi)147 and the time (t) required to 
                                                            
147
 Velocity of the descending sensor at impact.  The formula used is the same formula used to calculate Vdt.  This is 
based on the assumption that the sensor will reach Vdt before impacting the ground.  If it does not this value will 
be different, hence the use of a different variable. 
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decelerate from Vdi  V0 can be calculated.  Based on this calculation the acceleration (ad) 
through impact can be derived using the following formula: 
Sd = ½ ad * t2 – Vdi * t 
Unfortunately, the objective is to determine what Vdi is required for a specific deceleration, not 
the other way around.  Therefore, the equation must be rewritten so that Vdi is a function of t, Sd, 
and ad.  This new equation is: 
Vdi  = (½ ad * t2 - Sd) / t     
At this point the equation above is still a function of t.  This equation must be rewritten as a 
function of ad and Sd since t itself is not a known value.  Fortunately, this is a simple equation to 
derive: 
Vdi = ½ ad * t2  t = ((2 * Sd) / ad)0.5 
By combining the functions for Ad and t we arrive at the final equation for Vdi which is: 
Vdi  = (½ ad * (((2 * Sd) / ad)0.5)2 - Sd) / (((2 * Sd) / ad)0.5)     
Determining the Proper Parachute Design for Air Dropped Sensors 
 
The proper parachute is an essential component of the air dropped sensor.  Too small a parachute 
and the sensor will be damaged on impact.  If too large a parachute is used there are a myriad of 
problems that become obvious.  The first of these deals with the flight of the sensor itself.  A 
parachute that is too large may cause the sensor to strike the earth with insufficient velocity to 
plant (or stake) itself in the ground.  Another problem dealing with the flight of the sensor is 
drift.  The larger the parachute the more likely the parachute is to either sail or oscillate while 
descending.  If the parachute does either then its descent has a lateral component, increasing the 
chance that the sensor will not properly plant itself in the ground.  Finally, a large parachute may 
inhibit the sensors ability to penetrate dense foliage.   
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The second set of concerns that must be addressed when deciding on a parachute deal with the 
technical and operational needs of the system itself.  If too large a parachute is used each sensor 
will be both heavier and more expensive.  Using a heavy sensor means that aircraft will be able 
to carry less of them than they otherwise could.  Moreover, if the sensor descends slowly, on the 
back of a large parachute, it is more likely to be spotted by those whom the sensor is intended to 
monitor.  
A final detail to consider is what type of chute.  Various chutes have their benefits and 
shortcomings.  Beyond that, one can choose certain ‘options’ for a parachute such as how long 
the risers are or how large, if any, of a hole is in the center of the canopy.  Regardless of what 
issues are considered when choosing a parachute, the objective should be to use one that 
provides the most stable and highest velocity flight path that is technically possible (without 
damaging the sensor).   
The spreadsheet at the end of this appendix uses a plethora of variables to determine a sensor’s 
terminal velocity, most of which have to do with the massive variety of parachute options that 
are available.  Deriving the terminal velocity of a sensor based upon its aerodynamic and 
Newtonian qualities may seem at first a little counter-intuitive given what the objective of this 
chapter: to determine a correct parachute for a specific sensor.  However, this is exactly what is 
being calculated and for good reason.  Unlike the previous calculations performed to derive Vdi 
as a function of ad, there are many combinations of variables that can produce the same terminal 
velocity (Vdt) when choosing a parachute (in the case of deceleration, there was only one value 
of Vdi for a given value ad since Sd was known from the start).  With parachutes it is more 
important to select the type of parachute first, usually a decision that is based on the type of 
sensor being deployed, the environment of deployment, and the operational needs of the mission.  
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However, even after deciding on a specific type of parachute there is still more than one 
independent variable left.  Nonetheless, a specific parachute can be calculated based on 
additional criteria such as the desired stability of a falling sensor.  Unfortunately it is difficult to 
determine how changes to the parachute affect these criteria without conducting real life trials 
using full size sensors.   Because of this limitation, those attributes which are difficult to 
predict/calculate will be left out of the discussion, with the exception being that when parachute 
designs are introduced any inherent qualities of those parachutes will also mentioned.   
The next few paragraphs will introduce the various types of parachutes available, design 
variables, and any qualities inherent to them. In addition, the equations used to derive the 
terminal velocity for each parachute will be summarized, beginning with the only equation which 
is inherent to every type of parachute. 
Note: All of the parachutes in this section are going to serve the role of a drogue parachute.  This 
type of parachute typically functions at very high speeds and can typically be found on aircraft, 
spacecraft, and airdropped munitions. 
 
Equations Inherent to All Parachute Types 
 
The following equation is used to determine the terminal velocity of an object given certain 
perimeters: 
 
Vdt = !∗"∗#$%∗&∗'( )
*.,
    
 
This equation depends on the coefficient of drag (Cd), mass (m) in kg, force of gravity (Fg) in 
m/s2, air density (ρ) in kg/m3, and surface area (A) in m3 of the object that is perpendicular to the 
velocity of that object.  Some of these variables have been already been introduced, some have 
not. 
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Cd is a dimensionless variable that expresses the ability of a shape to resist the force of drag 
imparted on it by the fluid, in this case air, through which that shape is moving.  This value is 
independent of the both the shape’s size, mass, and density (i.e., two objects can have the same 
size, shape, and different masses but still possess the same Cd).  All things constant, as Cd 
increases so too does the force of drag acting on the object.   There is however more to 
estimating the Cd of a falling object.  As Vdt can increase or decrease (depending on the 
parachute) as Cd decreases, if only marginally.  This variation is difficult to gauge since the flow 
of air around the object itself can change radically with a change in Vdt.  Because of this, the Cd 
for each component will be estimated using a more simple method for all calculations performed 
using the SDT.   
Every component of a sensor must be accounted for when calculating the Vdt of a falling object.  
In this case that usually means the drag due to the sensor and the parachute.  When deciding on 
the surface area to account for it had to be determined whether to account for the surface area of 
the sensor (Ads) and that of the entire parachute (Ap) or the surface area of the sensor and 
parachute less the area of the parachute directly above the sensor.  The two facts that decided 
whether to account for the drag of the sensor and the parachute above it were the shape of the 
sensor and the distance between the top of the sensor and the bottom of the parachute.  Since 
nearly every air dropped sensor has a rounded top and is suspended a distance of between two to 
three meters below the parachute it is highly probable that the vacuum created behind the path of 
the falling sensor will have dissipated by the time that air contacts the parachute.   Next, the 
equation above must be rewritten so that it can account for drag imparted by both the sensor and 
the parachute, each of which has its own Cd and Ad.   
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From this point on the Cd and Ad for parachutes and sensors will be represented by the following 
variables: 
 
Cdp = Cd of a parachute      Cds = Cd of a sensor      Adpd = Ad of a deployed parachute      Ads = Ad of a 
sensor   
  
Using these variables the equation for Vdt is rewritten to account for the drag imparted on the 
falling sensor by both the sensor itself and the parachute dangling above it.  This new equation 
is: 
Vdt = ! ∗"∗#$%∗&(-∗'(-
∗%∗&(.∗'(-
)
*.,
   where m is the mass of the entire assembly 
 
The final equation shared by nearly all the parachutes examined in the thesis is that which 
governs the base Cdp for each parachute.  This simple equation is only an estimate, but is as 
follows:148 
 
Cdp = Adpd / Adpf 
 
In this equation Adpf is the total surface area of the parachute (i.e., if the parachute were laid out 
flat) while Adpd is the previously stated variable representing the area of the parachute that is 
perpendicular to the motion of the descending sensor.  Bear in mind that this relationship does 
not account for velocity.  If it did, flat parachutes would be superior to all others, which they are 
not.  This is simply a reference point for how parachutes of a similar design behave when their 
geometry is altered.   
In addition to the formula above there are some constants worth mentioning that are used in the 
coming sections and in the SDT.  First, the Cds used for each all calculations of Vdt is Cds = 0.75.  
This is a rough calculation based on the known Cd for long cylinders (0.82), short cylinders 
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 Sher, S. and Young, I. Drag Coefficients for Partially Inflated Flat Circular Parachutes.  NASA, Washington DC, 
September 1971. p. 2 
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(1.15)149 and spheres (0.47).  This estimation takes into account the general shape of the sensor 
(long cylindrical), the narrow center section with partially exposed cylindrical faces on the top 
and bottom (short cylinder), and the dome shaped camera lens (spherical).  The last and final 
constant is actually one which is programmed into the spreadsheet itself.  In order to attain 
realistic values of terminal velocity for each parachute, the Cdp was first determined using the 
equation above, after which Vdt was calculated as normal.  Next, this Vdt was used to calculate a 
second Cdp that takes into account the original velocity.  This new Cdp is then used to calculate a 
final Vdt.  The trick was to modify the second Cdp equation so that the second Cdp mirrors those 
of real parachutes.  Though exhaustive, this process provides an excellent estimation of how Cd 
varies with velocity. 
 
Flat Parachutes 
 
Flat parachutes are the least efficient and capable of all commonly used parachutes.  Their Cdp is 
fairly high at low velocities (below 10 m/s).150  Because of this, the previous equation for 
calculating a parachute’s Cdp works well so long the velocity is low.  However, the Cdp of flat 
parachutes decreases considerably.   Because of this, these parachutes tend to collapse the faster 
they travel.  Making matters worse, when this parachute collapses its diameter decreases and its 
height increases, resulting in lower values for both Cdp and Adpd.     
Unfortunately it is difficult to determine the how much a flat parachute’s Adpd decreases as 
velocity increases.  To simplify the problem, this characteristic was accounted for (in SDT) when 
programing the calculation of this parachutes velocity-corrected Cdp.  As if the flat parachute was 
not lacking in enough qualities already, it is also inherently unstable at high velocity.  The only 
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 Ludtke, W. Effects of Canopy Geometry on Drag Coefficients of a Cross Parachute in the Fully Open and Reefed 
Conditions for a W/L ratio of 0.26.  Naval Ordinance Laboratory, Silver Spring, MD, August 1971. 
150
 Sher, S. and Young, I. Drag Coefficients for Partially Inflated Flat Circular Parachutes.  NASA, Washington DC, 
September 1971. p. 8 
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real advantage to using a flat parachute is that it is inexpensive and performs well at low 
velocity.  Considering the fact that the Vdi of PSN sensors is two to three times velocity at which 
flat parachutes are designed to function, these parachutes are not a viable option for use on PSN 
sensors.  
 
 
 
                                    Figure iv.1: A 36” flat parachute used the U.S. Army to deploy flares 
 
Domed Parachutes 
 
Domed parachutes are some of the most common parachutes in existence.  These parachutes 
perform considerably better at higher velocities than flat ones.  Depending on the specific design 
of the parachute and velocity, Cd can vary between 0.4 and 1.4.  For the sake of this thesis, SDT 
was calibrated according to NATO tests performed at high velocities on a several different 
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domed parachutes151.  These parachutes tested varied considerably based on seeming innocuous 
details such as the type of stitching and fabric used to construct them.  With that in mind, the 
variables used to determine the Vdi for these parachutes has been reduced to Cdp, hole diameter, 
and canopy inflation.    
The only new variable to consider is hole diameter, or dh.  This variable refers to a hole that can 
be cut into the very top of the parachute.  This hole allows some of the air trapped in the canopy 
to escape through it, increasing stability and reducing lateral drift.  This value is usually between 
1/6th and 1/7th the diameter of a deployed parachute (dp).   
 
 
 
Figure iv.2: Dome type drogue parachute with hole in the top152 
 
Cross Parachutes 
 
The modern cross parachute is a relatively recent design compared to those which have been 
discussed so far.  While it is more complicated to construct than a flat parachute it is easier to 
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 Maydew, R.C. and Peterson, C.W. Design and Testing of High-Performance Parachutes. Advisory Group for 
Aerospace Research and Development, Neuilly Sur Seine, France, 1991. p. 15 
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construct than a regular dome parachute and both less expensive and considerably less complex 
than high speed dome parachutes.  It should come as no surprise that cross parachutes are also an 
excellent design for high speed applications, in most cases serving a drogue parachute.  Drogue 
chutes are parachutes that are designed to slow but not necessarily stop a craft.  This means that 
the average cross parachute is designed to function at a higher velocity than most flat and domed 
type parachutes.  Just as important is the fact that these cross parachutes are fairly stable at high 
speeds – they have to be when serving as a drogue parachute that is attached to an aircraft or 
bomb!   
Because cross parachutes are designed to function at high velocity they are the only parachute 
studied in this appendix that has a Cdp that increases, however slightly, as velocity increases.  
There is a slight drop between 0 and 15 m/s but it immediately climbs as velocity increases, well 
beyond 90 m/s.  The average Cdp for this type of parachute is 0.68 at 30 m/s, 0.70 at 60 m/s, and 
0.72 at 90 m/s.153  The SDT has been calibrated using these values as a baseline.  When it comes 
to high velocity parachutes the cross is hard to beat. This is an important fact when considering 
what parachute to equip the PSN airdropped sensors with since these sensors would be released 
from aircraft traveling at velocities that are often in excess of 100 m/s.  The cross parachute’s 
ability to sustain a relatively high Cdp at this velocity means that the initial deceleration will be 
faster than that of dome parachutes, something which is crucial if PSN sensors are deployed at a 
high velocity and low altitude.   
 
The Adp and Adf of the cross parachute are as follows: 
 
Adp = (2 * ( (lp * wp))/(0.5 * π) – (1/3 * wp)       Adf = 2*(lp * wp) – (1/3 * wp) 
                                                            
153
 Ludtke, W. Effects of Canopy Geometry on Drag Coefficients of a Cross Parachute in the Fully Open and 
Reefed Conditions for a W/L ratio of 0.26.  Naval Ordinance Laboratory, Silver Spring, MD, August 1971. 
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In this equation lp is the variable representing the length of a single rectangular section and wp 
the width of that same section.  
 
 
                   Figure iv.3: F-16 using a cross type drogue parachute - Photo courtesy of Aerazur 
 
Inverted Rigid Parachutes 
 
ad = Deceleration, which is measured in m/s2, ft/s2, or G’s.  One G = 9.81 m/s2 or 32.2 ft/s2 
Sd = Stopping Distance, which is measured in m/s or ft/s     Time from impact to zero velocity = t 
tb = time to go from impact to zero velocity for the batteries, spikes, and parts 1 and 3 
tc = time to go from impact to zero velocity for the camera, part 2, and associated electronics 
Sd = ½ Ad*t2 – Vd * t  =  total distance internal components have to decelerate from Vd to 0 
Sd will vary based on the component and how far the sensor sticks into the ground (max of 0.667 ft)   
For the purpose of this derivation Sd for the batteries and impact spikes (and all of parts 1 and 3) 
will be estimated at Sb = 8” (0.203 m) and Sc1 = 16” (0.406 m) with 8” (0.406 m) of spring 
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compression, SC2 = 24” (0.610 m) for a device with 16” (0.406 m) of spring compression, and Sc3 
= 18” = 0.457 m and 10”          (0.254 m) of spring compression. 
Determining What Spring to Use for Each Section  
Stopping distance = x = 3” for under camera, 7” for center tube, and 8” for spikes = 1.416 ft = 0.508 m 
Stopping distance for the batteries is 8” for the spikes and 2” for the battery springs = 0.833 ft = 0.254 m 
Total mass of the assembly with 3 batteries = 9.453kg 
Total mass of the assembly with 6 batteries = 10.301 kg 
So, the first spring constant is that for the entire bottom assembly which will be stopping in 
0.203 m (spikes).  However, after this section has stopped the rest of the sensor will still be in 
motion.  The batteries will have a travel of 0.051” additional travel.  The spring used in the 
batteries should prolong the impact as much as possible but also ensure that the batteries are 
stopped when the spring is fully compressed. If they are not, the batteries will experience rapid 
deceleration and extremely high G forces as the remaining velocity is absorbed near 
instantaneously.   
The second step is to ensure that shock absorber and spring in the mid-section have the proper 
spring constant.  If they do, they will extend the time through impact as long as possible but also 
ensure that the upper section (minus camera assembly) to a complete stop when the spring is 
nearing full compression. In this section, the force imparted by the camera and its assembly are 
ignored to simply the problem.  The mass of the camera, though not negligible, can be accounted 
for by using a slightly stiffer center spring.   
The final component is to determine what the proper spring constant is for the spring below the 
camera.  Once again, the objective is to extend the stopping time as long as possible.  However, 
in this case, the time that the spring should extend time beyond is the time it takes the center 
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spring to fully compress.  As in the previous cases, the camera should come to a complete stop 
when the spring in the upper section has reached its maximum compression.   
m = meters for the equations below 
F = Force = N        p = momentum = kg * (m/s) = N*s      x = spring compression/stopping distance = m     
Ek = Kinetic Energy = (kg * m2)/s2 = J           Ep = Potential Energy = J       k = spring constant = N/m                
w = work = J 
 
m = mass for the equations below = 9.453 kg  vdi = velocity at impact = 14.691  m/s  x = 16” = 0.406 m 
Ek = ½ m * (vdi)2  and     Ep = Ek = ½ k * x2    k = (2*Ek) / x2     
Ek = ½*9.453 * 14.6912 = 1020.099 J     Ep = 1020.099         w = F * x = 1020.099                      
F = w / x = 1020.099 / .403 = 2512.559 N through impact F = k*x    k = F / x = 6188.569 N/m 
m = mass  for the equations below = 9.453  vdi = velocity at impact = 22.007  m/s  x = 16” = 0.406 m 
Ek = ½ m * (vdi)2  and     Ep = Ek = ½ k * x2    k = (2*Ek) / x2 
Ek = ½*9.453 * 22.0072 =  2289.082 J     Ep = 2289.082     w = F * x = 2289.082                      
F = w / x = 2289.082 / .403 = 5680.104 N through impact F = k*x    k = F / x = 13990.404 N/m 
Note: Additional calculations required to determine the correct springs and dampeners for use in the final design.  
The work provided in this section is more than enough of a starting point from which that work can be performed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
 
 
References 
Criteria: Based on legislation, policy, and audits/reviews  
“2011 Air and Marine Milestones.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection: Office of Air and Maritime, December 2011.  Accessed February 26, 2013 
from: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/am/operations/2011_achiev.xml 
A Line In The Sand: Countering Crime, Violence And Terror At The Southwest Border. U.S. 
Congress: House Committee on Homeland Security, November 2012. 
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed 
before Proceeding. U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2011.  
 
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security 
Status and Resource Needs. US Government Accountability Office, December 2012.   
“Border Patrol Overview.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border 
Protection: Border Patrol, January 2011.  Accessed February 22, 2013 from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/overview.xml 
Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern 
Borders. U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2011. 
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine 
Assets. U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2012. 
“CBP Intercepts Cocaine Smugglers in Open Water” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Customs and Border Protection, January 2013.  Accessed March 12, 2013 from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/local/2013_nr/jan13/01302013_3.xml 
 “Critical Infrastructure Protection.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2013.  
Accessed February 26, 2013 from: http://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-protection 
“December 17th 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7.” White House, 
December 2003.  Accessed February 26, 2013 from:              
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html 
“DHS Napolitano’ Touts Border Security.” CBS News, February 2013.  Accessed February 23, 
2013 from: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57567822/dhs-napolitano-touts-border-
safety/ 
Fact Sheet: CBP Northern Border Division. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs 
and Border Protection, May 2012. 
163 
 
 
 
Fact Sheet: Office of Air and Marine. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection: Office of Air and Marine, January 2011. 
“FLIR Ranger III MS.” ThermalVideo.com 
Homeland Security: DHS is Addressing at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority is 
Needed. U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2006. 
“Iran Shows Film of Captured US Drone.” BBC World News, December 8, 2011.  Accessed 
April 23, 2013 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16098562 
Lewis, Ted G. Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation. John Wiley and Sons Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey, 2006.   
“MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense 
Systems” U.S. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, July 27, 2011.  Accessed March 12, 2013 
from: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/169139.htm 
Mobile Surveillance Capability. Telephonics Corporation, 2012. 
National Drug Threat Assessment for 2011. U.S. Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement 
Agency, August 2011.  
“Our Mission.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2013.  Accessed February 22, 
2013 from: http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission 
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2011. U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security: Customs and Border Protection, March 2012. 
Progress Made and Work Remaining after Nearly 10 Years in Operation. U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, February 2013. 
“Protecting Our Borders: This is CBP.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and 
Border Protection, September 2012.  Accessed February 22, 2013 from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml 
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective 
Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
December 2005. 
Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Cost. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
March 9, 2009 
Snapshot: A Summary of CBP Facts and Figures for 2012. U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security: Customs and Border Protection, January 2013. 
164 
 
 
 
“Tactical airfield landing” Wyoming Air National Guard: 153rd Airlift Wing, Cheyenne, WY, 
March 2013.  Accessed March 31, 2013 from: 
http://www.153aw.ang.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?page=6 
“Who We Are and What We Do.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border 
Protection: Border Patrol, September 2008.  Accessed February 18, 2013 from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/recruiting_hiring/who_we_are.xml 
Zuckerman, Jessica. “The 2013 Homeland Security Budget: Misplaced Priorities.” The Heritage 
Foundation, March 23, 2012.  Accessed January 3, 2013 from: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/the-2013-homeland-security-budget-
misplaced-priorities 
Existing and Proposed Systems: Used for comparison to the PSN, as a source of criteria, and as a 
source of the features expected to be included in the design of the PSN 
“1200 Lumen High Power LED Tactical Flashlight.” Barska, April 2013.  Accessed April 24, 
2013 from: http://www.barska.com/Flashlights-
1200_LUM_Flashlight_with_Rechargeable_Batteries.html 
Cam-V Mobile Security System Spec-Sheet. Cameras Onsite, 2013. 
“Customs Blackhawk from Tucson Air Branch at Dover A.F.B. to provide air security.” Customs 
and Border Protection, April 2013.  Accessed April 23, 2013 from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/ImageCache/cgov/content/newsroom/photogallery/9_5f11_5fwtc/highresim
age/wtc_5f14_2ejpg/v1/wtc_5f14.jpg 
Davis, Katrina. “Police to buy mobile observation tower.” U-T San Diego, March 2, 2009.  
Accessed February 28, 2013 online from: 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2009/jan/08/1cz8tower205326-police-buy-mobile-observation-
towe/ 
Fact Sheet: CBP Northern Border Division. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs 
and Border Protection, May 2012. 
“Factsheet: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” U.S. Air Force, November 5, 2008.  Accessed 
April 23, 2013 from: http://www.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=2352 
“Factsheet: MQ-9 Reaper.” U.S. Air Force, January 5, 2012.  Accessed April 23, 2013 from: 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405 
Fact Sheet: SBInet Block 1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border 
Protection, March 2009. 
165 
 
 
 
Fact Sheet: SBInet Field Test Lab. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border 
Protection, March 2009. 
Fact Sheet: SBInet Project 28. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border 
Protection, March 2009. 
“FEMA: Port Security Grant Program.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, June 2012. Accessed February 28, 2013 from: 
http://www.fema.gov/port-security-grant-program 
“First Mate II & First Mate II MS Handheld Thermal Night Vision Cameras.” FLIR, April 2013.  
Accessed April 24, 2013 from: 
http://www.flir.com/cvs/americas/en/maritime/view/?id=51292&collectionid=785&col=51293 
“FLIR Systems Announces Agreement to Acquire ICx Technologies.” FLIR Investor Relations, 
August 16, 2010. Accessed April 2, 2013 from: 
http://investors.flir.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=499403 
“Gatekeeper – Automatic and Under Vehicle Inspection Systems.” Army-Technology.com, 
2012. Accessed March 5, 2013 from: http://www.army-
technology.com/contractors/surveillance/gatekeeper 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE AUTHORIZED 
FEDERAL SUPPLY SCHEDULE PRICE LIST, CONTRACT NUMBER:GS-07F-0117U, U.S. 
General Services Administration, 2005. 
Gunter, Ford. “Local Firms Mobile Surveillance System Could be Border Solution.  Houston 
Business Journal, 2012.  Accessed March 3, 2013 from: 
http://www.camerasonsite.com/news/ASAPSecurity_border_news.pdf 
“Greenville Operations.” Lockheed Martin, April 2013.  Accessed April 21, 2013 from: 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/aeronautics/mmro/greenville-operations.html 
 
“Ground Surveillance Systems IFT.” Telephonics, March 2013.  Accessed March 23, 2013 from: 
http://www.telephonics.com/cis_groundsurvsys.asp 
Hock, Jessica. “FLIR Purchases ICx Technologies for $274 million.” Oregon Business, August 
16, 2010.  Accessed February 28, 2013 from: http://www.oregonbusiness.com/the-latest/3964-
flir-systems-icx-technologies-goverment-division 
“ICx Technologies Inc.” Security Technology News, April 2013.  Accessed April 20, 2013 from: 
http://www.security-technologynews.com/suppliers/icx-technologies-inc.html 
“Integrated Fixed Towers.” Federal Business Opportunities Office, January 2011.  Accessed 
March 24, 2013 from: 
166 
 
 
 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ddaa2027c96f3944a325426c6877b
35a&tab=core&_cview=1 
IT Program Assessment: CBP Video Surveillance System Program. U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security: Office of the Chief Information Officer, March 2012. 
IT Program Assessment: Customs and Border Protection Mobile Surveillance System. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security: Office of the Chief Information Officer, March 2012. 
Miller, Greg. “CIA flew stealth drones into Pakistan to monitor bin Laden house.” The 
Washington Post, May 17, 2011. Accessed March 12, 2013 from: 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-17/world/35233221_1_stealth-drone-bin-laden-
house-new-stealth 
“Napolitano Cancels Virtual Border Fence Project, Proposes Alternative.” Fox News, January 
14, 2011.  Accessed January 3, 2013 from: 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/14/napolitano-cancels-virtual-border-fence-project-
proposes-alternative/ 
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2011. U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security: Customs and Border Protection, March 2012. 
Ranger MS Illuminator, FLIR Systems, 2013. 
Ranger MS-UC EnforcIR Brochure, FLIR Systems, 2013.  
 SBInet Program: Program-Specific Recovery Act Plan. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Customs and Border Protection, May 15, 2009   
SkyWatch data sheet and brochure.  FLIR, February 2013. 
“M1-D Micro Thermal FLIR PTZ Camera.” SPI Infrared, April 2013.  Accessed April 24, 2013 
from: http://www.x20.org/m1-d-micro-thermal-ptz-camera 
“Telephonics: Ground Surveillance Radar and Long Range Systems.” Armed Forces 
International, 2012. Accessed March 3, 2012 from: http://www.armedforces-
int.com/suppliers/air-traffic-control-systems.html 
 
White Paper: The Secure Border Solution. ICx Technologies, February 2013. 
Z. Sun, P. Wang, M. Vuran, M. Al-Rodhaan, and A. Dhelaan. BorderSense: Border Patrol 
through advanced wireless sensor networks. Ad-Hoc Networks, 2011, Vol. 9 pp. 468-477 
Academic Research and/or Unapplied Technology: For use as a source of the features expected 
to be included in the design of the PSN 
167 
 
 
 
M. Argany, M. Mostafavi, F. Karimipour, and C. Gagne. A GIS Based Wireless Sensor Network 
Coverage Estimation and Optimization: A Voronoi Approach. Center for Research in Geomatics, 
Laval University, 2011.   
R. Kumar, J. Shin, L. Iftode, and U. Ramachandran. Mobile Virtual Sensors: A Scalable 
Programming and Execution Framework for Smart Surveillance (Position Paper). Georgia 
Institute of Technology and Rutgers University, 2008 
“Research at ARRI: Mobile Sensor Networks.” University of Texas at Arlington: Automation 
and Robotics Research Institute, 2006.  Accessed January 4, 2013 from: 
http://arri.uta.edu/smart_micromachines/distributed_devices/mobile_sensor_networks.html 
Tertiary References: References used in this report that are not surveillance specific  
“Department of Defense Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2012.” Office of Management and Budget, 
2012. Accessed March 12, 2013 from: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_defense 
“Department of Homeland Security Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2012.” Office of Management 
and Budget, 2012. Accessed March 12, 2013 from: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_homeland 
Farley, R. (2011). Obama Says Border Patrol Has Doubled the Number of Agents Since 2004. 
Politifactcheck.com, May 2011.  Accessed on November 26, 2011 from:  
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/may/10/barack-obama/obama-says-
border-patrol-has-doubled-number-agents/ 
Glossary I: Military Abbreviations and Acronyms. Global Security.org, March, 2013.  Accessed 
March 31, 2013 from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/55-
9/gloss.htm  
“How Night Vision Works.” Sofradir EC Night Vision Systems, 2013.  Accessed April 1, 2013 
from: http://www.hownightvisionworks.com/#IRI 
 “Littoral Combat Ships – Mission Modules.” U.S. Department of the Navy, 2012.  Accessed 
January 5, 2013 from: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=406&ct=2 
“Littoral Combat Ships, United States of America.” Naval-Technology.com, April 2013. 
Accessed April 20,  2013 from: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/littoral/littoral1.html 
“Lockheed C-130 Hercules.” The Aviation Zone, March 2013. Accessed March 15, 2013 from: 
http://www.theaviationzone.com/factsheets/c130.asp 
168 
 
 
 
Ludtke, W. Effects of Canopy Geometry on Drag Coefficients of a Cross Parachute in the Fully 
Open and Reefed Conditions for a W/L ratio of 0.26.  Naval Ordinance Laboratory, Silver 
Spring, MD, August 1971. 
Maydew, R.C. and Peterson, C.W. Design and Testing of High-Performance Parachutes. 
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, Neuilly Sur Seine, France, 1991. 
Molzahn, Rios, and David A. Shirk. Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011. 
University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute: Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies. 
National Drug Threat Assessment for 2011. U.S. Department of Justice: National Drug 
Intelligence Center, August 2011. 
Njock-Libbi, Josue. “USING HYPERGEOMETRIC FUNCTIONS TO DETERMINE THE 
TERMINAL SPEEDS OF PARACHUTES”. American Society for Engineering Education, 
2006-58.   
“Planned stealth destroyer could underpin Navys China strategy.” Fox News, June 4, 2012.  
Accessed March 4, 2013 from: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/04/planned-stealth-
destroyer-could-underpin-us-navy-china-strategy/ 
“Special Operations.” Military.com, March 2013.  Accessed March 10, 2013 from: 
http://www.military.com/special-operations 
Sher, S. and Young, I. Drag Coefficients for Partially Inflated Flat Circular Parachutes.  NASA, 
Washington DC, September 1971. 
Washington, Douglas Waller. “The CIA’s Secret Army.” Time Magazine, February, 2003. 
Accessed March 10, 2013 from: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145,00.html 
 
“What is the Orbit of a Satellite?” Space Today Online, March 2013.  Accessed March 15, 2013 
from: http://www.spacetoday.org/Satellites/SatBytes/SatOrbits.html 
 
“What’s The Difference between Thermal Imaging and Night Vision?” FLIR Systems, Inc., 
2013.  Accessed April 1, 2013 from: http://www.flir.com/cvs/americas/en/view/?id=30052 
 
 
 
 
